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EDITORIAL 
 
 
 
Dear readers! 
 
 
This issue of the journal Corporate Ownership and Control delivers to the reading audience the most 
important issues of corporate governance, such as corporate governance and firm valuation, stock 
options, internal audit, corporate ownership and performance, managerial ownership and firm 
valuation, family ownership and performance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate law and regulation. 
 
As a part of good tradition we have focused on a wide international representation of contributions. We 
have contributions made by authors from many countries of the world both developed and developing. 
These are papers by authors from Japan, the USA, Spain, Australia, Taiwan, Qatar, Brazil, Denmark.  
 
In this issue we were fortunate in composing a section devoted to corporate governance in a particular 
region with application to Japan. This is the first time for our journal to publish the special section on 
corporate governance in Japan. This is a result of efforts undertaken by us to get and develop very good 
and future-oriented relationships with corporate governance experts from Japan. I think you will enjoy 
reading the papers on corporate governance in Japan.  
 
In this issue of the journal we came back to the traditional issue of corporate governance – ownership 
structure as a special section. Major attention is paid to the link between ownership structure and 
performance. Our contributors were fortunate in generating new ideas and made new findings in this 
way. 
 
Our strategic purpose is to develop the new concepts and practices how to overcome the financial crisis 
with the corporate governance toolkit including mechanisms, instruments and participants. Your 
contributions on this issue would be very valuable for us. 
 
We are open for your suggestions in the new fields the books could be written and hope for the new 
contributions to the journal! 
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РАЗДЕЛ 1 
 НАУЧНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ 
                               И КОНЦЕПЦИИ 
SECTION 1 
ACADEMIC  
INVESTIGATIONS  
& CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING:  
BONDHOLDER TAKEOVER DEFENSES IN POISON PUTS 
 
Ai-Fen Cheng*, Tao-Hsien Dolly King** 
 
Abstract 
 
Bondholder governance through the use of bond covenants and the interactions between shareholder 
and bondholder governance mechanisms has been recently highlighted in the corporate governance 
literature. In this paper, we study bondholder governance mechanisms through takeover-related bond 
covenants (i.e., poison puts), confirm with agency theory on the characteristics of firms that are more 
likely to use these covenants, and emphasize the importance of bondholder governance in the overall 
structure of corporate governance. We find that poison puts are often bundled with asset sale, payout, 
and financing restrictions, which is consistent with agency theory. We also find that high growth firms, 
large, profitable, low-leverage firms are more likely to use poison puts. In addition, our results on free 
cash flow, insider and institutional ownership provide support for agency explanation. Lastly, we find 
that poor bond market performance and good equity market performance are likely to motivate the 
incidence of poison put bond issuance. Volatility of interest rate and volatility of bond index returns 
motivate more issues of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term and default premiums promote 
the use of poison puts. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Bondholder Takeover Defense, Poison Put 
 
*Department of Quantitative Finance, National Tsing Hua University, 101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road 
Hsinchu, Taiwan 30013 
Email: g946427@oz.nthu.edu.tw 
**Department of Finance, The Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City 
Boulevard, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001 
Phone: 704-687-7652, Fax: 704-687-6987 
Email: tking3@uncc.edu 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
For the past several decades, corporate governance has 
been a field that attracts many academic researchers, 
practitioners, and policymakers.  In the survey paper 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance 
is broadly defined as the structure through which 
capital suppliers make certain to obtain a fair return on 
their investment.  From this perspective, corporate 
governance consists of mechanisms and structure 
through which investors can align the incentives of 
managers with their own goals.  Current literature 
suggests the following categories of governance 
controls: (1) corporate governance mechanisms 
include external bonding and monitoring by regulatory 
and enforcement environment at the country/market 
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level (Albuquerue and Wang (2008)) and internal 
controls such as independent directors on the board, 
corporate charters and by-laws, and bank monitors 
(Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005)); and (2) 
financial contracting such as debt in capital structure, 
executive compensation, and incentive contracts. On 
the theoretical front, Albuquerue and Wang (2008) and 
Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005) present 
theoretical models on how imperfect corporate control 
and agency conflicts affect asset pricing. On the other 
hand, there has been an extensive strand of literature 
on various governance controls on equity and bond 
prices. For example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) create a governance index of anti-takeover 
defenses and other provisions and find that firms with 
a stronger shareholder protection (a lower governance 
index) have higher equity and firm values.   
In a recent paper, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) 
highlight the importance of bondholder governance 
through the use of bond covenants and present the 
interactions between shareholder and bondholder 
governance mechanisms. More specifically, they focus 
on three bond covenants that are closely related to 
takeover defenses: net worth restrictions, leverage 
restrictions, and poison puts. Their study is among the 
first to show that bondholder governance is an 
important element in corporate governance. Cremers, 
Nair, and Wei (2007) suggest that bondholder 
governance helps mitigates potential conflicts between 
shareholders and bondholders and interactions 
between shareholder and bondholder governance 
affect bond prices. Thus, the net impact of the overall 
governance structure (rather than a single element) 
consisting of shareholder and bondholder governance 
on management decisions and asset prices is an 
important issue (King and Wen (2009)).  In this paper, 
we study bondholder governance mechanisms through 
the takeover-related bond covenants and the 
characteristics of firms that are more likely to include 
these covenants in their bonds. In particular we focus 
on poison puts and the triggers associated with the 
puts, which are the covenants that are closely related 
to takeover defenses. Our goal is to explore 
bondholder governance through the use of 
takeover-related defenses and to highlight the 
importance of bondholder governance in the overall 
structure of corporate governance.   
Poison puts were introduced as a result of the 
waves of corporate restructuring in the mid 1980s.  
Poison put is designed to guard the bondholders 
against takeovers, buyouts, and other events. Poison 
put gives bondholders a right to redeem a bond, 
usually at par value, when the takeover provision is 
triggered. Triggers are clearly defined in the covenant 
and often include leverage and net worth triggers. In 
this study, we empirically examine poison puts and 
their embedded triggers in U.S. corporate bonds. In 
particular, we explore the following issues. First, 
Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) show that there exists 
evidence of correlation among covenants. We examine 
if bonds with poison puts are more likely to be 
bundled with certain types of covenants for 
governance purposes. Due the option to exit, fewer 
other covenants may be needed on a bond with a 
poison put so as to design an efficient and effective 
bondholder governance structure. Studies on 
convertible bonds indicate that there are fewer 
covenants in convertibles than in straight debt since 
conversion option makes the convertible bond a 
hybrid investment consisting of a debt and an equity 
component. Due to the equity component, fewer 
covenants are required to address the agency conflicts 
between bondholders and equityholders. Kahan and 
Yermack (1998) find that convertible debt issues have 
virtually no covenants, suggesting that for high growth 
firms the conversion feature is a more effective 
contracting mechanism than restrictive covenants in 
addressing stockholder–bondholder conflicts.  
Anderson (1999) finds consistent evidence for 
Brazilian debt. Therefore, design of bondholder 
governance is an important issue to examine. We find 
that poison puts are often bundled with asset sale, 
payout, and financing restrictions, which is consistent 
with agency theory.  Firms with greater free cash 
flows (Jensen (1986)) are more likely to over-invest in 
negative NPV projects and therefore have higher 
agency costs.  In addition, firms with a higher credit 
risk are more likely to have higher agency costs. 
Therefore, to design an effective debt contract, 
controls for agency conflicts should be strengthened 
for firms with high agency costs that stem from 
over-investment, credit risk, and takeover possibilities.  
Second, we examine the characteristics of firms 
that are more likely to issue bonds with poison puts.  
Based on a comprehensive sample, we perform a 
cross-sectional analysis of firm characteristics that 
lead to the use of poison puts in bondholder 
governance. We find that high growth firms, large, 
profitable, low-leverage firms are more likely to use 
poison puts.  In addition, firms with a higher 
percentage of fixed assets have a greater probability to 
issue poison put bonds. Free cash flow has a positive 
impact on the inclusion of poison puts, which is 
consistent with the agency prediction. Our findings on 
insider and institutional ownership provide support for 
agency explanation. 
Third, we examine time series factors that affect 
the use of poison puts. We find that bond market and 
equity market performance has a significant impact on 
the inclusion of poison puts. In particular, poor bond 
market performance and good equity market 
performance are likely to motivate the incidence of 
poison put bond issuance. The better the performance 
of bond market is, the less motivated the investors 
demand poison put to protect them. On the other hand, 
the better the equity market performance, the more 
motivated the investors to demand for poison puts. We 
also find that the volatility of interest rate and 
volatility of bond index returns motivate more issues 
of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term and 
default premiums promote the use of poison puts. 
Several recent studies link bondholder takeover 
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defenses, e.g., poison puts, to corporate governance.  
For example, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) examine 
the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on 
bondholders. They find that bondholder takeover 
defenses reduce the credit risk associated with strong 
shareholder governance. They suggest that, without 
bond covenants, shareholder governance and 
bondholder interests diverge. Hartley and Kendall 
(2005) indicate that bondholder demands for poison 
puts have increased after buyout deals showing losses 
on covenant-free bonds. This trend has recently 
extended to the sterling and euro corporate bond 
markets. King and Wen (2009) examine how the 
overall corporate governance structure consisting of 
shareholder governance (measured by anti-takeover 
provisions) and bondholder governance (measured by 
bond covenants) affect management risk-taking 
behavior. 
Earlier studies on poison puts focus on the 
pricing of these covenants by examining the yield 
differentials between bonds with and without poison 
puts (Crabbe (1991), Field, Kidwell, and Klein (1994), 
and Torabzadeh, Roufagalas, and Woodruff (2000)).  
Another strand of studies focus on the effects of 
poison puts on shareholder and/or bondholder wealth.  
Cook and Easterwood (1994) show that issuance of 
poison put bonds affects existing stockholders 
negatively and bondholders positively, whereas the 
issuance of bonds without such covenants has no 
effects. Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1994) on the other 
hand show that the announcement effects on 
shareholders are significantly higher for poison put 
debt issuance than for straight debt issuance. They 
suggest that firms with greater agency costs of debt 
and smaller size would benefit most from poison put 
debt issuance and therefore experience higher 
abnormal returns at issuance.
1
 Roth and McDonald 
(1999) find that poison puts have a negative impact on 
shareholder wealth when management ownership is 
low, and that firms with higher free cash flow are 
more likely to issue debt containing poison puts. 
This study makes the following significant 
contributions to the literature. First, we explore an 
important, but less-studied, internal controls in 
corporate governance, namely, takeover-related debt 
covenants. We examine the design of covenants by 
showing that poison puts are often bundled with 
payout and financing restrictions. Second, we show 
the unique set of firm characteristics that motivates the 
probability of including a poison put. We use a large 
sample over a long time period and find very 
interesting implications, which are mostly consistent 
                                                   
1 Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1997) examine the relationship 
between firm characteristics and the likelihood of event risk 
covenants in bond indentures. They suggest that the 
likelihood of event risk covenants in bond indentures is 
related to the agency costs of debt and the potential for 
takeover. However, their results do not support the financial 
distress costs hypothesis. 
 
with the agency theory. Third, we show how 
macroeconomic factors play a role in determining the 
decision for an issuer to include a poison put in the 
covenant structure. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  
Section II describes the data sample. Section III 
presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Data 
 
In this study, we obtain the sample of bonds from the 
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). FISD is the 
most comprehensive and publicly available collection 
of bond data on publicly offered U.S. Treasury, agency, 
and corporate bonds. FISD reports detailed 
information on debt issue characteristics, documents 
over 50 different types of covenants, and includes 
134,755 public issues from 1894 to 2003. Of the 
134,755 issues, 5,113 bonds issues have poison puts.  
We collect information on the issue and issuer, 
including coupon, maturity, credit rating, put schedule, 
industry codes, covenant information, and other 
characteristics. In addition, we construct an overall 
sample of corporate debt representing the population 
of the corporate debt issues. To provide a complete 
analysis on bonds with poison puts, we present the 
poison put sample from the following aspects: bond 
basic features, options and seniority, industry groups, 
and frequency of issues. Table 1 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the sample of 5,113 poison 
put bonds issued from 1980 to 2003. In particular, we 
present the descriptive statistics of the offering amount, 
coupon, and original maturity on the bonds.  Table 1 
shows that the median offering amount is $160.00 
million and median coupon rate is 9.63%. In general, 
the debt issues are of intermediate maturity with an 
average maturity of 10.00 years. Table 2 shows the 
poison put by convertibility, seniority, industry, and 
decade respectively. Panel A shows that the vast 
majority (81.03%) of poison put bonds are 
nonconvertible. In addition, poison put debt is evenly 
distributed between senior (45.77%) and senior 
secured (44.26%) levels, indicating that most poison 
put bonds have the highest seniority level. This 
finding provides evidence for the considerations in the 
design of debt contracts and bondholder governance.   
Panel B of Table 2 presents poison put bonds by 
industry.  The results show that 89.15% of the poison 
put bonds are issued by industrial firms, the most 
dominant industry group in the sample.  Poison puts 
are much less popular in the financial (7.35%) and 
utility (3.03%) sectors. The reason may be that agency 
conflicts is higher for industries that are not subject to 
extensive regulations (industrial group) than for 
industries that are (utility and finance).  
Consequently, the need for bondholders of industrial 
firms to include poison puts in bondholder governance 
to guard against such risks is great. Panel C of Table 2 
presents the sample by decade. The panel shows that 
poison put is a much recent invention with the issues 
starting in 1985. As discussed earlier, the creation of 
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poison puts is motivated by the RJR Nabisco buyout 
event and other buyouts in the merger wave at the end 
of the 1980s.  It is interesting to see that a significant 
portion (70.35%) of the poison put bonds is issued in 
the 1990s.  There also has been a quite active market 
(24.83%) for poison debt issues in the early 2000s. 
Based on all corporate debt issues from FISD 
over the period from 1980 to 2003, we collect firm 
characteristics on these corporate issuers from 
Compustat. The resulting sample for our 
cross-sectional analysis of firm characteristics 
contains 12,486 valid firm-year observations.
2
  If an 
issuer issues more than one bonds in a given year, we 
summarize across the issues the decision to include a 
poison put.  If the issuer offers at least one poison put 
bond in a given year, we classify this issuer in that 
year as issuing poison debt. For the time series 
analysis, we use 60,694 bond-year observations, i.e., 
each observation is on a bond-year basis rather than a 
firm-year basis.  We collect information on interest 
rates from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis 
FRED database. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
A. Bondholder Governance Structure: 
Poison Put and Other Covenants 
 
Based on the agency theory of debt, there are potential 
conflicts of interests between bondholders and 
stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers 
(1977) provide the pioneering work in this area. In 
particular, there are four major sources of conflicts: 
dividend payment, claim dilution, asset substitution, 
and underinvestment. If the firm consistently pays an 
unreasonably large dividend to stockholders, it might 
dampen the firm‘s ability to meet its debt payments 
and consequently negatively affect the bondholders‘ 
wealth.  If the firm issues additional debt, it would 
dilute the claim of the current bondholders.  If the 
management takes on projects of extremely high risk 
after debt issuance, the value of the bonds decreases. 
As the inherent risk of the assets increases, the coupon 
rate on the debt set prior to the risk-taking behavior is 
insufficient to compensate for the risk. In the case of 
underinvestment, if accepting certain projects benefits 
the bondholders, management may be motivated to 
pass up positive net present value projects.  
Based on the conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and bondholders, and if we assume that 
management acts in stockholders‘ interests, 
bondholders would require protection against potential 
events or actions by the management/shareholders.  
Bond covenants in debt contracts are a way to control 
these conflicts and reduce agency costs. A bond 
covenant is a clause which restricts an issuer from 
performing certain actions. Billett, King, and Mauer 
                                                   
2 We exclude 296 firm-year observations for issue in the 
1970s from the sample used in earlier versions of this study. 
The sample of 12,486 firm-year observations is an updated 
sample used in this version. 
(2007) show there exists certain amount of correlation 
among various covenants. In addition, Cremers, Nair, 
and Wei (2007) suggest that the effects of shareholder 
governance mechanisms on bond prices are related to 
bondholder takeover defenses such as poison puts.  
Thus, one can view bond covenants as an important 
internal control. It is interesting to examine if the 
poison put covenant is related to other covenants, from 
a control design point of view. Covenant bundling 
may exist due to firm characteristics for the purpose of 
reducing agency costs. In other words, an effective 
design of internal controls (i.e., takeover defenses and 
other covenants) should include takeover defenses and 
other covenants that are mostly related to agency 
conflicts. We explore the relation between poison puts 
(takeover defenses) and other covenants and provide 
explanations from agency theory. 
To examine the pattern of covenant bundling, we 
perform two analyses. First, we examine the frequency 
and percentage of various covenants in the poison put 
bond sample. Table 3 presents the results. In particular, 
we examine a total of 12 covenants to see if the 
inclusion of the covenants relates to poison puts.  
Negative pledge is a covenant that limits the issuer to 
issue secured debt unless it secures the current issue 
on a pari passu basis. Cross default is designed to 
activate default in the issue if an event of default has 
occurred in any other debt by the same issuer. 
Dividends restriction limits payments (and 
subsidiaries‘ payments) to shareholders or other 
entities. Share repurchase restriction prohibits the 
issuer from making payments (other than dividend 
payments) to shareholders and other claimholders 
using share repurchases or other cash distribution 
methods.  Indebtedness limits the total indebtedness 
of the issuer and subsidiaries. Funded debt prohibits 
the issuer and subsidiaries from issuing additional 
funded debt. Senior debt issuance limits issuer‘s 
ability to issue senior debt. Subordinated debt issuance 
limits the issuer‘s ability to issue junior or 
subordinated debt.  Investments clause prohibits the 
issuer from making risky investments. Asset sale 
restricts the issuer‘s ability to sell assets or requires 
the issuer to use proceeds to redeem the bonds.  Sale 
and leaseback restricts the issuer and subsidiaries to 
the type or amount of property used on a sale 
leaseback transaction. Stock issuance limits the 
issuer‘s ability to issue additional common stock. 
The results show that poison put bonds tend to 
have the asset sale clause. In particular, 94.17% of 
poison put bonds have an asset sale clause.  
According to Billett, King, and Mauer (2007), asset 
sale clause is one of the most frequently included 
covenants in bonds with 64.50% of their sample 
containing such a covenant. The much higher 
occurrence of asset sale clause in the poison put 
sample (94.17%) than that in the general corporate 
bond sample (64.50%) indicates that there is possible 
linkage between poison puts and asset sale. We also 
observe that poison put debt tend to include covenants 
related to indebtedness. Specifically, 71.68% of bonds 
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with a poison put have the total indebtedness limit on 
the issuer and it subsidiaries, which is much higher 
than the percentage in the overall corporate bond 
sample (30.4%). In addition, 70.58% of the bonds 
with a poison put contain a clause limiting share 
repurchases and 67.01% contains a clause limiting 
dividends.  For comparison, Billett, King, and Mauer 
report that the general corporate bond sample has 
22.60% with a share repurchase restriction and 
27.00% with a dividend restriction. The significantly 
higher percentage of poison put bonds containing 
indebtedness, share repurchase restriction, and 
dividend restriction relative to the general corporate 
bond sample suggest that there is an efficient design of 
covenants based on characteristics of issuers that 
require takeover defenses like poison puts.  
Table 3 also shows the Pearson correlation of 
poison put and other covenants. The results provide 
further confirmation to the results on the frequency 
and percentage of covenants in the poison put sample 
discussed above. In particular, we find that the 
correlation coefficient between poison put and asset 
sale is 0.53362. The indebtedness covenant is highly 
correlated with poison puts with a correlation 
coefficient 0.73093. Poison put is also highly 
correlated with the share repurchase restriction 
(correlation of 0.77322) and with the dividend 
restriction (correlation of 0.76272). The correlation 
between poison put and the remaining covenants is 
relatively low, with most of the correlation 
coefficients well below 0.50. 
Overall, the result indicates that a majority of 
poison put bonds are issued with an asset sale clause, 
indebtedness, share repurchase restriction, and 
dividend restriction.  The results are consistent with 
the agency theory that takeover defenses are bundled 
with other covenants to prevent asset substitution.  In 
addition, takeover defenses are also more likely to be 
combined with financing and cash payouts restrictions.  
Firms with more growth opportunities (which require 
more frequent financing) and/or greater free cash 
flows have higher agency costs. Therefore, firms with 
higher agency costs tend to issue debt containing 
covenants that are designed in an efficient way to 
reduce agency costs by including covenants on 
financing and payout restrictions.  Below we explore 
firm characteristics of issuers of poison put bonds to 
examine if the issuers have significant agency costs 
compared to the other issuers in the corporate sector. 
          
B. Firm Characteristics and Poison 
Puts  
 
In this section, we explore the characteristics of 
issuers that are more likely issue bonds with a poison 
put.  Following Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1997), we 
examine the firm characteristics that are related to 
growth opportunity, firm size, and agency cost.  As 
the growth opportunity increases, the firm is more 
likely to take on riskier projects. Therefore, 
bondholders require more protection in bond contracts 
to guard such against risk-shifting events.  We use 
R&D expenditure and market to book ratio to measure 
growth opportunity.  We expect a positive relation 
between R&D expense (or market to book ratio) and 
the probability of including a poison put.  We also 
examine if firm size has an impact on the probability 
of including a poison put.  Finally, we test if the 
inclusion of poison puts is related to the agency costs.  
When the agency cost is high, the need to issue bonds 
with poison puts in hopes to reduce the agency cost is 
greater. We employ free cash flow, insider and 
institutional ownership measure the level of agency 
costs.  In particular, we predict that the higher the 
free cash flow, the higher the agency cost. In addition, 
we expect that the lower percentage ownership of 
insider, the greater the agency cost. Institutional 
ownership is considered because institutional investors, 
who are major players in the bond markets, usually 
provide active monitoring of the issuers. This 
monitoring activity is generally considered effective in 
reducing agency cost. We expect a negative relation 
between institutional ownership and agency cost. 
Therefore, we employ the following model to 
examine the characteristics of issuers that are more 
likely to issue bonds with a poison put, 
 


NINSTITUTIOINSIDERFCFRATEPROFIT
FIXALEVERAGESIZE)BV_MVor(RDPOISONPUT
98765
43211
 
                                         (1) 
The dependent variable (POISONPUT), a 
dummy variable for the poison put covenant, equals 
one if the bond includes a poison put covenant and 
zero otherwise.  As discussed above, we include the 
following independent variables.  Research and 
development expense (RD) is measured by the 
research and development expenses dividing by total 
sales.  Market to book value ratio (MV_BV) is 
measured by market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets, where market value of assets 
equals the book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity. Market value of 
equity equals stock price per share times the number 
of shares. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the total 
value of assets in million of dollars. We include 
several firm characteristics that are related to capital 
structure, fixed assets, and profitability as control 
variables.  First we include leverage (LEVERAGE) 
measured by the book value of total debt divided by 
market value of assets, where total debt equals total 
long term debt plus debt in current liabilities.  
Second, we use the percentage of fixed assets to total 
assets (FIXA) and it is calculated by net plant and 
property equipment divided by book value of assets.  
Lastly, we measure profitability (PROFIT) by the ratio 
of EBITA to book value of assets. For time series 
effects, we use the level of interest rate to measure the 
interest rate environment. Interest rate (RATE) is 
measured by the yield on 6-month Treasury bills in 
percent. Finally, we include three explanatory 
variables to proxy for the level of agency costs as 
discussed above.  Free cash flow (FCF) is measured 
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by the operating income before depreciation adjusted 
for income taxes, change in deferred taxed, interest 
expense,  preferred dividends, and common stock 
dividends. Insider ownership (INSIDER) is measured 
by the percentage ownership of insiders including top 
management and directors. Institution ownership 
(INSTITUTION) is measured by the percentage 
ownership of institutional investors. We use the 
12,486 firm-year observations to perform the 
cross-sectional analysis. 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic 
regressions linking the inclusion of poison puts to 
explanatory variables. We use four models that consist 
of various combinations of explanatory variables.  In 
model 1, we find that R&D expense has a positive but 
insignificant effect on the decision to add a poison put.  
However, in model 2 through 4, we find that growth 
opportunities measured by market to book ratio 
(MV_BV) has a negative and significant effect on the 
probability of including a poison put option in a bond.  
Firms with more growth opportunities are more likely 
to issue bonds with poison puts. This is consistent 
with the previous prediction: firms with greater 
growth opportunities are more likely to face riskier 
projects and consequently bondholders would require 
protection. Furthermore, across all models the results 
suggest that issuers with a larger size (SIZE), lower 
leverage (LEVERAGE), higher percentage of fixed 
assets (FIXA), and more profitable (PROFIT) are 
more likely to include a poison put. Contrary to our 
expectations, firms that are considered ―safer‖ as 
depicted by the characteristics of firm size, leverage, 
fixed assets, and profitability are more likely to issue 
poison put debt. This may be due to that large and 
reputable firms are more likely to attract demands by 
institutional investors to include the takeover defense 
covenant.  Empirical evidence suggests that large and 
profitable firms tend to choose low financial leverage, 
which is inconsistent with traditional capital structure 
theories.  The result on interest rate (RATE) shown in 
model 3 and 4 suggests that the level of interest rate 
has a negative and significant impact on the decision 
to include a poison put.  In other words, the lower the 
interest rate, the higher the probability of including a 
poison put. Lower interest rates can lead to more debt 
issues in general and also controls for the buyout 
waves. For agency considerations, we find interest 
results that are generally consistent with agency theory.  
Across all models, we find that free cash flow has a 
positive and significant impact on the probability of 
poison puts. This finding is consistent with the agency 
theory prediction: agency conflicts stemming from 
more free cash flows may lead to a greater need to 
include a poison put. In addition, the model 4 result on 
insider and institutional ownership provides support 
for the agency explanation. In particular, insider or 
institutional ownership is negatively and significantly 
related to the probability of poison puts.  In other 
words, the lower the insider (or institutional) 
ownership, the greater the agency cost and therefore 
the higher the probability to include a poison put.  
Therefore, the result suggests that issuers with greater 
agency cost are more likely to use poison puts to help 
reduce the costs.   
The analysis suggests several issuer 
characteristics that are related to the probability of 
poison puts on a bond.  We find that high growth 
firms are more likely to issue bonds with a poison put.  
On the other hand, the results suggest that large, 
profitable, and low leverage firms are more likely to 
include poison puts. In addition, firms with a higher 
percentage of fixed assets have a greater probability to 
issue bonds embedded with poison puts. Finally, and 
most importantly, we find evidence supporting agency 
theory for the type of firms that are more likely to 
include takeover defenses in their debt. In particular, 
firms with a high free cash flow are more likely to 
include poison puts in debt issues, which is consistent 
with the prediction of agency theory. The negative 
relation between inside (or institutional) ownership 
and the inclusion of poison puts provides strong and 
further support for the agency explanation. 
 
C. Time Series Factors on the 
Decision to Issue Poison Put Bonds 
 
In this section, we study the time series factors on the 
decision to issue poison put bonds. We use 
macroeconomic factors including bond market index 
and volatility, equity market index and volatility, 
interest rate level and volatility, slope of the term 
structure, and market default risk premium. We use 
the level and volatility of broad market indices of debt 
and equity to proxy for the performance of these 
security markets. For example, bond market index 
provide market participants a benchmark for the 
performance of the bond market.  If the bond market 
is performing well, investors have less desire to 
require poison puts for protection against the drop in 
bond value due to unfavorable events. We also include 
the three main variables to describe the term structure 
of interest rates: level and volatility of interest rate, 
and the slope of yield curve. The structure of interest 
rates is an important benchmark for economic 
conditions.  If the economy is going into a recession, 
we would expect that bondholders are more likely to 
prefer bonds with poison puts to bonds without.  On 
the other hand, if the economy is in a boom, 
bondholders have less of an incentive demand poison 
puts.  Furthermore, if the volatility of interest rate is 
relatively high, investors are motivated to buy bond 
with poison puts to get better protection from market 
uncertainty. The slope of the interest rates is included 
as a control variable. It may be that future 
expectations of interest rates reflected in the slope 
have an impact on the decision to include poison puts.  
Lastly, we examine if the general level of default risk 
and the compensation demanded by the market have 
an impact on the inclusion of poison puts. If default 
risk premium is high, that means investors in general 
are concerned about defaults and consequently are 
asking for a higher compensation. Therefore, investors 
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have a greater incentive to buy bond with poison puts 
to guard against unfavorable credit events (e.g., rating 
downgrades). To examine the time series factors that 
motivate the issuance of poison put bonds, we use 
following model. 
 



DEFAPREMTERMPREM
RATE_VOLRATEEINDX_VOL
EQUITYINDXBINDX_VOLBONDINDXPOISONPUT
87
654
321
           
                                         (2) 
The dependent variable (POISONPUT), a 
dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one if 
the bond contains a poison put covenant and zero 
otherwise. We include the following macroeconomic 
factors as independent variables. Bond index return 
(BONDINDX) is measured by the total monthly return 
of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index.  
Volatility of the bond index return (VOL_BINDX) is 
measured by the standard deviation of BONDINDX 
during the 12-month period immediately prior to bond 
issuance. Equity index return (EQUITYINDX) is 
measured by the monthly returns of various equity 
indices. We use eight different equity indices 
including the S&P500 (value- and equal-weighted), 
NASDAQ (value- and equal-weighted), NYSE (value- 
and equal-weighted), and Amex (value- and 
equal-weighted) index. Volatility of equity index 
return (VOL_EINDX) is measured by the volatility of 
EQUITYINDX during the 12-month period prior to 
the issue date.  Interest rate (RATE) is measured by 
yield on the 6-month Treasury bill. Volatility of 
interest rate (VOL_RATE) is measured by the 
volatility of RATE during the 12-month period prior 
to the issue date. Term premium (TERMPREM) is 
measured by difference between the yield on the 
10-year Treasury note and the yield on the 6-month 
Treasury bill. Finally, default risk premium 
(DEFAPREM) is measured by the yield differential 
between AAA and BBB corporate bonds.  We use the 
60,694 bond-year observations to perform the time 
series analysis. 
We obtain similar results when different equity 
indices are used to measure the return on equity index 
(EQUITYINDX) and to calculate the volatility of 
equity return (VOL_EINDX). Table 5 reports the 
result based on the return on the S&P500 
value-weighted index. The results suggest several 
interesting implications. First, the incidence of poison 
puts is negatively and significantly related to bond 
index returns (BONDINDX). This result suggests that 
issuers tend to include a poison put on its debt issues 
when the bond market is performing poorly.  Poor 
performance of the bond market may convey a higher 
risk inherent in bond investments, triggering a greater 
demand to protection. To further strengthen our 
argument, we find that the incidence of poison puts is 
positively and significantly related to volatility of 
bond index returns (VOL_BINDX). The more volatile 
the bond market performance, the greater the need for 
the bondholders to demand protection on the bonds.  
For equity market variables, we find that the 
equity index return (EQUITYINDX) has a positive 
impact on the incidence of poison puts. The volatility 
of equity index returns (VOL_EINDX), on the other 
hand, does not have a significant effect. These 
findings suggest that issuers are more likely to issue 
poison put debt when the equity market is performing 
well. The activities in the equity market may link to 
the likely events in the market for corporate control 
and therefore the inclusion of a poison put on debt 
issues. 
For term structure variables, we find that the 
level of interest rate (RATE) has a negative effect on 
the inclusion of poison puts.  However, the parameter 
estimate is not significantly different from zero. The 
level of interest rate has been declining from the 
mid-1980s where the buyout wave started to the late 
1990s. Using the Treasury 5-year constant maturity 
rates as a benchmark, the rate averages from 8.47% 
during 1985-1989 to 6.75% in 1990-1994.
3
 It may be 
that during the higher interest rate environment, the 
need to include a poison put is less due to the higher 
borrowing cost in the market for corporate control. It 
is interesting to note that the volatility of interest rates 
(VOL_RATE) has a significant and positive impact on 
the incidence of poison puts. The term premium 
(TERMPREM), on the other hand, has a positive and 
significant effect. The results suggest that the 
volatility of interest rates may motivate the demand to 
include poison puts whereas the term premium has a 
similar, but weaker, effect on the inclusion of poison 
puts.  Lastly, consistent with our expectation, default 
premium (DEFAPREM) has a positive and significant 
impact on the inclusion of poison puts. This result 
suggests that general market sentiments toward default 
risk, which is reflected in default risk premium, 
promote the incentives for the use of poison puts. 
Overall, we find that bond market and equity 
market performance has a significant impact on the 
inclusion of poison puts. In particular, poor bond 
market performance and good equity market 
performance are likely to motivate the incidence of 
poison put bond issuance. The better the performance 
of bond market is, the less motivated the investors 
demand poison put to protect them.  On the other 
hand, the better the equity market performance, the 
more motivated the investors to demand for poison 
puts. Market volatility also has a positive and 
significant impact on the inclusion of poison puts: 
volatility of interest rate and volatility of bond index 
returns motivate the use of poison puts.  Finally, term 
and default premiums promote the inclusion of poison 
puts, protecting bondholders from interest rate and 
credit risks. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
As Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) point out the 
importance of bondholder governance through the use 
                                                   
3 5-year Treasury constant maturity rates are obtained from 
the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis FRED database. 
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of bond covenants and the interactions between 
shareholder and bondholder governance mechanisms, 
the role of bondholder governance in corporate 
governance is highlighted. Therefore, how the overall 
governance structure consisting of shareholder and 
bondholder governance (or investor protection) affects 
management decisions and asset prices is an important 
issue (King and Wen (2009)). In this paper, we study 
bondholder governance mechanisms through the 
takeover-related bond covenants and the 
characteristics of firms that are more likely to include 
these covenants in their bonds. In particular, we focus 
on poison puts and the triggers associated with the 
puts, which are the covenants that are closely related 
to takeover defenses. We examine bondholder 
governance through the use of takeover-related 
defenses and emphasize the importance of bondholder 
governance in the overall structure of corporate 
governance. 
In this study, we empirically examine poison puts 
in U.S. corporate bonds. We present the following 
interesting implications. First, we examine if bonds 
with poison puts are more likely to be bundled with a 
given set of covenants for governance purposes. Due 
the option to exit and the characteristics of issuers, 
certain covenant(s) may be included on a bond with a 
poison put so as to design an effective bondholder 
governance structure. We find that poison puts are 
often bundled with asset sale, payout, and financing 
restrictions, which is consistent with agency theory.  
Firms with greater free cash flows (Jensen (1986)) are 
more likely to over-invest in negative NPV projects 
and therefore have higher agency costs. In addition, 
firms with a higher credit risk are more likely to have 
higher agency costs. The results suggest that, to design 
an effective debt contract, controls for agency 
conflicts are strengthened for firms with high agency 
costs that stem from over-investment, credit risk, and 
takeover possibilities.  
Second, we examine characteristics of issuers 
that are more likely to issue bonds with poison puts.  
We perform a cross-sectional analysis of firm 
characteristics that lead to the use of poison puts in 
bondholder governance. We find that high growth 
firms, large, profitable, low-leverage firms are more 
likely to use poison puts. In addition, firms with a 
higher percentage of fixed assets have a greater 
probability to issue poison put bonds. Our findings on 
free cash flow, insider and institutional ownership 
provide support for agency explanation. 
Lastly, we examine time series factors that affect 
the use of poison puts. We find that poor bond market 
performance and good equity market performance are 
likely to motivate the incidence of poison put bond 
issuance. We also find that the volatility of interest 
rate and volatility of bond index returns motivate more 
issues of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term 
and default premiums promote the use of poison puts. 
The structure of bondholder governance (or 
protection) is an important area of study in corporate 
governance. However, so far it has received limited 
attention in the literature. Our study, following 
Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) and Billett, King, and 
Mauer (2007), provides findings that further 
understanding of bondholder protection and its design.  
Future research is needed to study the interactions 
among bondholder, shareholder protection, and other 
elements of corporate governance. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Poison Put Bonds 
The table presents the descriptive statistics on offering amount, coupon rate, and original maturity for the 5,113 
bonds with poison puts. Stdev denotes the standard deviation of variable, Q1 is the first quartile, and Q3 is the 
third quartile. Offering amount is presented in $ million, coupon rate in percent, and original maturity in years. 
 
Poison Put Bonds (n=5,113) 
 
 
Table 2. Poison Put Bonds by Convertibility, Seniority, Industry, and Decade 
The table presents the frequency and percentage of 5,113 poison put bonds by convertibility, seniority, industry, 
and decade.  
 
Panel A. By Conversion and Seniority 
By Conversion Option No. of Bonds % of Total No. 
Convertible 970 18.97% 
Nonconvertible 4,143 81.03% 
   
By Seniority   
Senior Secured 2263 44.26% 
Senior 2340 45.77% 
Senior Subordinate 427 8.35% 
Subordinate/Junior 25 0.49% 
Not Specified 58 1.13% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bond Characteristics Mean Median Max Min Stdev Q1 Q3 
Offering Amount ($million) 237.29 160.00 5,442.08 1.00 
282.07 100.00 275.00 
Coupon (%)  8.83 9.63 19.75 0.00 3.51 7.50 11.00 
Maturity (year) 8.53 10.00 35.00 1.00 2.04 7.00 10.00 
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Panel B. By Industry 
Industry No. of Bonds % of Total No. 
Industrial 4,558 89.15% 
Financial 376 7.35% 
Utility 155 3.03% 
Miscellaneous 24 0.47% 
Total 5,113 100.00% 
 
 
Panel C. By Decade 
Year No. of Bonds % of Total No. 
1985-1989 246 4.81% 
1990-1999 3,597 
70.35% 
2000-2003 1,270 
24.84% 
Total 5,113 
100.00% 
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Table 3. Poison Put Provision and Other Covenants 
 
This table examines the frequency and percentage of various covenants in the 5,113 poison put bonds. We include a total of 12 covenants. 
Negative pledge is a covenant that limits the issuer to issue secured debt unless it secures the current issue on a pari passu basis. Cross default 
is designed to activate default in the issue if an event of default has occurred in any other debt by the same issuer. Dividends restriction limits 
payments to shareholders or other entities. Share repurchase restriction prohibits the issuer from making payments (other than dividend 
payments) to shareholders and other claimholders using share repurchases or other cash distribution methods. Indebtedness limits the total 
indebtedness of the issuer. Funded debt prohibits the issuer from issuing additional funded debt. Senior debt issuance limits issuer‘s ability to 
issue senior debt. Subordinated debt issuance limits the issuer‘s ability to issue junior or subordinated debt. Investments clause prohibits the 
issuer from making risky investments. Asset sale restricts the issuer‘s ability to sell assets or requires the issuer to use proceeds to redeem the 
bonds. Sale and leaseback restricts the issuer to the type or amount of property used on a sale leaseback transaction. Stock issuance restriction 
limits the issuer‘s ability to issue additional common stock. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Issuer Characteristics of Firms issuing Poison Put Bonds 
 
The table reports the results of the logistic regression of the probability of including a poison put on its cross-sectional determinants. The 
sample includes 12,486 firm-year observations that contained valid firm information from Compustat and issued from 1980 to 2003. The 
dependent variable (POISONPUT) is a dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one if the bond contains a poison put covenant and 
zero otherwise. We include the following independent variables. Research and development expense (RD) is measured by the research and 
development expenses dividing by total sales. Market to book value ratio (MV_BV) is measured by market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets, where market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. 
Market value of equity equals stock price per share times the number of shares. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured by the book value of 
total debt divided by market value of assets, where total debt equals total long term debt plus debt in current liabilities. Fixed assets (FIXA) is 
measured by net plant and property equipment divided by the book value of assets. Profitability (PROFIT) is measured by EBITA divided by 
the book value of assets. Interest rate (RATE) is measured by the yield on 6-month Treasury bills in percent. Free cash flow (FCF) is 
measured by the operating income before depreciation adjusted for income taxes, change in deferred taxed, interest expense,  preferred 
dividends, and common stock dividends. Insider ownership (INSIDER) is measured by the percentage ownership of insiders including top 
management and directors. Institution ownership (INSTITUTION) is measured by the percentage ownership of institutional investors.   
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Table 5. Time Series Analysis of the likelihood of Issuing Poison Put Bonds 
 
The table reports the regression results of the probability of including a poison put and various time series factors. The sample includes 60,694 
bond-year observations from 1980 to 2003. The dependent variable (POISONPUT) is a dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one 
if the bond contains a poison put covenant and zero otherwise. We include the following macroeconomic factors as independent variables.  
Bond index return (BONDINDX) is measured by the total monthly return of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index. Volatility of the 
bond index return (VOL_BINDX) is measured by the standard deviation of BONDINDX during the 12-month period immediately prior to 
bond issuance. Equity index return (EQUITYINDX) is measured by the monthly returns of various equity indices. We use eight different 
equity indices including the S&P500 (value- and equal-weighted), NASDAQ (value- and equal-weighted), NYSE (value- and 
equal-weighted), and Amex (value- and equal-weighted) index. Volatility of equity index return (VOL_EINDX) is measured by the volatility 
of EQUITYINDX during the 12-month period prior to the issue date.  Interest rate (RATE) is measured by yield on the 6-month Treasury 
bill. Volatility of interest rate (VOL_RATE) is measured by the volatility of RATE during the 12-month period prior to the issue date. Term 
premium (TERMPREM) is measured by difference between the yield on the 10-year Treasury note and the yield on the 6-month Treasury bill. 
Default risk premium (DEFAPREM) is measured by yield difference between AAA and BBB corporate bonds. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUATION – THE CASE OF 
CHINA 
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Abstract 
 
We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 
period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash 
holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the 
cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm 
valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government 
ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government 
ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having 
high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively 
low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, 
investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about 
dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration. 
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Introduction 
 
The cash holding decision is a prominent theme in the 
agency relationships between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen, 1986). According to the agency 
theory, controlling shareholders should focus on 
increasing shareholders‘ wealth rather than taking 
advantage of the minority shareholders. However, 
when corporate governance circumstances are poor 
within a firm, controlling shareholders can derive 
substantial private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 
2003).  
There are restively few accurate estimates of the 
magnitude of private benefits obtained by controlling 
shareholders. All of the evidence concerning this point 
is indirect and is based on the assumption that 
minority shareholders are better protected when 
private benefits of control are curbed and financial 
development is enhanced (La Porta et al., 1997). 
Liquid assets can be converted into private 
benefits at lower cost than other assets, since it will be 
easy to use cash in non-value enhancing ways (Myers 
and Rajan, 1998). It stands to reason that controlling 
shareholders would tend to overinvest in liquid assets 
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2004 and 
Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If controlling shareholders do 
not maximize firm value and hold more liquid assets 
in countries in which it is easier to appropriate such 
private benefits, then minority shareholders should 
value liquid assets in those countries less than they do 
in countries where it is more difficult for controlling 
shareholders to do so (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If 
investors discount the value of cash holdings because 
they expect controlling shareholders to partly consume 
such holdings as private benefits, then they value 
dividends in that country at a premium (Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006). 
Ownership of most listed companies in China is 
heavily concentrated in government hands (Xu and 
Wang, 1999). The Chinese government is usually the 
controlling shareholder.  Thus, being a large majority 
shareholder in Chinese firms, the government can use 
its controlling position to dictate its own agenda on 
firm‘s managers. Cash holdings in Chinese firms 
become a very important factor for the future 
profitability of the firm, since Chinese financial 
regulations require that firms raising capital from 
outside sources (mainly by issuing new stock) need to 
maintain a certain level of return on equity (ROE) 
over the past three year period (Wang et al., 2006), it 
would be easier for the firm to invest its own cash in 
profitable projects without requiring to raise new 
capital by selling new stock. However, cash can be 
used also to serve the needs of the controlling 
shareholder in non-value enhancing manners for the 
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firm; examples include over-employment, acquisition 
of other firms for no reasons, investment in 
non-profitable assets, etc. 
In this paper, we investigate 1) how agency 
problems affect the level of cash holdings in listed 
Chinese companies; 2) The effect of Chinese 
corporate governance, in particular the presence of 
majority government ownership, on investor valuation 
of cash and dividends. To measure agency problems, 
we use multiple governance measures of ownership 
concentration (managerial ownership, government 
ownership, institutional holdings, and percentage of 
foreign shareholders).  In addition, we investigate the 
impact of Chinese ROE regulatory requirement on 
cash holdings of Chinese firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 is the literature review of previous 
studies related to equity offerings. Section 3 discusses 
the regulatory characteristics of the Chinese market.  
Section 4 covers the empirical hypotheses to be tested 
in the paper.  Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The free cash flow hypothesis asserts that shareholders 
will want to limit managers‘ access to free cash flow 
in order to reduce agency conflicts over its use (Jensen, 
1986 and Stulz, 1990). The primary tradeoff is 
providing sufficient internal capital for managers to 
efficiently fund all good projects, while not providing 
excess internal capital which would allow managers to 
fund projects and do perquisite consumption 
benefitting managers to the detriment of shareholders. 
If control is lacking, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
convince self-interested managers to allow cash 
reserves to flow as benefits to shareholders. 
Previous studies on cash reserves in the U.S. 
provide mixed evidence about the impact of large cash 
reserves on shareholders. Managers may hold cash as 
part of a precautionary motive (Opler et al., 1999). 
Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that large 
cash holdings may enhance firm value; do not cause 
poor performance and conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Alternatively, Harford 
(1999) concludes that cash-rich firms are more likely 
to make value-decreasing acquisitions. Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2006) find that shareholders assign 
lower value to cash reserves when it is likely that 
significant agency problems will be present at the 
firm.  
Faleye (2004) finds that the presence of 
significant excess cash reserves is more likely to lead 
to proxy contests which subsequently result in 
executive turnover followed by cash distributions to 
shareholders. This evidence suggests that there is a 
strong incentive for managers to avoid accumulations 
of large reserve excess cash. 
Dittmar, et al. (2003) find in a several-country 
comparison that firms hold less cash in countries 
where shareholders rights are greater and where there 
are relatively higher developed external capital 
markets. This reflects the motivation of shareholders 
to reduce the cash reserves subject to managerial 
control when they have the power to do so. In 
countries with low investor protection, it has been 
found that minority shareholders value cash holdings 
less (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2004). This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that poor shareholder 
protection enables management and controlling 
shareholders to appropriate cash holdings for their 
private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Lins and Kalcheva (2004) study how country-level 
investor protection affects cash holdings. They find 
that firms with relatively weak shareholder rights hold 
more cash which reinforces the thought that such 
increased cash holdings can be abused by managers 
and/or controlling shareholders. 
 
Review of Chinese Stock Market 
Regulations 
 
Regulations on equity financing have continuously 
changed since the Chinese stock markets were created 
in the early 1990s.  In December 1993, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued its 
first regulatory document on rights offerings. Firms in 
need of external financing could do so only by 
employing the rights offering method. This meant that 
firms in need of external financing gave their existing 
shareholders the right to subscribe in the new equity 
issue. Initially, in order to meet the rights offering 
requirements, firms had to be profitable for two 
consecutive years and could not have offered rights in 
the past twelve months.  In 1994, the CSRC 
increased the ROE requirement for rights offerings by 
requiring that only firms with an average ROE of ten 
percent or higher for the past three consecutive years 
were qualified for rights offerings. 
The ROE requirements set forth by the SRC may 
provide incentives to firms to stockpile internally 
generated cash in order to finance future investments.  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
According to LaPorta et al. (1999), firms controlled by 
large shareholders can encounter agency problems 
which pit the controlling shareholder against other 
minority shareholders.  The controlling shareholder 
attempts to maximize his welfare by influencing the 
decision of management. When the controlling 
shareholder‘s interests are perfectly aligned with the 
interests of outside investors, then the outside 
investors benefit when the controlling shareholder 
takes actions which maximizes his welfare. However, 
when the interests of the controlling shareholder and 
outside investors are not perfectly aligned, then 
agency problems arise causing the controlling 
shareholder to maximize his welfare while at the same 
time harming the interests of outside investors. The 
benefits that the controlling shareholder extracts at the 
expense of other investors are referred to as the private 
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benefits of control. The level of such benefits is in 
large part dependent on how well the interests of 
outside investors are protected in the firm‘s country. It 
should be noted that as a controlling shareholder 
obtains more private benefits, the outside investors‘ 
assessment of firm value falls.  
In China, the government is the large controlling 
shareholder in large number of Chinese firms, thus we 
hypothesize the following: 
H1: The higher the level of government 
ownership in firms, the lower the firm value since the 
government will try to extract private benefits of 
control based on its relatively large ownership of 
firms. 
In a world of perfect financial markets and no 
contracting costs, firms invest in all available positive 
net present value projects. They pay out the funds they 
cannot invest in such projects to shareholders. Funds 
paid to shareholders are funds that controlling 
shareholders cannot employ to further their own self 
interests. Controlling shareholders would alternatively 
use these distributed funds to increase their own 
personal wealth or to improve their controlling 
position in the firm. Thus, controlling shareholders 
prefer to keep funds in liquid assets because liquid 
assets can more readily be converted to private benefit 
of control. Liquid assets can immediately be invested 
in projects that provide personal benefit to controlling 
shareholders. As Myers and Rajan (1998) point out, it 
is easier to make cash disappear than to make a plant 
disappear. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the degree of government 
ownership in Chinese firms, the higher the likelihood 
of holding relatively higher levels of cash. 
According to LaPorta et al., (2000b) firms 
experience greater pressure to pay dividends in 
countries providing poor investor protection because 
firm resources are more likely to be subject to 
controlling shareholders‘ private benefit expectation. 
In firms in a country with poor investor protection, 
shareholders gain when the firm pays out liquid assets 
in the form of dividends because such dividends can 
then be invested at a rate outside the firm which will 
be higher than the rate of return on the liquid assets 
invested inside the firm. This is due to the fact that the 
rate of return on assets invested inside the firm is 
reduced when the controlling shareholder extracts part 
of such assets in the form of private benefits of control. 
From here, we hypothesize: 
H3: Higher dividends payout will have positive 
impact on firm value. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The sample of firms used in this study is comprised of 
all the Chinese firms present in the CSMAR database 
during the period 1993-2006. In our sample, we 
excluded financial sector firms (banks, insurance 
companies, etc.) since their cash policies and 
accounting procedures differ from that of other 
industrial sectors. The sample consists of 1164 firms 
over a 14 year time span. 
In order to investigate whether liquid assets are 
valued more in firms with lower government 
concentration or with higher concentration of foreign 
ownership, and whether dividends are valued more, a 
regression model is needed that reflects the 
relationship between firm value and firm 
characteristics. Fama and French (1998) develop a 
valuation regression that performs well under different 
testing procedures. This model is ad hoc in that it does 
not specify a functional form resulting directly from a 
theoretical model; however, it is well suited for our 
purpose because it explains well cross-sectional 
variation in firm values.  The basic regression 
specification is as follows: 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 1 6 , 7 ,
8 , 1 9 , 10 , 11 , 1 12 ,
13 , 14 , 1 15 , 1 16 , 17 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
V E dE dE dNA dNA RD dRD
dRD I dI dI D
dD dD dV dL dL
       
    
     
 
 
  
       
     
    
                                         (1) 
 
Where, Xt  is the level of variable X in year t divided 
by the level of assets in year t; dXt is the change in the 
level of X from year t − 1 to year t, Xt − Xt−1, divided 
by assets in year t; dXt+1 is the change in the level of X 
from year t to year t+1, Xt+1 − Xt, divided by assets in 
year t; V is the market value of the firm as the sum of 
the market value of equity, the book value of 
short-term debt, and the book value of long-term debt; 
E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, 
deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; NA is 
net assets defined as total assets minus liquid assets 
and L corresponds to liquid asset holdings; RD is 
research and development (R&D) expense I is interest 
expense; and D is dividends defined as common 
dividends paid. When R&D is missing, we set it equal 
to zero. 
We expect the change in liquid asset holdings to 
contribute less to firm value in high government 
ownership firms, so that β16 should be lower in the 
subsample of such firms. Also, we expect the change 
in dividends to have a positive impact on firm value in 
high government ownership firms since higher 
dividend payout ratios will result in less cash holdings. 
This means that the Chinese government, as 
controlling shareholder, will receive less private 
benefits of control.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are contained 
in Table 1 including the mean, median, standard 
deviations of all the different variables used in the 
study. The cash holdings variable, the primary variable 
in the study, has a mean of 18.7%, a median of 14.2% 
with a standard deviation of 9.4%. The sample has 
little skewness. Government ownership is 21.4% 
while insiders own an average of 2.8% of the 
outstanding shares. The government ownership 
variable is highly skewed because some of the 
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Chinese listed companies have high government 
ownership while others have very little. The board 
independence variable reflects a mean of 54.7% and a 
median of 81.4%. The average firm in the sample has 
sales of approximately $4 billion Yuan; assets of 
approximately $4.7 billion Yuan; a leverage ratio of 
21.7%; market to book ratio of approximately 2.64; 
cash flows to assets of approximately 17%; capital 
expenditures to assets of about 5.1%; and acquisition 
to assets of approximately 1.8%. The percentage of 
revenue devoted to R&D is about 1.7% and the 
percentage of the working capital from the total assets 
is approximately 7.1%.  The percentage of firms‘ 
shares owned by foreign investors has a mean of 
11.7%. This variable is skewed since the median value 
of foreign ownership percentage is 40.5%.  In our 
sample, the firms have a relatively low payout ratio 
which is 2% on average. The average earnings per 
share ratio is 2.6%.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 contains the correlation coefficients 
between cash holdings, governance proxies, and firm 
size. Cash holding is positively related to government 
ownership and the companies‘ assets. Cash holding is 
negatively related to insider ownership and board 
independence. Insider ownership is negatively related 
to government ownership while it is positively related 
to board independence and firm size. Overall, a more 
independent board, with higher insider ownership 
tends to have lower cash holdings. High government 
ownership firms tend to have low independence and 
high cash holdings.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Our study examines the relation between cash 
holdings and various controls for firm specific 
variables in a multivariate setting using cross-sectional 
regressions. The dependent variable is cash holdings, 
i.e. the log of cash to assets ratio. The independent 
variables are governance-related variables and firm 
specific factors affecting cash holdings. The 
regression coefficients of the different variables 
address the predictions of our hypotheses relating 
governance to cash ratios. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Models 1 through 3 of Table 3 provide the 
analysis of the relation between corporate cash 
holdings and governance/company specific variables. 
The results in Models 1 and 3 suggest that the 
government ownership is positively and significantly 
related to cash holdings. Higher government 
ownership leads to larger corporate cash holdings. 
Also, there is a negative relationship between the 
board independence variable and the cash holdings 
which is consistent with our hypotheses; firms with 
more independent board tend to hold less cash. The 
results in Model 2 suggest that the firms with higher 
future investments opportunities and lower cash flow 
volatility tend to have higher cash holdings. We do not 
find any significant relationship between the firm‘s 
ROE level and its cash holdings, thus suggesting that 
the regulatory requirement is not an important factor 
in determining the level of cash holdings in Chinese 
firms. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In Table 4, we examine the impact of corporate 
governance variables and firm specific variables on 
the firm valuation using multivariate cross-sectional 
regressions. In all three models, the value of the firm 
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the 
book value of short-term debt, and the book value of 
long-term debt. The results show that government 
ownership has a negative effect on firm value; 
investors value firms with high government ownership 
levels at lower rates than firms with low government 
ownership levels. The payout ratio has a positive 
effect on firm valuation; investors‘ value firms higher 
when the payout ratio in those firms is higher than 
average. On the other hand, investors value firms 
lower when the payout ratio in those firms are lower 
than average. Both results are consistent with our 
hypotheses. Also, we find a significant positive 
relationship between the board independence variable 
and firm valuation which is also consistent with our 
hypotheses. The Model 2 results suggest that firms 
with higher future investment opportunities and lower 
cash flow volatility tend to have higher values. Finally, 
we do not find any significant relationship between 
the firm‘s ROE level and the firm value. This suggests 
that regulatory impact is not as important as firm 
specific variables in determining Chinese firm value. 
 
Market Value of Cash Holdings 
 
To further test our hypotheses and provide more 
robust results, we estimate the regression model given 
by equation (1). We deflate all variables by total assets 
to control for heteroskedasticity. We follow Fama and 
French (1998) and estimate equation (1) using 
Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions.  
Table 5 shows our regression estimates based on 
the Fama and French (1998) model. We use two 
subsamples with the first divided by the government 
ownership concentration. The 35% median value of 
government ownership is the dividing point of the two 
samples due to the large degree of skewness present in 
the data. The second subsample is divided by the level 
of foreign investors in Chinese firms. The median 
value of 40% is employed as the dividing point.  
 
Table 5 about here 
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We find that cash contributes significantly more 
to the firm value in firms with lower government 
ownership and higher foreign investor concentration. 
Our regression allows us to isolate the impact of a 
change in cash holdings while keeping all other 
variables in the regression unchanged. Consequently, 
we can evaluate the impact of an increase in cash that 
brings about an increase in total assets by the same 
amount as opposed to an exchange of fixed assets for 
cash. In high government concentration firms, a one 
Yuan increase in cash holdings results in an increase in 
firm value of 0.18 Yuan. In low government 
concentration firms, a one Yuan increase in cash 
holdings results in an increase of 0.86 Yuan. We find 
that a one Yuan increase in non-cash assets is 
associated with an increase of 0.34 Yuan in firm value 
in high government ownership firms while the same 
increase in the non-cash assets results in an increase of 
0.68 Yuan in firm value for low government 
ownership firms. The regression is consistent with a 
greater discount for cash than for fixed assets for firms 
with high levels of government concentration. A 1 
Yuan of cash contributes 0.70 Yuan less to firm value 
for high government ownership firms while a 1 Yuan 
of fixed assets contributes 0.34 Yuan less. The 
regression provides no evidence that earnings are 
valued more in low government ownership firms.  
The second regression reported in Table 5 
divides the subsamples by utilizing the percentage of 
foreign investors out of the total number of investors. 
The results show that firms with relatively more 
foreign investors show a stronger relationship between 
changes in cash and firm value. We find that an 
additional 1 Yuan of cash accumulated over the most 
recent year results in a 0.21 Yuan change in firm value 
for firms with low foreign investor concentration. The 
same 1 Yuan change in cash accumulated over the 
most recent year results in a change of 0.91 Yuan in 
firms with high foreign investor concentration. Thus 
we conclude that increases in other assets are 
discounted less in countries with poor investor 
protection than are increases in cash. However, in 
contrast to the regression that uses the government 
ownership, firms with higher foreign ownership are 
valued more regardless of firm characteristics. In sum, 
the two regressions displayed in Table 5 strongly 
support hypotheses 1 and 2. Further, both regressions 
in Table 5 support hypothesis 3. If cash is valued less 
in high government ownership firms, we would expect 
payouts to be worth more. In the regression utilizing 
government ownership as the criterion, high 
government concentration firms had a dividend payout 
of 7.95 while low government concentration firms had 
a dividend payout of only 3.44. The difference 
between the two coefficients is significant at better 
than the 1% level. In the regression using foreign 
ownership concentration the dividend payout for low 
foreign investor firms is 10.23 and only 5.12 for high 
foreign investor firms.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we examine factors affecting the cash 
holdings of Chinese firms. We also examine the effect 
of the Chinese government in its role as majority 
stockholder, on private benefit extraction in firms it 
controls and the effect such extraction has on firm 
valuation. We test three main hypotheses. First, 
minority shareholders value cash holdings less in high 
government ownership firms. Second, high 
government ownership negatively affects the firm 
value. Third, minority shareholders value dividends 
more in high government ownership firms. In order to 
test for robustness, we also employed the foreign 
investor concentration variable in testing hypothesis 3. 
All three hypotheses are grounded in agency theories 
that state that controlling shareholders will extract 
more private benefits from firms they control if 
investor protection is weak. Our results strongly 
support all three hypotheses. We find that high 
government ownership negatively affects firm value. 
Investors discount the value of cash holdings in high 
government ownership firms and prefer instead to 
receive larger dividend payouts from those firms. 
Conversely, investors assign higher value to cash 
holdings in low government ownership firms and do 
not prefer large dividend payouts when compared to 
high government ownership firms. We also find 
similar effect for the presence of foreign ownership 
concentration in Chinese firms. Investors discount the 
value of cash holdings firms with low foreign 
ownership concentration and instead prefer to receive 
larger dividend payouts from those firms. Conversely, 
investors assign higher value to cash holdings in high 
foreign ownership concentrated firms and do not 
prefer larger dividends when compared to low foreign 
ownership concentrated firms.  
Overall, our results indicate a strong inverse 
relationship between firm value and government 
ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Also, our 
results indicate that investors do not think that the 
presence of large cash holdings in high government 
concentrated firms will have positive impact on the 
firm‘s future profitability, thus they require higher 
dividend payouts from such firms. Our paper sheds 
light on one of the most important aspects of corporate 
governance i.e. the impact of government ownership 
on firm valuation and its effect on minority 
shareholders.  
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Appendices 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the sample. The dataset comprises 1164 firms covering the period from 1993 to 
2006. The descriptive statistics include: ratio of cash to assets (Cash Holdings), equity ownership of the top five officers 
(Inside Ownership), government ownership, ratio of independent directors on the board to total directors (Board 
Independence, non-government representative), sales, total assets, firm leverage (Leverage), ratio of the market value to book 
value of assets (Market-to-Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (CF/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets 
(Working Capital/Assets), standard deviation of cash flows for the past five years (CF Volatility), ratio of research and 
development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net assets (CapEx/Assets), and ratio of acquisition to sales 
(Acquisition/Sales), the percentage of the dividends distributed to the shareholders (Payout ratio), earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits and investment credits (Earnings), the total assets minus cash (Net 
assets), the interest expense, and percentage of foreign investors in the company (Foreign). 
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Cash Holdings 0.187 0.142 0.094 
Inside Ownership 0.028 0.351 1.681 
Government Ownership 0.214 0.351 2.374 
Board Independence 0.547 0.814 0.184 
Sales (Millions of Yuan) 3,987 1,587 11,471 
Assets (Millions of Yuan) 4,748 1,684 15,369 
Leverage 0.217 0.197 0.157 
Market-to-Book 2.64 1.95 1.32 
Cash Flow/Assets 0.172 0.157 0.145 
Working Capital/Assets 0.071 0.057 0.139 
CF Volatility 0.087 0.062 0.041 
R&D/Sales 0.017 0.001 0.127 
CapEX/Assets 0.051 0.048 0.042 
Acquisition/Sales 0.018 0.001 0.043 
Payout Ratio 0.019 0.030 0.034 
Earnings 0.026 0.036 1.136 
Net Assets 3,861 2,917 10,524 
Interest Expense 156 67 127.34 
Foreign 0.117 0.405 2.361 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
 
This table provides data on the correlations between cash holdings, governance variables, and firm size. The dataset comprises 
1164 firms covering the period from 1993 to 2006.  
 
 Cash Holdings Inside Ownership Government 
Ownership 
Board Independence 
Inside Ownership -0.141**    
Government Ownership 0.214*** -0.028*   
Board Independence -0.057** 0.374** -0.518***  
Assets (Millions of YUAN) 0.236* 0.196** -0.174* 0.241** 
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis – Cash Holdings 
 
This table provides regression results of the determinants of cash holdings; three different specifications are used, the first 
using only governance variables as the independent variables, the second using accounting variables, and the third using both 
governance and accounting variables. 
 
 Cash Holdings Cash Holdings Cash Holdings 
Intercept 0.069 0.051 0.084 
Inside Ownership 0.014*  0.011* 
Government Ownership 0.041***  0.032*** 
Board Independence -0.015*  -0.021 
Sales (Millions of Yuan)  0.185 0.019 
Net Assets (Millions of Yuan) 0.171*** 0.0168** 0.0145** 
Leverage  -0.145* -0.095* 
Market-to-Book  0.251 0.341 
Cash Flow/Assets  0.051** 0.044* 
Working Capital/Assets  0.041* 0.032* 
CF Volatility  -0.019** -0.022** 
R&D/Sales  0.0174 0.084 
CapEX/Assets  0.0185* 0.036* 
Acquisition/Sales  0.0391 0.0486 
ROE  -0.015 -0.024 
Payout Ratio  -0.271** -0.317** 
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Table 4. Regression Analysis – Firm Value 
 
This table provides regression results of the determinants of the firm value; three different specifications are used, the first 
using only governance variables as the independent variables, the second using accounting variables, and the third using both 
governance and company specific variables. The firm value is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt. 
 
 Firm Value Firm Value Firm Value 
Intercept 0.374 0.514 0.611 
Inside Ownership -0.250**  -0.315** 
Government Ownership -0.687***  -0.487*** 
Board Independence 0.269**  0.614** 
Sales (Millions of Yuan)  0.748  
Net Assets (Millions of Yuan) 0.374** 0.359**  
Leverage  -0.276*  
Market-to-Book  0.354** 0.571*** 
Cash Flow/Assets  0.036**  
Working Capital/Assets  0.011*  
CF Volatility  -0.344**  
R&D/Sales  0.251  
CapEX/Assets  0.289  
Acquisition/Sales  0.151  
ROE  0.514 0.817 
Payout Ratio  0.415*** 0.698*** 
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5. Fama and MacBeth (1973) Regressions 
 
This table presents the regressions of firm value using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. Regressions are estimated 
independently for each subsample. The firm value is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. The 
firm value is found for two samples: government ownership concentration and foreign ownership percentage – government 
ownership sample being divided by the median value of 35%; above 35% is high government ownership, below 35% is low 
government ownership; foreign ownership being divided by the median value of 40%; above 40% is high foreign ownership 
while below 40% is low foreign ownership.  
 
 High Government Low 
Government 
p-value of 
Difference 
Low Foreign High Foreign p-value of 
Difference 
Intercept 0.81 
(0.041) 
0.84 
(0.043) 
0.3841 0.62 
(0.015) 
0.79 
(0.051) 
0.0000 
tE  
2.36 
(0.517) 
1.96 
(0.329) 
0.3751 3.15 
(0.436) 
4.02 
(0.218) 
0.1574 
tdE  
-0.69 
(0.421) 
-0.32 
(0.205) 
0.1241 -0.78 
(0.308) 
-0.41 
(0.119) 
0.0068 
1tdE   
1.21 
(0.621) 
1.84 
(0.241) 
0.2869 0.38 
(0.284) 
1.32 
(0.145) 
0.0001 
tdNA  
0.34 
(0.024) 
0.68 
(0.084) 
0.0041 0.38 
(0.251) 
1.16 
(0.173) 
0.0011 
1tdNA   
0.23 
(0.051) 
0.31 
(0.071) 
0.4185 0.05 
(0.076) 
0.18 
(0.048) 
0.2958 
tRD  
-4.05 
(1.573) 
5.21 
(0.841) 
0.0000 0.61 
(0.712) 
4.89 
(0.887) 
0.0000 
tdRD  
7.23 
(3.982) 
3.82 
(2.373) 
0.1574 4.25 
(1.527) 
4.64 
(1.387) 
0.8194 
1tdRD   
5.31 
(3.721) 
7.56 
(2.043) 
0.6521 4.52 
(1.814) 
9.11 
(1.402) 
0.0314 
tI  
-3.81 
(0.854) 
-2.63 
(1.025) 
0.0000 -0.68 
(0.517) 
-3.07 
(0.923) 
0.0004 
tdI  
1.39 
(0.597) 
-0.82 
(0.769) 
0.0023 0.51 
(0.891) 
-0.44 
(0.499) 
0.1841 
1tdI   
-1.36 
(0.782) 
-2.86 
(0.567) 
0.0115 -0.91 
(0.668) 
-2.17 
(0.428) 
0.0602 
tD  
7.95 
(2.341) 
3.44 
(1.694) 
0.0011 10.23 
(2.188) 
5.12 
(1.856) 
0.0017 
tdD  
-1.07 
(0.674) 
0.87 
(0.536) 
0.0574 -2.57 
(1.547) 
0.65 
(0.436) 
0.0024 
1tdD   
2.67 
(0.841) 
1.76 
(0.718) 
0.9517 4.52 
(1.748) 
-0.85 
(1.188) 
0.0118 
1tdV   
-0.23 
(0.087) 
0.12 
(0.013) 
0.1423 0.04 
(0.185) 
0.03 
(0.041) 
0.9053 
tdL  
0.18 
(0.175) 
0.86 
(0.176) 
0.0004 0.21 
(0.206) 
0.91 
(0.185) 
0.0015 
1tdL   
0.28 
(0.117) 
0.71 
(0.204) 
0.0000 0.31 
(0.157) 
0.47 
(0.138) 
0.3984 
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EVIDENCE THAT STOCK OPTIONS WORK FOR CEOS –  
BUT NOT FOR INCENTIVE REASONS 
 
Bruce A. Rosser*, Jean M. Canil* 
 
Abstract 
 
We document the first evidence of a structure of timing returns, award discounts/premia and CEO 
dilution costs relative to shareholders set at award and before the CEO invests marginal effort.  All 
three factors affect CEOs’ effective exercise price and hence incentive to expend marginal effort.  
Exercised options, which exhibit the highest CEO and shareholder returns, are characterized by CEO 
acceptance of high dilution cost and high sensitivity to award premiums.  CEO and shareholder 
returns for lapsed options and annual/biannual awards show high dependency on the dilution cost 
factor.  Irregular awards are characterized by active pre-effort positioning by shareholders to reduce 
CEO opportunism. 
 
Keywords:  Executive compensation, CEO performance, stock option awards, discounted options, 
award timing 
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Introduction 
 
Meulbroek (2001) and Hall & Murphy (2000, 2002) 
show that risk-averse and undiversified executives 
exposed to total firm risk but rewarded only for the 
systematic component of that risk value non-tradeable 
stock options below their market (or Black-Scholes) 
value, which is the opportunity cost of the option to 
shareholders. A valuation divergence or ‗gap‘ impairs 
stock options‘ effectiveness as incentive-aligning 
devices, and also reduces their effectiveness relative to 
stock ownership (see endnote 1).  This gap widens as 
the difference between the market value of these 
granted instruments and the value executives place on 
them as substitutes for cash compensation widens.  
Using simulations, Hall & Murphy (2002) show that 
awards (or grants) of at-the-money options maximise 
incentive when stock options are an add-on to existing 
compensation packages, while restricted stock is 
preferred when awards are a cash-substitute. 
Stock options create incentive by virtue of their 
design, but as the gap widens, lose their effectiveness 
relative to other forms of equity-compensation.  
From the viewpoint of the CEO, any contractual 
provisions that raise the effective exercise price, while 
decreasing the cost to shareholders, depress 
executives‘ own valuation and hence their 
effectiveness in reducing agency costs of equity.  
Provisions that potentially do this include awards of 
premium options, exercise restrictions generally 
(including vesting periods, hurdle prices and rationing 
of volumes exercised) and lower dilution protection 
relative to shareholders, as well as denial of the right 
to reprice in the event of substantial stock price 
declines.  Given a valuation gap, it is important to 
realise that granting or awarding options at-the-money 
(using market value of Black-Scholes valuation as a 
benchmark) is in effect an award of premium options 
relative to executives‘ lower valuation. For analytical 
purposes, incentive may be defined as the partial 
derivative of the executive‘s value (V) with respect to 
the stock price (P).  Hence, any contracting provision 
that raises (lowers)  
V
P is an incentive 
(disincentive). 
In addition to these considerations, allowing 
executives the right to time their awards allows 
executives to take advantage of information 
asymmetry.  Even for annual awards there is some 
scope for varying the award date by a few weeks or 
months to precede anticipated stock price runups (see 
endnote 2). Yermack (1997) infers ‗good‘ timing from 
the tendency of US firms to time awards prior to 
quarterly earnings increases, but interprets this as 
‗bad‘ for shareholders because the options are 
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effectively discounted which makes exercise more 
likely, perhaps through luck. While this may be so, 
discounted options also narrow the valuation gap and 
therefore increase the efficiency of options as 
incentive devices.  
In this paper we report evidence on the trade-offs 
or exchanges that take place at the time of award, 
which has not hitherto been reported. Subsequent 
risk-return exchanges that are contingent on stock 
performance, such as repricing of deep 
out-of-the-money options, are excluded from the study 
(see endnote 3). The trade-offs examined include 
option premia, dilution protection, exercise restrictions 
and award timing. All require exercise to be activated.  
The extent of dilution protection relative to 
shareholders‘ and any exercise restrictions are likely to 
have been incorporated in the stock option plan when 
first adopted by shareholders, but even so these 
provisions remain part of the set of trade-offs for any 
given award and are likely to influence option premia 
and award timing. The actual cost of inferior dilution 
protection accepted by executives is not known until 
later capital changes (specifically, rights and bonus 
issues and capital reconstructions) actually occur, so 
executives necessarily accept this cost in anticipation 
of such events. The structure of trade-offs identified at 
award is then related to subsequent CEO and 
shareholder returns in order to infer incentive 
consequences. We are able to observe shareholder 
(and CEO) returns over the life of option contracts 
because Australian companies are required to disclose 
comprehensive information about both awards (as in 
the US) and outcomes (unlike the US), in many cases 
enabling identification of the exercise date. In 
common with the incentives literature we focus upon 
stock options awarded to CEOs rather than the entire 
board.     
Our main findings are as follows. We document 
evidence that exercised options are awarded 
at-the-money (with some tendency to a discount), 
have the lowest dilution protection (incentive 
decreasing), and show no timing gains or losses. In 
contrast, lapsed options are found to be granted at a 
premium (incentive decreasing), but have the highest 
dilution protection (incentive increasing relative to 
exercised options) and show timing gains (incentive 
increasing). Exercised and lapsed options are 
important sub-groups because they represent cases 
where the posterior probability of incentives having 
worked is high and low, respectively. Of course, 
exercise through good luck (noise) or private 
information (affecting the prior probability of 
exercise) cannot be ruled out. At-the-money awards 
are predicted by Hall and Murphy (2000) because they 
maximize pay/performance incentives for risk averse, 
undiversified executives when stock options are an 
add-on to their existing sources of compensation. If 
they are right, then our observation of at-the-money 
grants for exercised options implies that stock options 
are add-ons and not cash substitutes. However, these 
regularities do not mirror the valuation consequences.  
Shareholder returns across both sub-groups are found 
to be decreasing in both relative dilution protection 
and award returns, with some substitutability between 
the two according to the sub-group. Timing returns 
and exercise restrictions have no impact. In other 
words, shareholder returns are highest when dilution 
protection is lowest and options are granted at a 
premium (both incentive decreasing). Both effects are 
opposite to those predicted by Hall and Murphy 
because both factors would reduce executives‘ 
valuation of their granted options.   
The only explanation that fits the data is that 
exercised options have a higher prior probability of 
exercise in the first place, and hence a higher 
executive‘s valuation.  Information asymmetry is 
present to the extent that shareholders do not have 
access to the same information as executives.  
Although premium options and inferior capital 
dilution protection are both incentive decreasing, 
CEOs rationally will always prefer relatively lower 
dilution protection to an award premium because the 
cost to the CEO of inferior dilution protection is 
contingent on the specified capital changes occurring 
in the future, while a premium option locks in a higher 
exercise price from the start across all states. We test 
the proposition that CEOs accept lower dilution 
protection when no capital changes are expected.  An 
absence of timing gains on exercised options is further 
evidence in support of our conjecture that CEOs do 
not need incentives when the prior probability of 
exercise is already high.  A major implication is that 
CEOs value subsequently exercised options at higher 
values than surmised (but not observed) by Meulbroek 
(2001) and Hall & Murphy (2000, 2002).   
By corollary, lapsed options (for which 
shareholder returns are around zero) are those for 
which the prior probability of exercise must have been 
lowest. Although some lapsed options in our sample 
were granted at higher premia (incentive reducing), 
most were granted at-the-money and had higher 
relative dilution protection and also exhibited ‗good‘ 
timing (both incentive increasing). If just 
out-of-the-money or ‗marginal‘ lapsed options had a 
higher prior probability of exercise than options 
lapsing deep out-of-the-money, then CEOs may have 
been expected to bargain for higher incentives. The 
evidence (albeit thin, n=19) is exactly the opposite: 
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‗marginal‘ lapsed options have lower dilution 
protection and lower timing gains than deep 
out-of-the-money lapsed options, suggesting these 
disincentive effects may have been crucial in 
contributing to the lapsation.   
We conclude that stock options as incentive 
devices do not work, although they remain effective 
vehicles for delivering bonuses to CEOs. If stock 
options are expected to be add-ons, as suggested by 
Hall and Murphy (2002), then it also follows that most 
exercised stock options represent wealth transfers to 
CEOs from shareholders.      
The paper is organised as follows. The next 
section reviews the evidence, identifies opportunities 
for exchanging risks at award (or earlier on adoption) 
and defines the ensuing returns. Section II explicates 
CEO and shareholder return measures. Section III 
details the sample and provides descriptive statistics.  
Analysis is performed in Section IV, which is followed 
by summary and conclusions in the final Section. 
 
I. Review and Analysis 
 
Evidence suggesting that stock options are effective in 
aligning incentives is surprisingly sparse. DeFusco, 
Johnson and Zorn (1990) document higher stock price 
variance following adoption of stock option plans, 
implying a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
stockholders. Yermack (1997) documents increasing 
abnormal stock returns following awards to CEOs, 
which are linked to earnings improvements.  
Successful incentives will generate these outcomes, 
but so will ―good timing‖ where CEOs influence 
awards to occur before good news known to 
themselves. Yermack infers award timing from the 
tendency in U.S. companies for awards to precede 
quarterly earnings increases, which implies de facto 
awards of discounted ESOs (see endnote 4).   
Several competing explanations, including insider 
trading, problems in writing compensation contracts, 
taxation, CEO manipulation of news releases, and 
out-of –the-money awards are dismissed on a priori 
grounds. Jin & Meulbroek (2002) report that 
long-dated stock options retain their incentive-aligning 
power (through delta arguments) even in years when 
stock indexes fall, provided volatility increases as 
stock prices fall. A positive association between 
voluntary liquidations and CEO stock/option 
ownership reported by Mehran, Nogler and Schwartz 
(1998) is consistent with the incentive-aligning 
motivation of stock options.   
Contrary evidence is more extensive. Lambert, 
Lanen and Larcker (1989) report lower than expected 
dividends after adoption of stock option plans, while 
Fenn and Liang (2001) find an inverse relation 
between stock option holdings and dividend payouts 
(but a positive association with stock repurchases).  
In apparent contrast to Yermack (1997), Gerety, Hoi 
and Robin (2001) document zero stock market 
reaction to proposals for equity-linked incentive plans 
for CEOs. There is also sporadic evidence of 
executive compensation contracts appearing to 
increase agency costs, including diversion of cash 
windfalls to increase executive compensation 
(Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994)), 
lower than expected dividends after executive stock 
option (ESO) adoptions (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 
(1989)), an inverse relation between ESO holdings 
and dividend payouts but a positive association with 
stock repurchases (Fenn and Liang (2001)), and lower 
special dividend payouts for optioned versus 
non-optioned firms (Hollis (2001)).   
In this paper we focus on trade-offs observed at 
or before award that impact on the effective exercise 
price, X.  The trade-offs or exchanges observed are: 
option premia, timing returns, exercise restrictions and 
protection against capital dilution relative to that of 
shareholders. Premium (discount) options are created 
when the exercise price exceeds (is less than) the 
market price on the award date. Since exercise prices 
are often set in relation to stock prices over the 
preceding five trading days, some discounts (premia) 
may be observed because stock prices in the preceding 
week were below (above) the stock price at award.  
However, in contrast to Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 
(1989), there is such a wide distribution of award 
discounts/premia in our sample (with a central 
tendency of zero) that we are pressed to doubt a 
‗prior-week‘ explanation (see endnote 5).    
Discounts to market directly reduce the exercise price 
or, equivalently, imply acquisition of underpriced 
stock.  Premium options have the reverse properties.     
CEO timing returns are positive (i.e., timing 
gains) when there has been a pre-award stock price 
rundown. Conversely, a pre-award runup creates a 
timing loss for the CEO. Timing gains are a 
deadweight cost to shareholders when the CEO 
expends no effort in return. Their existence would 
imply that either CEOs are able to influence award 
terms and conditions through their compensation 
committees, or shareholders are willing to grant timing 
rights in exchange for other concessions. Exercise 
restrictions may also be costly to CEOs either by 
prohibiting exercise outright until a hurdle stock price 
is reached, or capping the quantity of options that may 
be exercised per period, which amounts to deferral of 
exercise with respect to some or all options that are 
presently in-the-money (and may not remain so).  
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However, while such restrictions limit take-home gains, 
they do not impinge on the exercise price, and as a 
consequence CEO incentive should be unaffected.   
The level of CEO dilution protection relative to 
shareholders‘ is specified in the stock option plan as 
approved by shareholders, and applies to all 
subsequent awards under the plan until varied by 
shareholders. The return consequences depend on 
whether capital changes for which protection is not 
granted occur during the life of the awarded options.  
When protection is afforded for all capitalization 
changes, the CEO suffers no dilution on exercise vis à 
vis shareholders. Inferior dilution protection always 
reduces a CEO‘s return relative to shareholders.  
When uninsured capitalization changes occur, the CEO 
suffers a dilution cost (or negative return) that 
effectively increases the exercise price or, equivalently, 
requires the CEO to purchase overpriced stock.  In 
Australia, CEOs are typically afforded protection 
against some or all of bonus issues, rights issues and 
capital restructures, but not dividends.   
Although contingent on exercise, timing and 
award gains (losses) are potentially costly (beneficial) 
to shareholders because they combine to reduce the 
exercise price before marginal effort is expended.  
Shareholders do not benefit when timing and award 
gains do not induce extra CEO effort. Likewise, CEOs 
would not accept up-front timing and award losses 
because even full dilution protection and zero exercise 
restrictions would not provide higher returns than 
shareholders. Inferior dilution protection reduces the 
payoffs of exercise, so equivalently increases the 
exercise price and hence creates an incentive for a 
CEO to invest marginal effort to ensure exercise: the 
incentive is higher as the relative level of dilution 
protection is lower.   
In the absence of exercise restrictions, 
shareholders face the risk of CEOs exercising their 
stock options before tendering marginal effort, i.e., on 
the first occasion the stock price peaks above the 
exercise price. The risk is presumably highest for 
awards made at a discount after a rundown and where 
CEOs have full dilution protection. Shareholders can 
limit the costs of early exercise by outright prohibition 
or by setting hurdle prices, but such restrictions do 
nothing to augment the incentive to tender marginal 
effort. Our evidence suggests that lower dilution 
protection relative to shareholders is the primary 
mechanism used to boost CEOs‘ incentive to cause 
exercise. 
 
 
 
 
II. Measurement of CEO and 
shareholder returns  
 
CEO and shareholder returns are measured directly.  
To do this, we require full information on the terms 
and conditions of an award, capital dilutions during the 
currency of the options and the dates and prices at 
which the options are exercised or lapse through expiry.  
We use Australian data on stock options grants to 
CEOs for which exercise dates are available. This 
means that CEO and shareholder returns for both 
exercised and lapsed (i.e., expired) options can be 
directly measured, which provides a more complete 
measure of valuation consequences than analysis of 
cumulative abnormal returns around award 
announcements, which as Yermack (1997, p. 457) 
notes are often deferred until release of the next 
earnings report.  
The institutional and regulatory framework in 
Australia is similar to those of both the United States 
and the United Kingdom. In Australia, as in the United 
States, shareholders must approve ESO plans put to 
them by company compensation committees, usually 
in Annual General Meeting. During the sample period, 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 10.14 
prescribed shareholder approval by special resolution 
for issues of securities to related parties (which include 
CEOs) by way of employee incentive schemes. The 
resolution must have been passed at a general meeting 
held no earlier than the last annual general meeting of 
the company. Issues of ordinary securities (the 
American equivalent is common stock) or claims 
thereon through such schemes and without ordinary 
shareholders‘ approval were capped at 15% of 
outstanding ordinary share capital (Listing Rule 7.1).  
Irregular grants outside such schemes similarly 
required shareholder approval (Listing Rule 10.11), but 
the 15% cap did not apply.  The Corporations Act (s. 
205G) set a maximum period of 14 calendar days 
within which a company was to notify the ASX of any 
change, acquisition or disposal of company-issued 
securities held by directors, including stock options.  
A convenient source of announcements concerning 
awards and ASX notifications was provided by 
Huntleys‘ Dat Analysis service. Once shareholder 
approval is given, the compensation usually has 
discretion as to the frequency, size and timing of 
awards, as well as determination of the exercise price.  
CEOs are invariably not members of their 
compensation committees, but this does not preclude 
CEO influence over their deliberations (see endnote 6).     
In Australia, ESO award plans tie CEO rewards 
to the company‘s raw or non-risk-adjusted stock price, 
but often with protection against dilution caused by 
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rights issues, bonus issues and capital reconstructions, 
but not dividends. Some awards carry only partial 
protection against capitalization changes (for example, 
only reconstructions may be allowed for), so in these 
cases fewer adjustments are applied. Anti-dilution 
protection varies from the same level implicitly 
enjoyed by shareholders (all three sources of dilution) 
to zero protection. Three CEO returns and a 
shareholder return are calculated.  Two of the CEO 
returns are determined at 0t , the award date: 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP 
, and 
Award return = 
0
00
P
XP 
. 
30P is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is 
adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award. 0P is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the 
exercise price (see endnote 7). The timing return is an ex post measure of the opportunity for timing. The timing 
return is positive (negative) when an award is made after a stock price rundown (runup). When an award is made 
(day 0), the timing return is already ex post, but is included in the aggregation of CEO returns because it is 
contingent on exercise along with the two other CEO returns. The award return is instantaneous and positive 
when an award is made at a discount to the stock price ( 00 PX  ), and negative when made at a premium 
( 00 PX  ).  
 
A CEO‘s holding return accrues from the award 
date until termination (through exercise or lapse). It is 
the same as that accruing to shareholders over the 
same period plus (minus) any option discount 
(premium), but minus the costs of lower relative 
dilution protection, both conditional on later exercise.  
The CEO holding return is also reduced by exercise 
restrictions. When dilution costs and exercise 
restrictions are present, the CEO holding return is 
likely lower than the shareholder return, unless timing 
and award gains are offsetting. The shareholder return 
over the same interval therefore reflects the wealth 
increments resulting from tendered CEO effort, while 
the CEO holding return yields insights into the 
incentive structure generating these shareholder 
returns.   
A CEO‘s (ex post) holding return is measured as 
the stock return accruing from award to the earlier of 
exercise or lapse. Although exercise restrictions 
potentially reduce the dollar value of take-home gains 
available to a CEO, they do not impact on return 
calculations. For instance, rationing of exercised 
options to 25% per annum does not affect the return 
per option; likewise, a hurdle price might prevent 
exercise but it does not affect the CEO‘s holding 
return. The CEO holding return is the same as the 
shareholder return plus any award return and the effect 
of lower dilution protection for CEOs relative to 
shareholders, which we term the relative dilution cost 
factor. The shareholder return incorporating CEO 
dilution cost is given by  
0P
XP TT  ,  
where TP is the stock price at the time of 
exercise or lapse (T) and is adjusted for all 
capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price 
at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and 
capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  
Deducting the award return yields the CEO holding 
return:  
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  .   
When CEOs have no dilution protection, 
0XXT  ; but as the level of CEO protection rises 
toward that of shareholders, 0XXT  . Finally, the  
shareholder return = 
0
0
P
PPT  .   
The CEO holding return is lower than the 
shareholder return whenever CEO dilution protection 
is less than shareholders‘. When shareholder returns 
exceed CEO returns this means the relative dilution 
disadvantage faced by CEOs more than offsets any 
timing and award gains. A reverse inequality is 
therefore caused by timing and award returns 
outweighing CEOs‘ inferior dilution protection and 
exercise restrictions. For instance, if there are no 
capitalization changes during the CEO holding period 
and no conditions placed on exercise, then total CEO 
return will exceed shareholder return when timing and 
award returns are net positive.   
Although the level of CEO protection is set at or 
before award, the effect on future CEO returns can be 
assessed only by tracking capitalization changes 
during the term of the options. To the extent CEOs are 
able to anticipate these changes, the realized dilution 
cost (relative to shareholders) matches its expected 
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value. Since CEOs almost certainly have ready access 
to private information, we proceed on this assumption. 
The relative dilution cost factor is therefore the 
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative 
stock return accruing to the CEO, where the difference 
is caused by the dilution factor as implied by an award 
never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to 
shareholders. The dilution cost factor is zero when 
CEO dilution protection matches that of shareholders, 
and positive (unbounded) otherwise.   
 
III. Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
The sample consists of 207 awards made by 56 
companies for fiscal 1985-1999; 158 awards were 
made by industrially-listed companies and the 
remainder by companies listed on the mining and oil 
board (see endnote 8). Table I presents descriptive 
statistics.  Irregular awards (n = 151) dominate the 
sample.  
207
129  or 62.3% of all awards end up being 
exercised, with the remainder lapsing unexercised.  
The percentage exercised is more than double the 
exercise rate commonly observed in the stock options 
market generally. The percentage of cases with 
exercise restrictions contained in award agreements is 
highest for lapsed options (48.7%) and lowest for 
exercised options (22.5%).   
Unlike Yermack‘s (1997) sample, there is no 
evidence of awards being timed to precede 
earnings/investment increases. Earnings returns are 
computed by dividing bottom-line half-year earnings 
(which accrue to shareholders) by the market value of 
the company‘s outstanding stock at the start of the 
half-year period (see endnote 9). Award timing is 
most likely to show up in irregular awards, but the 
pre- to post-award earnings changes for this and all 
other groups do not differ significantly from zero, 
although the median pre-award earnings return is 
lower than the preceding half-year earnings return for 
two groups. Raw earnings changes (not reported here) 
not standardized for the value of investment show a 
small but also insignificant increase pre- to post-award.  
To the extent that earnings revisions drive stock prices, 
timing returns as measured by pre-award stock price 
runups and rundowns are therefore expected to 
average approximately zero as well. The median 
intervals to exercise or expiry (measured in calendar 
days) are closely similar, implying infrequent early 
exercise. 
Half-yearly, quarterly and monthly and 10 day 
timing returns are reported in Table II. Recall that the 
timing return  
0
0
P
PPt  ,  
where tP  is a company‘s closing stock price 
adjusted for all capitalization changes t days 
pre-award, respectively, and 0P  is the stock price on 
the award date (see endnote 10). Negative timing 
returns (stock price runups) are observed for exercised 
options and positive timing returns are observed (stock 
price rundowns) for lapsed options. The [-10, -30] 
differences are significant or nearly so for both 
exercised and lapsed options, but the [-30, -90] 
differences are not. The former difference appears 
driven by market anticipation of at least some awards, 
for the timing returns are increasing for exercised 
options but decreasing before awards of lapsed options.  
Since the timing returns for these groups do not differ 
for day –90 and day –30, and the difference tests for 
lapsed options suggest the day –180 returns are 
becoming unstable, timing returns are hereafter 
computed relative to the shorter period, viz., day –30.   
Table III looks at CEO timing, award and 
holding returns together with shareholder returns for 
the whole sample and major sub-groupings. Relative 
dilution cost is also reported. For the whole sample, 
the median CEO holding return is 45.32% over a 
median holding term of 1216 days, which works out to 
a modest annualized return of 11.87%; for 
shareholders the annualized return is 13.08%. Several 
regularities are apparent. Timing returns tend to zero 
across the whole sample, so at an aggregate level there 
is no evidence of opportunistic timing of awards (see 
endnote 11). However, small timing gains from 
pre-award rundowns are indicated for lapsed options.  
Award losses (exercise prices set at a premium to 
market) are indicated for some lapsed options and 
irregular awards; award discounts are absent. Thus, 
there is no evidence of opportunism, where CEOs 
receive ―good deals‖, viz., award discounts after a 
stock price rundown. CEO holding returns are 
negative only for the lapsed group and strongly 
positive elsewhere; the negative returns are lost to 
CEOs through non-exercise that is also in 
shareholders‘ interest. The association of lapsed 
options with pre-award stock price rundowns is 
consistent with the market already anticipating 
declining returns for this group, which has a 
shareholder return of –19.33% from award to expiry 
(more than three years). Option awards in this group 
appear to make little or no difference to this trend. 
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This is, of course, the scenario in which incentives are 
most needed, but at the same time the CEO may 
rationally have decided that extra effort will not alter 
the outcome (as already anticipated by the market).  
Options awarded annually/biannually are, on average, 
awarded at market with no timing gains (see endnote 
12). Not surprisingly, ex post selection guarantees that 
exercised options have the highest CEO holding and 
shareholder returns and lapsed options the lowest.  
None of the returns for annual/biannual versus 
irregular awards differ significantly (difference tests 
are not reported).   
Relative dilution cost is at a maximum (median 
-.1635) for exercised options, and lowest for 
annual/biannual awards (-.0519), closely followed by 
lapsed options (-.0695).  In other words, holders of 
exercised options accept the least dilution protection, 
while holders of annually/biannually awarded options 
have the highest dilution protection relative to 
shareholders. Table IV indicates that pre-effort 
bargaining is unevenly distributed across large and 
small issuing companies. CEOs of large companies 
accept much less dilution protection than small 
companies (in terms of median cost, -.1998 versus 
-.0013). There is some evidence of pre-award stock 
price falls for some small companies, which appear to 
be more than offset by award premiums. Exercise 
restrictions for large companies occur at about twice 
the rate for small companies. A similar inequality is 
observed for below-median award size vis à vis 
above-median award size. In contrast, relative award 
size is not a major source of differences. The strongest 
result from Table IV is that CEOs of large companies 
accept less dilution protection and bear more exercise 
restrictions, both of which serve to lower CEO holding 
returns. Since, as indicated, Top 100 companies have 
about half the total risk of non-Top 100 companies, 
this inequality is in the right direction.   
 
IV. Analysis 
 
Tables V and VI look at interactions between risk and 
award attributes. Table V partitions all returns into 
high and low risk categories, according to above- and 
below-median standard deviations of stock returns for 
one year pre-award (see endnote 13). The CEO 
holding and total returns together with the shareholder 
return are higher for the high risk group than for the 
low risk group, which is an expected result.  
However, the relation breaks down for timing and 
award returns. Since there are more lapsed options in 
the high risk group (exercise rate = 60.6% versus 
64.1% for the low risk group), the results presented 
here are consistent with those for lapsed options in 
Table III, which possibly have a higher prior 
probability of non-exercise than awards in general. 
However, Table VI shows that group standard 
deviations (all of which differ significantly from zero) 
do not differ between exercised/lapsed options and 
regular/irregular awards. At this stage, risk differences 
appear not to be a major cause of return differences 
between these groups.   
Table VII relates CEO holding returns to the 
pre-effort arguments. Exercise restrictions are 
excluded from the set of explanatory variables because 
they affect only realized or ―take-home‖ returns and 
not CEO holding returns. All regression parameters 
are highly satisfactory. For the whole sample, CEO 
holding returns are decreasing in award returns but 
increasing in relative dilution cost. Award discounts 
therefore reduce CEO holding returns, while award 
premiums increase CEO holding returns. Thus, award 
discounts (which may be seen as leverage of CEO 
holding returns) appear to reduce rather than increase 
CEO incentive. Likewise, as relative dilution 
protection falls, i.e, the cost to the CEO of inferior 
dilution cost is higher, the observed CEO holding 
return rises. Both results suggest a more general 
finding: up-front award discounts and relatively high 
dilution protection do not enhance CEOs‘ incentive. 
By corollary, lower dilution protection induces more 
effort if the CEO is to exercise. The CEO holding 
return is lower if the issuing company is in the Top 
100, as suggested earlier by the results of Table IV.  
The sum of the standardized coefficients on the three 
returns determined at award is positive (.555) for all 
groups, which reflects the incentive potential of stock 
options and can be interpreted as an incentive index.  
In summary, holding returns are increased when CEOs 
have lower dilution protection and are awarded 
options at a premium.     
The structure of pre-effort exchanges varies 
across option outcomes and award frequency.  For 
exercised options, CEO holding returns respond more 
positively to an award premium (three times the 
sample average) but show less response to lower 
relative dilution protection (coefficient 3.749 vs. 
5.773). The incentive index value for exercised 
options at .227 is the lowest for all groups, which at 
first sight is surprising given the highest relative 
dilution cost borne by CEOs in this group, as reported 
in Table III. However, our interpretation is that CEOs 
in this group expect a lower stock return response 
coefficient on their dilution cost bearing. In other 
words, CEOs‘ payoff for bearing dilution risk is lower, 
and hence so is their incentive for investing marginal 
effort. In contrast, lapsed options show the highest 
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return sensitivity for dilution cost (7.777), and a 
higher incentive index value (.609 vs. .227). Given 
that holders of lapsed options bear lower dilution risk 
(refer Table III), the market places a higher reward per 
unit of relative dilution cost that is borne, but 
comparatively higher effort is required to generate a 
sufficient return to guarantee exercise, so the options 
lapse. Annual/biannual awards are almost 
indistinguishable from lapsed options in an incentive 
context.   
For irregular awards, CEO holding returns are 
decreasing in both timing and award returns and 
increasing in relative dilution cost. The return 
coefficient on dilution cost and the incentive index 
value are similar to those for exercised options and the 
award return sensitivity is close to the sample average, 
but timing returns enter the set of pre-effort exchanges 
for the first time. Here, pre-award stock price runups 
are associated with higher CEO holding returns.  In 
general, from an incentive perspective, runups and 
award premiums are mutually reinforcing, whereas 
rundowns and award premiums are not.  Irregular 
awards suggest opportunism, implying that CEOs 
have private information of future earnings increases.  
Even if the market has partially anticipated this 
information, it would still pay a CEO to accept an 
award despite an upward trend in the stock price.  
Hence, for irregular awards, we expect to observe 
stock price runups. We argue that the same reasoning 
does not extend to award premiums because award 
returns are negatively signed across all groups; in 
particular, lapsed options would seem to have the 
lowest propensity for good news. The low incentive 
index value (.264) reflects the lower payoff on bearing 
dilution risk.  
If early exercise is not prohibited, shareholders 
run the risk that granted options will be exercised at 
the first opportunity when the stock price peaks above 
the exercise price without the CEO expending extra 
effort. The risk is higher for awards made after a 
rundown and at a discount and where CEOs have full 
dilution protection. Shareholders can limit the costs of 
early exercise by setting hurdle prices or prohibit early 
exercise outright, but such restrictions are 
incentive-weakening. Table VIII therefore explores the 
relation between the returns on pre-effort exchanges 
and CEO holding returns with and without exercise 
restrictions in order to reveal the impact of exercise 
restrictions. For this purpose the three pre-effort 
returns are summed. Aggregate pre-effort returns are 
found to be negative irrespective of exercise 
restrictions, reflecting the dominance of inferior CEO 
dilution protection. The negative correlation between 
pre-effort returns and the CEO holding return remains 
when exercise restrictions are absent, implying that 
the positive incentive effect of inferior CEO dilution 
protection is robust across an exercise restriction 
switch. We conclude that exercise restrictions do not 
materially impact on pre-effort exchanges. 
Table IX shows the impact of timing and award 
returns and relative dilution cost on shareholder 
returns after controlling for possible intervening 
factors. Zero CEO marginal effort is unlikely to 
reduce CEO holding gains to zero as well because 
profitable operations are likely to continue irrespective 
of CEO quality, but high CEO holding gains are more 
likely the result of extra CEO effort. CEO holding 
returns that do not vary with CEO effort are most 
likely to vary according to cross-sectional risk 
differences. The standard deviation of pre-award stock 
returns is therefore included in the regressions to 
control for this effect.  Variables are also included to 
represent award size relative to outstanding capital and 
Top 100 membership. Table IX shows that the 
addition of intervening variables (particularly risk) do 
not materially disturb the structure of pre-effort 
exchanges identified in Table VII for CEO holding 
returns, subject to an important exception. For 
irregular awards, award returns do not influence 
shareholder return, despite influencing the CEO 
holding return (refer Table VII). For this group, we 
infer that award premiums exist because future 
earnings growth would make the options ―too easy‖ to 
exercise without an award premium.  Interestingly, 
risk has significance only for exercised options, 
implying the probability of exercise is increasing in 
underlying risk, which is a standard result.  
Somewhat surprisingly, award size is not a 
consideration in any group, so if opportunism exists it 
does not extend to the relative size of the award.   
High CEO holding gains do not guarantee 
exercise, for either the exercise price may be too high 
or exercise restrictions may be invoked. Table X 
presents logistic regressions on exercise (=1) in order 
to assess the impact of exercise restrictions and 
exchanges bargained at award. Regressions of CEO 
holding returns alone on the exercise/lapse outcome 
are also reported (see endnote 14). Overall, the 
expectation is that the fit will improve as the realized 
CEO holding return measured over [t0,T] is substituted 
for the set of pre-effort exchanges at t0. For all awards, 
the percentage of cases correctly classified increases 
markedly (from 66.7 to 86.0) as the scenario moves 
forward in time. At t0, the probability of exercise is 
shown to be increasing only in the award return, 
which is expected because award discounts directly 
lower the exercise price. There is no indication that 
pre-award stock price movements, i.e., award timing, 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
38 
relative dilution protection and exercise restrictions 
affect the likelihood of exercise. The latter is result is 
construed to mean that CEOs do not accept exercise 
restrictions if there is any material likelihood of 
exercise being affected.     
The estimation for annual/biannual awards at 
award is not successful, from which we infer that 
exercise of annual/biannual awards is determined by 
exogenous factors, such as changes in business and 
financial risks. In contrast, irregular awards show 
strong evidence of active pre-effort bargaining. For 
these awards, pre-award runups increase the likelihood 
of exercise, as does lower dilution protection, i.e., 
higher relative dilution cost. Again, exercise 
restrictions do not affect the likelihood of exercise.   
 
V. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper documents a structure of timing returns, 
award returns and relative dilution costs at award.  
The structure varies according to option outcomes and 
award frequency. CEO holding returns generally are 
found to be decreasing in award returns and increasing 
in relative dilution cost. Award discounts (premiums) 
reduce (increase) CEO holding returns, from which 
we infer that award discounts (which may be seen as 
leverage of CEO holding returns) reduce rather than 
increase CEOs‘ incentive. As relative dilution 
protection falls, i.e, the cost to the CEO of inferior 
dilution cost is higher, CEO holding returns increase.  
We conclude that up-front award discounts and 
relatively high dilution protection lower CEO 
incentive.  By corollary, lower dilution protection 
induces more effort if the CEO is to exercise.  With 
the lone exception of irregular awards, timing returns 
(pre-award stock price runups/rundowns) do not 
impinge on shareholder returns.  Thus, we do not 
corroborate the suggestion by Yermack (1997) that 
CEOs influencing their awards to occur before 
earnings increases are acting opportunistically.  The 
CEO holding return is lower if the issuing company is 
in the Top 100, which we attribute to lower 
uncertainty rather than less incentive.   
For exercised options, CEO holding returns 
respond more positively to an award premium but 
show less response to lower relative dilution 
protection, which we interpret as CEOs expecting a 
lower stock return response coefficient on their 
dilution cost bearing.  In other words, CEOs‘ payoff 
for bearing dilution risk is lower, and hence so is their 
incentive for investing marginal effort.  In contrast, 
lapsed options show the highest return sensitivity for 
dilution cost.  Given that holders of lapsed options 
bear lower dilution risk (refer Table III), the market 
places a higher reward per unit of relative dilution cost 
that is borne, but comparatively higher effort is 
required to generate a sufficient return to guarantee 
exercise, so the options lapse. Annual/biannual awards 
are almost indistinguishable from lapsed options in an 
incentive context. However, for irregular awards, 
award returns do not influence shareholder return, 
despite influencing the CEO holding return. For this 
group, we infer that award premiums exist because 
future earnings growth would make the options ―too 
easy‖ to exercise without an award premium. The fact 
that exercise restrictions do not impact on exercise 
suggests that CEOs do not accept restrictions if they 
are at all likely to impede exercise. It appears that 
inferior CEO dilution protection may substitute for 
exercise restrictions, which is logical because 
capitalization changes are automatically insured 
against as they occur, whereas exercise restrictions are 
absolute and hence a relatively inefficient mechanism 
to achieve the same end.   
In summary, our evidence is that award returns 
and relative dilution cost combine to influence CEO 
incentives and, as a consequence, shareholder returns 
and hence exercise. Timing returns and exercise 
restrictions have comparatively minor and zero impact, 
respectively. Contrary to popular belief, award 
discounts do not act as incentives, so the implicit 
leverage does not work. Exercised options have the 
highest relative dilution cost factor and the highest 
sensitivity to award returns: specifically, an award 
premium adds more value for shareholders in this 
group than in any other.  In contrast, lapsed options 
have a low dilution cost factor and a less sensitive 
response to award premiums. The comparatively flat 
structure of pre-effort exchanges for annual/biannual 
awards suggests low shareholder intervention in 
setting the terms and conditions of awards. This 
contrasts with evidence of higher shareholder 
intervention with respect to all other awards. For 
lapsed options, we conclude that the pre-effort 
exchanges were not able to affect CEO incentive 
sufficiently to lead to exercise; in many cases we 
suspect that no amount of up-front bargaining can 
reverse a stock price decline.  We interpret runups 
prior to irregular awards as reflecting shareholders‘ 
intention to elicit more CEO effort in the face of 
impending good news. Restrictions on pre-effort 
bargaining are likely to lower the probability of 
exercise and harm shareholders‘ interest. It would 
therefore be informative to see if agency problems 
suggested by investment and financing regularities 
observed for optioned firms are positively related to 
flat pre-effort exchanges possibly caused by outside 
restrictions on pre-effort bargaining.   
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
39 
References 
 
1. Blanchard, O., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 
1994, What Do Firms Do With Cash Windfalls?, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 36, 337-360. 
2. DeFusco, R. A., R.R. Johnson and T.S. Zorn, 1990, 
The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders 
and Bondholders, Journal of Finance, 45, 617-627. 
3. Fenn, G.W. and N. Liang, 2001, Corporate Payout 
Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 60, pp. 45-72. 
4. Gaver, J.J. and K.M. Gaver, 1995, Compensation 
Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set, Financial 
Management 24,19-32. 
5. Hollis, M., 2001, Executive Stock Options and 
Dividend Policy, Mimeo, Commerce School, Adelaide 
University (November). 
6. Lambert, R.A., W.N. Lanen and D.F. Larcker, 1989, 
Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend 
Policy, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 24, 
pp. 409-425. 
7. Mehran, H., G.E Nogler and K.B. Schwartz, 1998, 
CEO Incentive Plans and Corporate Liquidation, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 50, pp. 319-349. 
8. Meulbroek, L.K., 2001, The Efficiency of 
Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost 
of Awarding Executive Stock Options, Financial 
Management, 30, 5-30. 
9. Smith, C. and R. Watts, 1992, The Investment 
Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and 
Compensation Policies, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 
263-292. 
10. Yermack, D., 1997, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option 
Awards and Company News Announcements, Journal of 
Finance, 52, 449-476. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
40 
Appendices 
Table I.  Descriptive statistics 
 
An earning return is bottom-line half-year earnings divided by the market value of the company‘s outstanding stock at the start 
of the half-year period, and is not annualized. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.  
Exercise restrictions include hurdle prices and yearly limits on the portion of an award that may be exercised. 
 
 All awards 
 
Exercised 
options 
Lapsed options Annual/ 
biannual 
awards 
Irregular 
awards 
Observations 
 
207 129 78 56 151 
Percentage of cases with 
increases in half-year earnings 
return: 
     
pre- to post-award 47.8 48.8 46.2 50.0 47.0 
12 months to 6 months 
pre-award 
44.0 43.4 44.9 41.1 45.0 
      
Percentage of cases with options 
exercised 
62.3 100.0 0 66.1 60.9 
      
Percentage of cases with exercise 
restrictions 
32.3 22.5 48.7 25.0 35.1 
      
Pre- to post-award change in 
half-year earnings return  
     
mean .0066 .0162 -.0094 .0326 -.0030 
t statistic .725 1.645 -.531 1.592 -.311 
median -.0015 -.0009 -.0016 -.0001 -.0015 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -.114 -.429 -.316 -1.371 -.630 
      
12 months‘ prior to 6 months‘ 
prior change in half-year 
earnings return  
     
mean -.0039 -.0061 -.0003 -.0287 .0053 
t statistic -.478 -.657 -.021 -1.410 .648 
median -.0016 -.0019 -.0009 -.0065 -.0008 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -1.626 -1.723* -.449 -2.272** -.530 
      
Calendar days from award to 
post-award earnings 
announcement date: 
 
  
  
mean 74 82 63 69 77 
median 63 63 45 71 60 
      
Calendar days from award to 
option termination: 
     
mean 1193 1148 1269 1088 1233 
median 1216 1202 1257 1019 1311 
      
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
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Table II.   Half-yearly, quarterly, monthly and ten-day pre-award timing returns 
Timing return = 
0
0
P
PPt  , where tP  is a company‘s stock price at the close of trading (t) 180, 90, 30 and 10 calendar days 
before the ESO award date, respectively, adjusted for all capitalization changes. 0P  is the stock price on the award date.  
Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually. 
 
 Base day for timing return 
 
  day-180   day –90 
 
day –30 day –10 
All awards (n=207)     
Mean .0027 .0148 .0133 .0164 
t statistic .143 1.023 1.125 1.627 
median  -.0318 .0000 .0000 .0034 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -1.283 -.693 -.075 .669 
     
Annual/biannual awards 
(n=56) 
    
Mean -.0064 .0117 .0143 .0031 
t statistic -.172 .429 .860 .246 
median  -.0476 -.0201 .0000 .0113 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -1.150 -.297 -.602 .916 
     
Irregular awards (n=151)     
mean .0060 .0159 .0129 .0214 
t statistic .278 .932 .861 1.642 
median  -.0318 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -.785 -.682 -.236 .911 
     
Exercised options (n=129)     
mean -.0240 -.0205 -.0170 -.0009 
t statistic -1.142 -1.523 -1.709* -.118 
median  -.0480 .0000 .0000 .0033 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -1.742* -1.918* -1.452 .151 
mean difference        
t statistic  .199  .325  1.773*  
median difference        
Wilcoxon Z statistic  .933  .413  1.248  
        
Lapsed options (n=78)     
mean .0468 .0732 .0632 .0452 
t statistic 1.331 2.428** 2.454** 1.944* 
median  -.0229 .0028 .0071 .0049 
Wilcoxon Z statistic -.088 1.307 2.124** 1.289 
mean difference        
t statistic  1.581  .483  1.771*  
median difference        
Wilcoxon Z statistic  1.914*  .314  1.595  
    
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
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Table III.  CEO timing, award and holding returns, relative dilution cost and shareholder returns by option 
outcome and award frequency 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of 
trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before 
award.  0P  is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  Relative dilution cost is the 
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO 
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum 
value of the factor is zero.  CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of 
exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T 
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award 
gain or loss (
00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted. Shareholder return = 
0
0
P
PPT  .  Returns are not adjusted for 
differing intervals. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually. 
 
 Timing return  
[t-30, t0] 
Award return  
[t0] 
Relative 
dilution cost 
[t0,T] 
CEO holding 
return 
[t0,T] 
Shareholder 
return 
[t0,T] 
 
All awards (n=207)      
mean .0133 -.0726 .1650 .8409 .8967 
t 1.125 -2.390** 12.397*** 7.618*** 8.001*** 
median .0000 .0064 .1072 .4532 .5062 
Wilcoxon Z -.075 .110 11.074*** 7.565*** 8.803*** 
      
Exercised options 
(n=129) 
     
mean -.0170 .0280 .1883 1.2451 1.3059 
t -1.709* 1.260 11.646*** 10.499*** 10.830*** 
median .0000 .0081 .1635 .8787 .8873 
Wilcoxon Z -1.452 1.639 8.937*** 9.707*** 9.752*** 
      
Lapsed options 
(n=78) 
     
mean .0632 -.2390 .1264 .1726 .2198 
t 2.454** -3.517*** 5.610*** .879 1.104 
median .0071 .0000 .0695 -.2095 -.1933 
Wilcoxon Z 2.124** 1.716* 6.567*** -3.821*** -3.252*** 
      
Annual/biannual 
awards (n=56) 
     
mean .0143 .0145 .1669 1.195 1.2819 
t .860 .314 5.187*** 4.351*** 4.530*** 
median .0000 .0117 .0519 .5331 .5331 
Wilcoxon Z .602 1.239 5.512*** 3.606*** 3.630*** 
      
Irregular awards 
(n=151) 
     
mean .0129 -.1049 .1643 .7096 .7538 
t .861 -2.784*** 11.836*** 6.409*** 6.810*** 
median .0000 .0050 .1191 .4467 .4987 
Wilcoxon Z .236 .517 9.624*** 6.607*** 7.146*** 
      
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
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Table IV.  Cross-tabulations of relative dilution cost, timing and award returns and exercise restrictions by 
issuer and award size 
 
Relative dilution cost is the cumulative CEO stock return minus the cumulative shareholder stock return, where 
the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor 
applicable to shareholders; the maximum value of the factor is zero. Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  , where 30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 30 calendar days before the ESO 
award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award. 0P  is the stock price at award, and 
0X  is the exercise price at award.  Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total 
assets at book in a given year are large enough for inclusion in this group. Relative award size is the number of 
options awarded divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares. The standard deviation of pre-award stock 
returns is calculated from adjusted weekly returns for one year prior to award.  Irregular stock option awards are 
all awards not made annually or biannually. 
 
 Top 100 membership 
 
Relative award size 
 Top 100 Non-top 100 
 
Above-median Below-median 
n 104 103 103 104 
     
Relative dilution cost     
mean -.2310 -.0098 -.1526 -.1773 
t -11.272*** -6.882*** -8.275*** -9.232*** 
median -.1998 -.0013 -.0840 -.1210 
Wilcoxon Z -8.768*** -6.792*** -7.374*** -8.284*** 
   
difference:   
t -5.303*** .928 
Mann-Whitney U 2510.0*** 4598.0* 
     
Timing return     
mean -.0107 .0374 .0362 -.0094 
t -1.336 1.695* 1.674* -1.021 
median -.0011 .0000 .0000 -.0011 
Wilcoxon Z -.567 .678 .913 -.846 
   
difference:   
t -2.048** 1.941* 
Mann-Whitney U 4867.0 4809.5 
     
Award return      
mean .0115 -.1575 -.1008 -.0447 
t .815 -2.701*** -1.885* -1.528 
median .0064 .0050 .0000 .0071 
Wilcoxon Z .399 .759 .094 .531 
     
difference:     
t 2.817*** -.921 
Mann-Whitney U 5194.5 5352.0 
     
Percentage of awards with 
exercise restrictions  
41.35 23.30 24.27 40.78 
     
Standard deviation of     
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pre-award returns  
mean .0354 .0680 .0559 .0474 
median .0279 .0527 .0483 .0360 
     
difference:     
t 5.206*** 1.280 
Mann-Whitney U 1954.0*** 3800.0*** 
     
 
Table V.  CEO timing, award and CEO holding returns and shareholder returns by risk 
 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of 
trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before 
award.  0P  is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all 
capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital 
reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award gain or loss ( 00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted.  
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return = 
0
0
P
PPT  .  
Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals.  The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was estimated 
from weekly returns for one year prior to award. 
 
 (1) 
Timing return  
[t-30, t0] 
(2) 
Award return  
[t0] 
(3) 
CEO holding 
return 
[t0,T] 
(4)  
= (1)+(2)+(3) 
Total CEO 
return  
[t-30, T] 
(5) 
Shareholder 
return 
[t0,T] 
Above-median pre-award standard deviation of stock 
returns (n=104); percentage exercised = 60.6 
   
      
mean .0347 -.1549 1.1189 .9987 1.1849 
t 1.529 -2.714*** 5.902*** 5.166*** 6.160*** 
median .0000 .0000 .5331 .5331 .6259 
Wilcoxon Z .592 .599 5.541*** 4.767*** 5.784*** 
      
Below-median pre-award standard deviation of stock 
returns (n=103); percentage exercised = 64.1 
   
      
mean -.0084 .0105 .5603 .5624 .6056 
t -1.563 .620 5.275*** 5.340*** 5.625*** 
median -.0011 .0078 .3695 .4038 .4557 
Wilcoxon Z -.902 .793 5.317*** 5.399*** 5.718*** 
      
Above- less below-median group return    
      
t 1.840* 2.767** 2.571** 1.982** 2.628*** 
Mann-Whitney U 4748 5188.5 4817 4896 4775 
      
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
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Table VI.  Risk of pre-award stock returns by option outcome and award frequency 
Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.  The standard deviation of 
pre-award stock returns was estimated from weekly returns for one year prior to award. 
 
 All awards Exercised 
options 
Lapsed options Annual/ 
biannual awards 
Irregular awards 
n 207 129 78 56 151 
      
Standard deviation of 
pre-award stock returns 
     
mean .0516 .0470 .0593 .0487 .0527 
median .0397 .0396 .0427 .0355 .0385 
      
Irregular less 
annual/biannual awards 
     
t    .735 
3947 Mann-Whitney U    
      
Exercised less lapsed 
options 
     
t  -1.507 
4407.5 
  
Mann-Whitney U    
      
 
Table VII.  OLS regressions on CEO holding returns by option outcomes and award frequency 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of 
trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before 
award.  0P  is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all 
capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital 
reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award gain or loss ( 00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted.  
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return = 
0
0
P
PPT  .  
Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals.  The relative dilution cost factor is the cumulative shareholder 
return minus the cumulative CEO holding return, where the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as 
given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum value of the 
factor is zero.  Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total assets at book in a 
given year are large enough for inclusion in this group.  Relative size of an award is the number of options 
awarded divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares at the award date.  Irregular stock option awards 
are all awards not made annually or biannually.  The numbers below coefficients are t statistics. 
 
 
 
All awards Exercised 
options 
Lapsed options Annual/ 
biannual 
awards 
Irregular awards 
n 207 129 78 56 151 
Dependent variable: 
CEO holding returns  
     
mean .8409*** 1.2451*** .1726 1.195*** .7096*** 
median .4532*** .8787*** -.2095*** .5331*** .4467*** 
      
Percentage of cases with 
options exercised 
62.3 100.0 0 66.1 60.9 
      
Adjusted R2 .433 .306 .740 .560 .346 
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F 40.364*** 15.122*** 55.664*** 18.465*** 20.844*** 
      
Constant .185 
1.410 
.944 
5.928*** 
-.874 
-5.051*** 
.182 
.754 
.180 
1.125 
      
[t-30, t0] Timing return -.927 
-1.644 
-.410 
-.448 
-.501 
-.956 
1.461 
.954 
-1.343 
-2.286** 
      
[t0] Award return -.513 
-2.331** 
-1.516 
-3.727*** 
-.821 
-3.969*** 
-.936 
-1.740* 
-.518 
-2.134** 
      
[t0, T] Relative dilution cost 5.773 
12.368*** 
3.749 
6.391*** 
7.777 
14.482*** 
6.828 
8.146*** 
4.961 
8.710*** 
      
Top 100 (=1) -.640 
-3.565*** 
-.722 
-3.382*** 
-.207 
-.903 
-.468 
-1.076 
-.553 
-2.723*** 
      
Sum of standardized 
coefficients on significant 
return variables 
.555 .227 .609 .642 .264 
      
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
 
Table VIII.  Relationship between bargained gains and CEO holding returns with/without restrictions on 
exercise 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 
30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award.  0P  
is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  The relative dilution cost factor is the 
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO 
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum 
value of the factor is zero. CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of 
exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T 
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award gain 
or loss ( 00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted.  Exercise restrictions include hurdle prices and yearly limits on the 
portion of an award that may be exercised.   
 
 (1) 
Timing return  
[t-30, t0] 
 
(2) 
Award return  
[t0] 
(3) 
Relative 
dilution cost  
[t0, T] 
(4) 
=(1)+(2)-(3) 
Total  
[t0] 
(5) 
CEO holding 
return 
[t0,T] 
 
Exercise restrictions (n=67)      
mean .0128 -.0195 .5306 -.6260 .7575 
t 1.489 -1.824* 2.345** -.2723*** 3.415*** 
median .0116 .0064 .1072 -.1316 .1561 
Wilcoxon Z 1.498 .161 6.510*** -4.801*** 3.492*** 
Correlation between pre-effort 
exchange and CEO holding 
returns 
    
-.859*** 
      
No exercise restrictions (n=140)      
mean .0135 -.0549 .1615 -.2029 .8807 
t .794 -1.588 10.821*** -6.645*** 7.078*** 
median -.0006 .0073 .1062 -.1516 .5147 
Wilcoxon Z -.790 .331 8.979*** -6.379*** 6.709*** 
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Correlation between pre-effort 
exchange and CEO holding 
returns 
    
-.337*** 
      
Exercise restrictions less no 
exercise restrictions 
     
t -.033 .787 1.628* -2.569** -.483 
Mann-Whitney U 4077.5 4490 4622.5 4665.5 4123 
      
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
 
Table IX. OLS regressions on shareholder return by option outcomes and award frequency 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of 
trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before 
award.  0P  is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all 
capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital 
reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award gain or loss ( 00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted.  
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return = 
0
0
P
PPT  .  
Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals.  The relative dilution cost factor is the cumulative shareholder 
return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as given 
by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum value of the factor is 
zero.  Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total assets at book in a given year 
are large enough for inclusion in this group.  Relative size of an award is the number of options awarded divided 
by the number of outstanding ordinary shares at the award date.  Irregular stock option awards are all awards not 
made annually or biannually.  The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was estimated from weekly 
returns for one year prior to award.  The numbers below coefficients are t statistics. 
 
 
 
All awards Exercised 
options 
Lapsed options Annual/ 
biannual awards 
Irregular awards 
n 207 129 78 56 151 
Dependent variable: 
Shareholder return  
     
mean .8967*** 1.3059*** .2198 1.2819*** .7538*** 
median .5062*** .8873*** -.1933*** .5331*** .4987*** 
      
Percentage of cases with 
options exercised 
62.3 100.0 0 66.1 60.9 
      
Adjusted R2 .444 .364 .747 .542 .359 
      
F 28.412*** 13.200*** 38.793*** 11.839*** 14.975*** 
      
Constant .142 
.441 
.131 
.681 
-.708 
-3.335*** 
.012 
.022 
.096 
.462 
      
[t-30, t0] Timing return -.910 
-1.596 
.094 
.100 
-.565 
-1.073 
1.348 
.814 
-1.315 
-2.245** 
      
[t0] Award return -.420 
-1.786* 
-1.260 
-3.084*** 
-.864 
-3.857*** 
-.916 
-1.560 
-.396 
-1.558 
      
[t0, T] Relative dilution cost 6.032 
12.641*** 
4.106 
6.532*** 
7.903 
14.647*** 
7.050 
7.799*** 
5.167 
8.787*** 
      
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
48 
Top 100 (=1) -.667 
-3.511*** 
-.432 
-1.843* 
-.291 
-1.225 
-.443 
-.902 
-.546 
-2.552** 
      
Standard deviation of 
pre-award stock returns 
2.323 
1.161 
14.077 
3.119*** 
-.662 
-.401 
3.393 
.372 
2.385 
1.250 
      
Relative size of award -10.720 
-1.199 
-.431 
-.038 
-13.702 
-1.219 
24.238 
.239 
-4.669 
-.552 
      
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
 
Table X.  Logistic regressions on exercise by award frequency 
Timing return =
0
030
P
PP  , and award return = 
0
00
P
XP  .  30P  is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 
30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award.  0P  
is the stock price at award, and 0X  is the exercise price at award.  The relative dilution cost factor is the 
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO 
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the maximum 
value of the factor is zero. CEO holding return = 
0
00 )(
P
XPXP TT  , where TP is the stock price at the time of 
exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and TX is the exercise price at T 
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan.  The award gain 
or loss ( 00 XP  ) is necessarily subtracted.  Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or 
biannually.  The numbers below coefficients are Wald statistics. 
 
 
 
All awards 
(n=207) 
Annual/biannual awards 
(n=56) 
 
Irregular awards 
(n=151) 
    
Percentage of cases 
correctly classified 
66.7 86.0 64.3 66.1 69.5 88.1 
       
Cox & Snell R2 .116 .145 .092 .057 .150 .233 
       
2  25.440*** 32.528*** 5.424 3.284 24.592*** 40.007*** 
       
Constant .454 
3.881** 
.038 
.051 
.921 
2.512* 
.302 
2.542 
.149 
.270 
-.203 
.923 
       
[t-30, t0] Timing return -2.205 
2.330 
 -.934 
.118 
 -3.323 
3.033* 
 
       
[t0] Award return 1.329 
7.031*** 
 2.141 
2.092 
 1.026 
3.324* 
 
       
[t-30, T] Relative dilution 
cost 
1.443 
2.519 
 -.326 
.063 
 3.154 
5.235** 
 
       
Exercise restrictions (=1) -.228 
.494 
 -.592 
.837 
 -.281 
.511 
 
       
[t-30, T] CEO holding 
return 
 .857 
18.818*** 
 .376 
1.366 
 1.550 
22.740*** 
       
*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01. 
**  denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05 
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10 
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Endnotes  
 
1 In this paper we do not explore the substitutability between stock ownership and stock options.  A recent survey of the 
theoretical literature is provided in Henderson (2001) and further insights are offered by Hall and Murphy (2002).    
2 although CEOs rarely sit on their compensation committees, this is not to suggest they do not influence committee 
deliberations.  This would seem especially so for founder CEOs.   
3 This issue is addressed in a number of papers in the special issue of Journal of Financial Economics devoted to ESOs (a 
Symposium on Executive Stock Options, July 2000). 
4 Yermack (1997) infers award timing with respect to quarterly earnings announcements.  Three-day abnormal returns on 
earnings announcements are significantly positive when an award is made in the preceding week, but not otherwise.  As well as 
post-award stock price runups, Yermack also documents significant pre- to post-award quarterly earnings increases, whether 
measured as earnings surprises (more than two standard deviations from the mean analyst forecast) or changes in 
earnings/investment.  Awards made at irregular intervals attract higher post-award runups than annual awards. 
5 Another possibility is that discounted options may be awarded after successful CEO effort as a risk-free reward.  We consider 
this less likely than bonuses or other non-contingent benefits because both are less risky means of delivering rewards than 
options.   
6 Yermack (1997) cites two examples of companies acknowledging management CEO influence over the terms and conditions 
of CEO awards, but no such instances were observed during collection of our sample.   
7 The choice of day –30 for the base price is justified in the next section. 
8 Where portions of an awarded tranche of ESOs are exercised on different dates or lapse, each portion is counted as an award for 
the purposes of this study,  
9 The earnings returns are therefore not annualised. 
10 Intervals less than 30 days pre-award were not considered because some awards may have been anticipated, which would tend 
to show runups even where the stock price had been declining since day –90. 
11 The results are closely similar when timing returns are recalculated using day –90 as a starting point. 
12 Total CEO returns (defined as the sum of timing, award and holding returns) and shareholder returns are highly positively 
correlated for all groups, with the lapsed options having the lowest r at .907, with p=.000. 
13 The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was calculated from adjusted weekly returns for one year prior to award.  
Weekly returns were preferred to daily returns in order to eliminate the effect of very short term price fluctuations.  
14 The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns, relative award size and Top 100 were initially included as an explanatory 
variables, but are omitted from our reported results owing to lack of significance in all cases. 
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY, AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE, 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
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Abstract 
 
This study explores whether the relation between internal audit quality and firm performance is 
associated with firm characteristics of information asymmetry and uncertainty (growth opportunities) 
and certain governance controls (audit committee effectiveness). The results from this preliminary 
study of 60 Malaysian companies show that the association between internal audit quality and firm 
performance is stronger for firms with high growth opportunities and that this positive association is 
weakened by increasing audit committee independence. These findings demonstrate the internal 
auditors conflicting roles and question the governance recommendations that require all members of 
the audit committee to be non-executive directors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the role of internal audit quality 
on firm performance in a sample of Malaysian firms. 
It extends prior research on the role of internal audits 
(e.g., Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan, 2005; 
Jensen and Payne, 2003; Nagy and Cenker, 2002), 
including whether the role should be outsourced (e.g. 
Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000). The study is 
motivated by three factors. First, prior research 
suggests that internal audits can have a positive 
influence on corporate governance, including 
reporting quality and firm performance (e.g. Gramling, 
Maletta, Schneider and Church, 2004). Despite 
widespread acceptance of the benefits of internal 
auditing, there is relatively little documented empirical 
research on the role of internal auditing on firm 
performance.  Further, it appears that the quality of 
the internal audit department is more important than 
the existence of an internal audit department. For 
example, Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2005) find no significant association between 
voluntary establishing an internal audit function and a 
reduction in the level of discretionary accruals.  This 
finding suggests that merely establishing an internal 
audit does not control managers‘ incentives to manage 
earnings. Second, organizational theory and 
contracting theory suggests that only certain types of 
organizations with particular firm characteristics could 
benefit from internal audit quality (IAQ).
4
 According 
to organizational contingency theory, linkages 
between specific management control systems and 
firm performance are likely to depend on contextual 
and environmental factors (Chenhall, 2003). Similarly, 
according to contracting theory the relationship 
between management control systems and firm 
performance depends on the costs of writing and 
enforcing contracts which may vary depending on 
firm characteristics (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
In this study we draw on contracting theory to 
investigate whether growth opportunities and audit 
committee independence affect the relationship 
between IAQ and firm performance. Third, while 
several studies have focused on internal auditing 
issues in developed countries, such as the USA and 
                                                   
4 SAS 65 (AICPA 1991) describes internal audit quality 
characteristics as comprising of competence (i.e. educational 
level, certification and prior experience), objectivity (e.g., 
reporting relationship, party responsible for appointment and 
termination of internal auditors), and quality of work 
performance (e.g., adequacy of audit programs). Likewise, 
the IIA standard 1210 on internal auditor‘s proficiency 
specifies that the internal auditors should possess the 
knowledge, skills and other competencies needed to perform 
in order to ensure audit effectiveness. In our study, we focus 
on   internal auditors‘ competence, proxied by auditing 
experience and certification of the internal audit staff. 
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UK, there is little evidence from emerging markets 
such as Malaysia.  Malaysian firms are of interest to 
this area of research because during this period it was 
mandatory for listed Malaysian companies to have an 
audit committee
5
 while forming an internal audit 
function was voluntary.
6
  Therefore, establishing an 
internal audit department is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in Malaysian companies.
7
  In addition, 
the necessity for stringent corporate governance in 
Malaysia is demonstrated by the alleged accounting 
fraud at Technology Resources Industries Berhad (see 
Fadzil, Haron and Jantan, 2005).  In this paper we 
provide some insights on whether internal auditing as 
a monitoring/control mechanism is linked to firm 
performance in Malaysian firms.    
The first objective of this paper is to determine if 
there is an association between internal audit quality 
and firm performance.  The professional literature 
identifies both accounting qualifications and prior 
auditing experience of the internal audit staff as 
important ingredients for an effective internal audit 
function (e.g. the Research Committee of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland in McInnes, 
1993).  However, the relation between IAQ and firm 
performance is unlikely to be straightforward since 
both organizational theory and contracting theory 
suggests that only certain types of organizations with 
particular firm characteristics could benefit from IAQ. 
                                                   
5 In August 1994 the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) Listing 
Requirements made it mandatory for all public listed 
companies to have an audit committee. Further, to enhance 
the effectiveness of the audit committee, the BMB Listing 
Requirements amended its listing rules in 2001 requiring 
public listed companies to include the Audit Committee 
Report in their Annual Reports. The ten mandatory 
requirements for the Audit Committee Report are: (1) the 
audit committee should comprise of at least three members, 
(2) the majority of the audit committee should be composed 
of independent directors, (3) at least one of the audit 
committee members is financially literate, (4) the chairman 
of the audit committee must be an independent director, (5) 
no alternate director of the audit committee is appointed as a 
member, (6) there are written terms of reference, (7) the 
number of meetings should be noted, (8) the majority 
attending the meeting should be independent directors, (9) 
there should be a summary of audit committee activities and 
(10) a summary of internal audit activities should also be 
produced. 
6 Although it is not mandatory to establish an internal audit 
function, an interesting issue is the revamped Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad Listing Requirements (Previously know as 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) in particular Para 15.27 
(b) states that a listed issuer must ensure that its board of 
directors includes in its annual report as a ―statement about 
the state of internal control of the listed issuer as a group‖. 
7  During the year 2000, the Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Malaysia approved the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). In contrast with 
the BMB Listing Requirements, the MCCG  BB VII in Part 
2 Best Practice Provision specifically recommends the board 
establish an internal audit function and maintain a sound 
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders‘ 
investments and the company‘s assets. 
Since, prior evidence drawn from contracting theory 
suggests that growth (or investment) opportunities is 
likely to affect firm performance (see Smith and Watts, 
1993; Baber et al. 1996) we us also examine if growth 
opportunities affects the linkage between IAQ and 
firm performance. Contracting theory suggests that 
firms with high growth opportunities are associated 
with high information asymmetry and managers of 
these high growth firms are more difficult to monitor 
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; 
Baber et al. 1996).  Therefore, the role of IAQ is 
expected to be more beneficial for such firms.  This 
study seeks to determine whether the link between 
IAQ and firm performance is dependent on the level 
of growth opportunities of the firm.   
As audit committees are also part of the internal 
control system of a firm, the second objective of this 
paper is to determine whether audit committee 
independence has an impact on the association 
between IAQ and the performance of growth firms. 
Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003) suggest that the role 
of the auditor is one of preeminent monitoring and 
reporting to the board on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. They foresee a possible conflict 
between the role of the internal audit function and the 
role of the audit committee and these tensions could 
affect organizational outcomes
8
. Together with 
Gramling et al (2004), they suggest that we need to 
understand how the internal audit function interacts 
with the audit committee, management, and the 
external auditors to achieve quality corporate 
governance.  By examining the interaction between 
IAQ and audit committee independence on the 
performance of growth firms we shed some light on 
this question.   
The data for this study of Malaysian firms is 
obtained from two sources. The first source is a survey 
of Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad
9
 to obtain data on internal auditing. The 
second source is the annual reports of the firms 
responding to the survey.  The data on firms‘ growth 
opportunities, audit committee and profitability is 
collected from the 2003 financial reports. Prior studies 
of Malaysian firms have examined the internal control 
practices of the internal audit function but not the 
implications on firm performance. Research of 
Malaysian firms demonstrate the importance of the 
internal audit by showing that management relies on 
internal audits to provide assurance on matters relating 
to internal control such as the provision of an 
independent review of efficient operations (Ernst and 
Young, 2005; Fadzil et al., 2005). Recent research by 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examines the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the value of 
                                                   
8 The issue of the potential for tension between the internal 
audit department and audit committees is also raised by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (2005).  
9 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) changed its 
name to the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) on April 20, 
2004. 
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Singapore and Malaysia firms (as measured by Tobin's 
Q).  The only significant association they find is a 
negative relationship between board size and firm 
value.  They fail to find any significant association 
between either audit committee size or the proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee and 
firm value. The evidence provided in this study 
suggests links between the performance of firms 
adopting a growth strategy and the quality of the 
internal audit function. Further, this study 
demonstrates that these associations are moderated by 
audit committee independence.  Using observations 
from 60 Malaysian firms, this paper provides 
preliminary evidence that there is a positive 
association between IAQ and firm performance for 
firms with high growth opportunities, but not for firms 
with low growth opportunities. Further, we also show 
that, in the presence of an independent audit 
committee, the positive association between IAQ and 
performance for high growth firms disappears, 
suggesting a conflict effect between IAQ and audit 
committee.  These preliminary findings suggest that 
focusing attention on the composition of the audit 
committee ignores the essential skills required for an 
effective AC.  ―Overemphasis on monitoring and 
control risks non-executive directors seeing 
themselves, and being seen, as an alien policing 
influence….. An overemphasis on strategy risks 
non-executive directors becoming too close to 
management… (Higgs Report 2003:27). An effective 
AC attains the appropriate balance between internal 
and independent directors; a great proportion of either 
can swing the balance in the wrong direction and 
cause conflict with the role of the IA. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several 
ways.  First, this study provides evidence from an 
emerging economy, Malaysia. Given the globalization 
of business, there is increasing interest in accounting 
and control issues in these countries.  Second, this 
study demonstrates that research can successfully 
utilize both survey methodology and accounting data 
to study management control issues.  Third, the 
results of this study are consistent with the notion that 
internal audits provide higher levels of control and 
monitoring that are associated with performance.  
However, this association is dependent on the firm‘s 
growth opportunities.  Our results imply that it may 
not be economically efficient to establish an internal 
audit function in the absence of growth opportunities. 
Fourth, this study demonstrates the contingent nature 
of IAQ and how IAQ is related to other corporate 
governance controls, such as audit committee.  The 
results of this study question whether firm 
performance is enhanced when internal audits are 
expected to serve as a resource to the audit committee 
and management, placing the internal auditor in a 
situation of possible conflict.  Finally, this paper 
contributes to the literature by integrating 
management control and corporate governance theory 
in terms of the role of IAQ and audit committees and 
shows that such integration provides a deeper 
understanding of how and why these variables interact 
to affect firm performance.  This evidence is not 
available in the extant literature. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis 
development 
 
An increasing number of earnings restatements along 
with allegations of financial statement fraud 
committed by high profile companies have eroded 
public confidence in corporate governance, the 
financial reporting process, and audit functions 
(Rezaee, et al., 2003). Subsequently, the firm‘s 
internal control environment is under scrutiny.  As 
part of the overall internal control environment, the 
internal auditor and the audit committee have a 
responsibility to provide oversight on the reliability of 
financial reporting.  The Institute of Internal Auditors 
(2000) suggests that the internal audit function should 
bring a systematic approach to evaluating and 
improving the effectiveness of risk management, 
control and governance processes.  This is likely to 
lead to increased responsibilities placed on the internal 
audit function and audit committee of companies that 
previously did not have or outsourced the internal 
audit function. Consequently, the internal audit 
function has greater responsibilities for supporting 
management and the audit committee.   
 
2.1 Internal auditing and firm 
performance  
 
One of the roles of the internal auditor is to provide 
management with an independent and objective 
assurance that the organizations internal control 
system is effective, adequate and reliable (IIA, 2000).  
In addition, the IA provides consulting on operational 
skills that focus on risks, evaluate the efficiency of 
operations and stimulate organizational actions 
(Hermanson and Rittenberg 2003). In response to 
regulatory, environmental and technological change, 
IA is required to do much more than compliance work.  
The IA must have a thorough knowledge of how their 
work contributes value and links to organizational 
strategies and achievement (Hass, Abdolmohammadi, 
and Burnaby, 2006). Therefore, internal auditing is 
designed to add value and improve the organizations 
operations (Carcello et al., 2005). Research on 
auditors‘ assessment of the criteria of IA competence 
includes IA training programs, with an emphasis on 
professional certifications (Brown, 1983), and IA 
experience (Messier and Schneider, 1988).   
Prior studies also suggest that the auditor should 
have professional qualification and prior experience if 
they are to lead a good quality audit (e.g. Brody et al., 
1998). Boo and Koh‘s (2004) study indicates that audit 
team quality and attributes relate to their ability to 
suggest improvement to internal control systems; 
operational efficiency; risk management; and financial 
matters. Prior experience is important for internal 
auditors as many oversight judgments are subjective 
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and managerial action may have pervading effects.  
Therefore, in the absence of objective criteria, internal 
audit staff  not possessing prior experience in 
auditing (or less experience), may not understand the 
wide range of existing and potential problems nor 
possess problem-solving skills (DeZoort, 1998). 
Consequently, an IA with greater training and 
experience is more able to provide assurance of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of oganisational controls 
in aligning with organizational strategies. Research by 
Fadzil et al (2005) supports this notion by finding that 
IAQ
10
 significantly influences the quality of 
monitoring the internal control system. Mat Zain et al 
(2006) find that internal auditors contribute more to 
financial statement audits when they have a greater 
proportion of IA staff with prior experience in 
accounting and auditing. Research also finds that 
effective internal audits are more likely to detect and 
prevent fraud (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and 
Lapides, 2000; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1999).   
The redefinition of internal control as risk 
management emphasizes the links to strategy 
formulation which is supported by the internal 
controls of the organization. All risks experienced by 
organizations have potential financial implications and 
so too does the risk management responsibility of the 
IA.  Further, the internal audit helps to maintain 
cost-efficient contracting between owners and 
managers.  Thus, the internal audit has the potential 
to augment the external audit function and reduce the 
overall monitoring costs.  For instance, research by 
Felix et al (2001) find that the contribution of IA to 
financial statement results in cost saving related to 
audit fees paid by the firm to their external auditors. 
Taken together, these preceding factors suggest that 
greater IAQ is associated with greater firm 
performance. However, it is likely that the relation 
between IAQ and firm performance varies with 
organizational characteristics.  Despite increasing 
attention on IAQ, little is known about factors that 
influence the association between IAQ and firm 
performance. Why would higher IAQ be associated 
with better firm performance for some firms and not 
for others?  There are a myriad of factors that could 
influence the association between IAQ and firm 
performance.  Given the role of the IA as monitoring 
and managing risk, we examine whether the 
association between IAQ and firm performance is 
dependent on uncertain investment opportunities and 
the independence of the audit committee. 
 
2.2 Growth opportunities  
 
Firms need to establish internal controls that manage 
risk effectively. Risk has been defined as the 
possibility of loss as a result of a combination of 
uncertainty and exposure flowing from an investment 
decision or a commitment (Boritz, 1990).  The 
                                                   
10 IAQ also refers to the management of the internal audit 
department, professional proficiency, objectivity and review. 
agency costs associated with high growth 
opportunities means that high growth firms have high 
levels of inherent risk
11
.  Subsequently, high growth 
firms are more likely to benefit from higher IAQ, 
which means better financial performance.  The 
reasons for this proposition follow the research by 
Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Smith and Watts, (1992).  
Low growth firms are valued independently of the 
firm‘s future investment opportunities while high 
growth firms are valued based on the firm‘s future 
discretionary investment decisions.  As low growth 
firms are pre-committed to a certain course of activity, 
shareholder/manager conflict is low which minimizes 
agency costs.  In contrast, high growth firms incur 
greater agency costs because managers‘ actions are 
less discernible as the value of growth opportunities 
depends on further discretionary expenditures by 
managers
12
. The subsequent information asymmetry 
means that growth firms adopt particular strategies to 
monitor managers, including creating internal audit 
departments.  Carcello et al. (2005) suggest that 
greater information asymmetry increases the need for 
greater investment in IA to bond or monitor
13
 agents.   
Further, high growth firms are more likely to 
encounter problems with internal control requiring 
greater monitoring and assistance from internal 
auditors (Carcello et al., 2005; Maletta and Kida, 
1993).  However, it is not simply the existence of IA 
that is important, as demonstrated by Davidson et al. 
(2005), but the quality and effectiveness of the internal 
audit department that is important for firms with 
uncertain investment opportunities.  The IA must 
have the training and experience that links the 
evaluation of the risks associated with uncertain 
growth opportunities to the firm‘s strategies that 
achieve positive outcomes.  In the high-risk 
conditions of high growth opportunities, internal audit 
quality is a primary factor that influences internal 
audit contribution to firm performance.  
Consequently, we expect a positive association 
between IAQ and firm performance for high growth 
firms.  The preceding discussion leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
H1:   A combination of high quality internal audit 
(X1) and high levels of growth (X2) will have a 
positive impact on firm performance (Y).  
 
2.3 Audit committee   
 
Audit committee oversight includes financial reporting, 
internal controls to assess risk and auditor activity 
                                                   
11  Inherent risk relates to the type of business and 
environment in which the firm operates. 
12 Discretionary expenditures include capacity expansion 
projects, new product lines, maintenance and replacement of 
existing assets. 
13 Internal auditing is a bonding cost incurred by agents to 
signal to the principal they are acting responsibly, while 
monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to protect their 
economic interest (Adams, 1994) 
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(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed, 
2002).
14
  The audit committee, as a governance 
mechanism, reduces information asymmetry between 
stakeholders and managers and therefore mitigates 
agency problems.  Research finds that firms without 
audit committees are more likely to have fraudulent 
financial reporting (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 1996) 
and earnings overstatement (DeFond and Jiamnalvo 
1991).  To fulfill the oversight role, the audit 
committee must be independent from management, 
thus giving rise to the recent governance 
recommendations and regulations demanding an 
independent audit committee.    
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates that 
the audit committees of listed companies consist 
entirely of independent directors and the recent 
amendments to the Bursa Malaysia corporate 
governance framework, which was introduced in 2008, 
requires all members of the audit committee to be 
non-executive directors.   
Research also provides evidence of the 
importance of audit committee independence (ACI). 
Krishnan (2005) find that independent audit 
committees and audit committees with financial 
expertise are significantly less likely to be associated 
with the incidence of internal control problems
15
.  
Likewise, Abbott et al. (2004) find that audit 
committees consisting of all independent members 
and with at least one member with accounting or 
related expertise are negatively associated with 
financial restatements. Beasley et al. (2000) find firms 
that commit fraud are likely to have less independent 
audit committees.
16
 
                                                   
14 In Malaysia the audit committee is required to prepare a 
summary of the principal internal audit activities and 
functions. These activities include audit of financial 
management and human resource operations and security 
controls. The reports should also mention that the audit 
committee has approved the internal audit program at the 
beginning of the year and the chief internal auditor has 
submitted regular reports on audit work and activities prior 
to the committee meeting.  In addition, the audit committee 
must be satisfied that the internal auditors have worked 
closely with external auditors to resolve issues raised by the 
external auditors in relation to the control issues in the 
organization (Haron, Jantan and Pheng, 2005, p. 193). 
15 They investigated two levels of seriousness in internal 
control problems: reportable conditions and material 
weaknesses. The data on internal controls is acquired from 
the reports from companies changing auditors.  These 
companies are required to disclose any internal control 
problems that are pointed out by the predecessor auditors 
16 Based on reputational capital enhancement theory, past 
studies argue that independent audit committees are more 
likely to demand a higher quality audit in order to protect 
their reputation as experts in decision making (Abbott & 
Parker 2000; Carcello & Neal, 2000).  Further Abbott & 
Parker (2000, p.56) argue that while an ―audit committee 
service may increase directors‘ reputation as a monitor, it 
also exacerbates the potential reputational damage should 
the misstatement occur while the director serves on the audit 
committee‖.  In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) find 
that independent audit committees are more willing to 
One of the main objectives of establishing an 
audit committee is to strengthen the board‘s ability to 
monitor the performance of managers. However, 
studies testing the association between ACI and firm 
performance are inconclusive.  Erickson et al. (2005) 
find a positive relationship between ACI and firm 
performance while Klein (1998) and Hsu (2008) find 
no significant association. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) 
fail to find any significant relationship between either 
audit committee size or the proportion of independent 
directors on the AC and firm value.  Failing to 
account for environmental uncertainty faced by the 
firms, such as uncertain investment opportunities, and 
interrelations between governance controls such as 
IAQ and ACI may have led to the conflicting results. 
An optimal internal control system is associated 
with the environment and the context in which the 
system operates.  It is posited in this paper that a 
positive association between IAQ and firm 
performance is contingent on the level of risk faced by 
the firm, that is, high, but uncertain, growth 
opportunities
17
. Further, Klein (2002) finds that audit 
committee independence declines as growth 
opportunities increase. This result is consistent with 
her expectation that managers demand for internal 
directors with expertise increases with the 
complexities and uncertainties of growth opportunities.  
Klein (2002, p.436) also suggests that firms tailor 
audit committee composition to suit their economic 
environment. Subsequently, the level of growth 
opportunities of the firm has the potential to influence 
the association between the IA and AC and 
subsequently, firm performance.  Previous research 
has found that high growth firms prefer an insider 
dominated board to integrate the practical activities of 
the firm around its strategies (Bathala and Rao, 1995; 
Hutchinson, 2001). As growth opportunities are firm 
specific, subject to managerial decisions, inside 
directors have an essential role to play in providing 
valuable information to the AC about the firm‘s 
activities.  Donaldson and Davis (1994) suggest that 
inside directors make superior decisions, having 
access to corporate information and the ability to take 
a long-term view.   
Codes, regulations, and various best practice 
guides stress the importance of the internal audits‘ 
relation with other parties responsible for corporate 
governance. However, research on the relations 
between internal audits and the audit committee is 
limited, focusing only on the association between 
audit committee characteristics and the internal audit 
(e.g. DeZoort, Friedberg, and Reisch, 2000). Internal 
audits have a dual role to play in the corporate 
governance of the organization, which places the 
internal auditor in a position of possible conflict. 
                                                                             
disagree with management and are more likely to insist on 
high quality audit. 
17 Of course there are other risks that may be affect the 
association between IAQ and firm performance, such as 
audit risk, operating risk, financial risk, etc.    
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Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003, p. 34) suggest that 
there are  
―significant differences in functions and skill 
sets required when trying to serve audit 
committee needs, as opposed to meeting the 
needs of strategic and operational management. 
Management wants the internal auditor to 
provide both assurance and consulting based on 
broad operational skills that address risks, 
evaluate the efficiency of operations, and 
stimulate organizational action. On the other 
hand, the audit committee is more interested in 
assurance regarding controls.‖ 
Prior research demonstrates the complex and 
contingent nature of the association between internal 
audits and the audit committee.  The internal auditor 
in many firms reports directly to the CEO and the 
head of the audit committee rather than management 
because the audit committee‘s role is to monitor and 
report on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
(Krell, 2003).  However, Nagy and Cenker (2002), 
find, when interviewing internal audit directors, 
management primarily determines the role of the 
internal auditor, thus placing the IA in a position of 
potential conflict.  Raghunandan, Read and Rama 
(2001) find that the audit committee independence
18
 
and expertise
19
 is associated with their ability to 
influence internal auditors via access to the chief 
internal auditor and their ability to review internal 
audit activities. Hence, an independent audit 
committee places greater demands on internal audits.  
However, good corporate governance should be 
promoted without stifling entrepreneurial drive or 
impairing competitiveness. The business advisory 
group‘s to the original OECD principles states:  
―Entrepreneurs, investors and corporations 
need the flexibility to craft governance 
arrangements that are responsive to unique 
business contexts…..‖ (OECD, 1998, p.34).   
Subsequently, audit committee independence 
(ACI) may inhibit the performance of growth firms as 
the internal auditor focuses on the compliance 
requirements of the audit committee rather than 
assisting management with assessing the potentially 
profitable risks of uncertain investment opportunities.  
Thus, ACI affects the strength of the relationship 
between IAQ and the performance of high growth 
firms.  No research is found that addresses these 
associations.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2:  A combination of both high quality internal 
audit (X1) and audit committee independence 
(X3) have a negative impact on firm 
performance (Y) for high growth firms (X2). 
 
 
 
                                                   
18 The proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee. 
19  The proportion of committee members with an 
accounting or finance background.  
3. Data  
 
Data on internal audit quality is collected though a 
mail questionnaire survey of public listed companies 
in Malaysia during 2003. Five-hundred and four 
questionnaires were sent to the head of the internal 
departments of public companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad.  A total of 101 (20.03 percent) 
responses were received of which 60 (12 percent) 
were useable responses. Of the 41 non-useable 
responses, 30 were eliminated due to the companies 
having fully outsourced and co-sourced their internal 
audit functions, thus information relating to the 
quality of internal audits was unavailable. The 
remaining responses were excluded due to incomplete 
information. While the original questionnaire 
contained several questions, the two questions of 
interest in this paper deal with the auditing experience 
and accounting qualification of the internal audit 
staff. The relevant questions of the survey instrument 
on the internal audit function are reported in the 
appendix. Other information on firm performance, 
audit committees and growth opportunities is 
obtained from the annual reports of the respective 
firms (year-ending 2003) responding to the survey.  
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The internal audit function includes risk management 
and better internal controls which should manifest in 
better firm performance. The dependant variable, firm 
performance is measured as the firm‘s return on assets 
(ROA). We use this accounting based measure 
because internal audits and the audit committee are 
concerned with, among other things, providing 
assurance regarding the integrity of financial 
information, that is, that the firm‘s performance is 
accurately reported. Hence, we would expect to see a 
positive association between IAQ and firm 
performance.  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
 
The measure of internal audit quality is separated into 
two variables to capture the auditing experience 
(PSAPA) and accounting qualifications (PSAQ) of the 
internal audit staff. PSAPA is the proportion of 
internal audit staff with prior work experience in 
auditing to the size of the internal audit function while 
PSAQ is the proportion of internal audit staff with an 
accounting qualification to the size of the internal 
audit function.  These measures also control for the 
size of the internal audit team since they are 
proportions of the total number of staff in the internal 
audit department. Prior research and legislation 
suggests that audit committee effectiveness is 
dependent, in part, on the extent to which the 
committee is independent and suggest that the audit 
committee should consist of a majority of 
non-executive or independent directors (e.g. 
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Raghunandan et al 2001)
20
.  Our measure of audit 
committee independence (ACI) is an indicator 
variable of audit committee effectiveness (the 
proportion of independent members to the total 
number of members in the audit committee).  The 
measure of growth adopted in this study, the 
market-to-book value of equity, is used extensively in 
prior research (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992) and is 
obtained from the annual reports of the firms 
completing the usable responses to the questionnaire. 
 Following Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) and 
Gul and Chia (1994) we adopt the multiplicative 
model for testing our hypotheses. The model requires 
transformation of the independent variables into a 
point-scale for the analyses.  The three point-scales 
for PSAPA and PSAQ are determined following 
assessment of the distribution of the variables. Table 1 
reports the distribution of the proportions for PSAPA 
and PSAQ.  The scores for each of the variables are 
converted to a three-point scale. PSAPA is a 
three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit 
staff with auditing experience: 1 if the proportion is 
<= 0.5; 2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; and, 3 if 
the proportion = 1.  PSAQ is a three-point scale of 
the proportion of internal audit staff with an 
accounting qualification: 1 if the proportion is <= 0.5; 
2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; and, 3 if the 
proportion = 1.  The measure of audit committee 
independence (ACI), the proportion of independent 
members to the total number of members in the audit 
committee is: 0 if the proportion is < 0.7; 1 if the 
proportion is >= 0.7 and <= 1. The cut-off point is 
based on the distribution of the proportions. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.3 Control variables   
 
Agency theory suggests that increased leverage 
controls agency costs by reducing the amount of cash 
available to managers for discretionary investments.   
Hence, managers are constrained in making 
sub-optimal decisions from the debt-holders 
perspective.  Leverage and liquidity also impact on 
the firm‘s ability to generate profits. We use two 
measures of debt (total debt and long-term debt) 
which are included as control variables as they 
represents an external corporate governance control 
which is likely to impact on firm performance.  
Leverage is measured as: Leverage = current and 
non-current borrowings divided by total equity.  This 
ratio indicates how firms choose to finance operations.  
The lower the ratio, the greater the protection for 
lenders, who rank before shareholders.  A measure of 
long term debt is included and is measured as NCL = 
net current liabilities divided by total assets.  The 
liquidity ratios, inventory ratio and accounts 
receivable ratio, are included in the model as these 
                                                   
20 Bursa Malaysia recently prohibited executive directors 
from being part of the audit committee. 
variables are likely to impact on firm risk. These 
variables are measured as: INV/TA – inventory 
divided by total assets; and, AR/TA – account 
receivable divided by total assets. 
 
4. Method 
 
4.1 Multiplicative model 
 
The multiplicative model (Althauser, 1971; 
Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990), used extensively in 
contingency-type research, is adopted for testing the 
interactive effects of internal auditor quality (IAQ), 
growth (market-to-book value of equity) and audit 
committee independence (ACI) on firm performance 
(ROA) in hypothesis one and hypothesis two. This 
involves using the following multiple regression 
equations: 
 
Y = a0 + a1 X1 + a2 X2 + a3 X1 X2 +   
               
  (1) 
Y = b0 + b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 + b4 X1 X2 + b5 X1 X3 + 
b6 X2 X3 + b7 X1 X2 X3 +   (2) 
 
Where Y = Firm performance (ROA); X1 = 
Internal auditor quality proxies using a three point 
scale for the proportion of internal audit staff with 
prior work experience in auditing to the size of the 
internal audit function (PSAPA) and proportion of 
internal audit staff with accounting qualification to the 
size of the internal audit function (PSAQ); X2 = 
Growth is measured as the market-to-book value of 
equity; X3 = Audit committee independence using an 
indicator variable for the proportion of independent 
members to the size of the audit committee); X1 X2 , X1 
X3 , X2 X3 , X1 X2 X3 = Interaction of X1 , X2 and X3.  
The regression models test whether the 
interactive effects of the independent variables are 
important in explaining variations in firm performance. 
If a3 and b7 are significant, this is equivalent to saying 
that the corresponding incremental R
2
 is statistically 
significant at the same probability level (Southwood, 
1978, p.1168; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan., 1990, p.22; 
Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Hartmann and Moers, 1999). 
This means that the introduction of the term X1 X2 in 
equation (1) and X1 X2 X3 in equation (2) add 
significantly to the variance explained. However, this 
provides no information on whether the posited 
relationship is monotonic
21
. In order to test for a 
monotonic relationship, the partial derivatives from 
the above regression equations are examined 
(Southwood, 1978; Schoonhoven, 1981).  For 
example, in testing whether the relationship between 
IAQ and ROA depend on the level of a firm‘s growth 
opportunities (MBE) (hypothesis one), we take the 
partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to X1, as 
below: 
                                                   
21 For a discussion on monotonic and non-monotonic effects, 
see Schoonhoven (1981). 
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Y /  X1 = a1 + a3 X2   
     
  (3) 
The partial derivative of the impact of internal 
auditor quality (X1) on firm performance (Y) in 
equation (3) depends on the level of growth (X2). If the 
value of Y /  X1 in equation (3) is always positive or 
always negative over the entire observable range of X2, 
the relationship between Y and X1 would be regarded 
as monotonic; otherwise, it would be regarded as 
non-monotonic. Similarly, the partial derivative of 
equation (2) with respect to X1 is examined, as below: 
 
Y /  X1 = b1 + b4 X2 + b5 X3 + b7 X2 X3  
     
 (4) 
 
Equation (4) illustrates that the relationship 
between Y and X1 depends on both the level of growth 
and audit committee independence. If audit committee 
independence (X3) is a constant, equation (4) can be 
re-arranged as: 
 
Y /  X1 = (b1 + b5 X3) + (b4 + b7 X3) X2  
     
 (5) 
 
In this way, the effect of growth on the 
relationship between internal auditor quality and firm 
performance can be examined conditional on the 
independence of the audit committee. 
 
5. Results 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  
The average ROA is 4.7 percent while the average 
market-to-book ratio of equity (growth) is 1.51.  
Leverage is 41 percent, the long term debt ratio is 14.5 
percent and the liquidity ratios average between 13 
and 14 percent. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The correlations between the dependent 
variable ROA and the independent variables are 
shown in Table 3. The only variable that is positively 
and significantly correlated with ROA is the measure 
of growth opportunities.  The long-term debt ratio is 
negatively and significantly correlated with ROA. 
  
Insert Table 3 here 
  
Table 4 and 5 provide the results of the multiple 
regression models performed to test the various 
hypotheses
22
. As reported in Table 4, the interaction 
terms between internal auditor quality and growth are 
                                                   
22 The statistical analyses and interpretations of the results 
followed the approach adopted by Govindarajan and Fisher 
(1990) and Gul and Chia (1994). 
positively and significantly associated with firm 
performance (ROA) for the two proxies of internal 
auditor quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and PSAQ)
23
. The 
coefficients in Equation A and B suggest that a 
positive association between IAQ (in terms of 
accounting backgrounds or prior experience of the 
staff) and firm performance is contingent on the level 
of growth opportunities.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The partial derivatives of Equation A and B in 
Table 4 over different internal auditor quality proxies 
give the following results: 
 
Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0347 + 0.0380X2 
     
   (6.1) 
Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0181 + 0.0298X2 
     
   (6.2) 
 
Equation A and B will be zero when X2 
(growth) has a value of 0.9132 and 0.4548 
respectively, which are known as the inflection points 
(i.e. where the change in the direction of the relations 
occur). In other words, the association between IAQ 
and performance (ROA) are positive (negative) when 
growth is above (below) the inflection points, as 
shown in Figure 1.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
These inflection points are within the range of 
observable values for X2 (1 - 5, see Table 1) for the 
above equations. Therefore, the above results show 
that for firms with a higher level of growth, internal 
auditor quality is positively associated with better firm 
performance in terms of ROA, and the reverse is true 
for firms with a lower level of growth, consistent with 
hypothesis one. 
Table 5 reports the results of testing hypothesis 
two. Similar to the above analysis, it is found that the 
three-way interaction terms are negative and 
significant for the two proxies for internal auditor 
quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and p<0.01 for PSAQ)
24
. 
To examine the effect of audit committee 
independence on the relation between growth, internal 
auditor quality and firm performance, the partial 
derivatives of Equation A and B in Table 5 over 
                                                   
23 An equivalent test, as suggested in Cohen and Cohen 
(1983), is to test the statistical significance of the 
incremental R2 with the addition of the interaction term. 
Unreported results show that the increases in R2 are 
statistically significant with the interaction term included in 
the regression (For example, R2 increases from 19 percent to 
29 percent in the case of PSAPA). 
24 Unreported results also show that the addition of the ACI 
variable significantly increases the explanatory power of the 
models. 
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internal auditor quality are analyzed as follows: 
 
Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2 + 0.0733 
X3 – 0.0626 X2 X3   
 (7.1) 
Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2 + 0.1446 
X3 – 0.0970 X2 X3   
 (7.2) 
Equations A and B suggest that the effect of 
internal auditor quality on firm performance is a 
function of both the level of growth and audit 
committee independence
25
.  Govindarajan and Fisher 
(1990: 274) suggest that the values and significance of 
the unstandardised coefficients will change when the 
origin points of the independent variables change, but 
a change in the origin points of the independent 
variables will have no impact on the value or 
significance of the unstandardised coefficients of the 
three-way interaction term.  Therefore, apart from the 
three-way interaction term (b7) the coefficients for 
Equation 2 in Table 5 are not interpretable since they 
can be altered by shifting the origin points of X1, X2, 
and X3.  Consequently, the purpose of Equation 2 is 
to provide information on the interaction of X1, X2, and 
X3 on Y, not on the main effects. In addition, 
multicollinearity is not an issue with Equation 2 as 
multicollinearity is eliminated by manipulating the 
origin points of the independent variables and the R
2
 
to zero which does not affect the significance of b7 
(Govindarajan and Fisher 1990). 
 
Inset Table 5 here 
 
In order to analyze the relationship under low 
audit committee independence, ACI (X3) is set to 0.  
The above equations are then expressed as follows: 
 
Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2   
     
    (8.1) 
Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2  
     
    (8.2) 
The inflection points are 1.123 and 1.313 
respectively. On the other hand, the equations are 
expressed as follows if ACI is set to 1: 
 
Y /  X1 = 0.0141 - 0.0099 X2   
     
            (9.1) 
Y /  X1 = 0.0654 – 0.0367 X2   
        
                    (9.2) 
The inflection points will be 1.424 and 1.782 
respectively. These points are illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
                                                   
25  The subsequent interpretation followed the approach 
adopted by Govindarajan and Fisher (1990). 
It is shown that for firms with fewer 
independent directors on the audit committee, the 
equations will be positive when X2 is high (above the 
inflection points), meaning that there is a positive 
effect of internal auditor quality on firm performance 
for high growth firms with more executive directors 
on the audit committee.  Interestingly, for firms with 
more non-executive directors on the audit committee, 
the equations are negative when X2 is above the 
inflection points, suggesting that the effect of internal 
auditor quality on firm performance is negative for 
high growth firms with independent audit committees.  
This provides evidence of conflict between internal 
audit quality and audit committee independence in 
terms of their effects on firm performance, consistent 
with hypothesis two
26
. 
 
5.1 Robustness tests 
 
We conducted three additional tests to assess the 
robustness of our results. First, we included industry 
dummies in all the regressions to control for the 
confounding effects of industry differences. Second, 
we included size (log of total assets) in all the 
regressions with and without the industry controls. 
Regression analyses with controls (dummy variables) 
for the 8 industries with and without the size variable 
did not change the qualitative nature of the results. 
Finally, we also used return on equity (ROE) as 
another measure of firm performance and the 
qualitative nature of the results, in general, remain 
unchanged.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the current legislative environment, many 
organizations are considering implementing an 
internal audit function, or are taking actions to 
improve IAQ, such as appointing more personnel with 
auditing and accounting qualifications in the internal 
audit department. However, the extant literature 
provides little guidance as to which governance 
characteristics should be improved if an organization 
desires to increase IAQ and, subsequently, its 
performance. Monitoring internal control is the result 
of actions by, and interactions between, management, 
the internal auditor, the external auditor and the audit 
committee (Krishnan, 2005). This paper provides an 
insight, albeit preliminary, into the role of internal 
audits and the impact on firm performance and 
explores the inter-relationships between firm and 
governance factors.  Primarily, our results show that 
effective governance, in terms of internal audits and 
the audit committee is contingent on the risks 
associated with the firm‘s environment.  In this paper 
                                                   
26 Other than analyses on partial derivatives, Hartmann and 
Moers (1999) suggests that an alternative test of 
non-monotonicity is by means of sub-group linear 
regressions. This analysis has not been done in view of the 
small sample size of the study (N = 60). 
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the risks are those associated with the firm‘s 
investment opportunities.   
The findings are subject to a number of 
limitations. Cross-sectional studies such as this can 
establish associations, but not causality.  Given the 
paucity of research into the association between 
internal audits and the audit committee and contingent 
factors affecting corporate governance it is difficult to 
identify pervasive themes.  There are many different 
types of internal control systems, we have only 
considered two.  Future research could also consider 
the role of the board in the interplay between IAQ and 
ACI. Another factor that may affect these results is the 
method of data collection, a mail survey, which is 
subject to response bias. The results are obtained from 
a small subset of firms that responded to the internal 
audit survey questionnaire. The results could have 
been different if other firms that did not respond to the 
survey are included in the sample. This research 
project provides preliminary results and a more 
comprehensive, national industry association-backed 
study which increases the sample number and number 
of participating firms in Malaysia would add to the 
validity of the results.  Finally, our data is from 
Malaysia and the findings may not be germane to 
other countries.  
The main thrust of our result support the notion 
that firms need to establish an internal control system 
to manage risk effectively.  An audit committee with 
a majority of non-executive directors may constrain 
the efficiency of internal audits which impacts firm 
performance. That is, not all firms benefit from ACI, 
for some firms it is imperative that the AC has 
firm-specific knowledge about operations when 
assessing risks. This understanding can only be 
acquired from insider knowledge. Thus, it is more 
important for the IA to align with management rather 
than the AC when operating in an uncertain 
environment such as high investment opportunities.  
What is important is that there should be a fit between 
the oganisations' operating environment and the 
monitoring and control functions of the IA and AC.  
Therefore we encourage future research that considers 
alternate models of factors that may influence IAQ and 
enhance corporate governance. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the results of this study have implications 
for policy setters and regulators. The negative impact 
of ACI on the association between IAQ and 
performance for growth firms suggests that it is 
inappropriate to mandate specific AC composition; 
attention should be focused on firm-specific 
requirements.  Studies of this nature are useful to 
organizations trying to improve the quality of their 
internal audit, as evaluated from the perspective of the 
firm‘s growth opportunities and their audit committee.  
By maintaining the right mix of governance 
mechanisms, overall governance and hence 
performance may be improved.   
Finally, the results of this study question the 
recently released key amendments to the Bursa 
Malaysia corporate governance framework in 2008 
which require all members of the audit committee to 
be non-executive directors (Mondovisione News, 
2008). The key amendments of the Listing 
Requirements (LR) and MESDAQ Market Listing 
Requirements (MMLR) are aimed at raising the 
standards of corporate governance for companies 
listed on Main Board, Second Board and MESDAQ 
Market and increasing investor confidence
27
.   
However, the results from this study demonstrate that 
an insider dominated audit committee may cause 
conflict for the internal auditor which, in turn, has an 
adverse effect on firm performance. This suggests that 
the important thing is not the independence of the 
audit committee, but rather having the right mix of 
members with the necessary skills to evaluate the risks 
faced by the firm. The key amendments to the Bursa 
Malaysia corporate governance framework may need 
to be adjusted, for example, to an audit committee 
composition which reflects a simple majority of 
non-executive directors (with a non-executive chair).  
This will allow for representation of inside directors 
who possess the firm-specific knowledge necessary to 
properly assess risk especially in high-growth 
opportunity firms.  Consequently, this will allow for 
the balance necessary between the "agent" and 
"principal" representation. The trend towards 
legislating for non-executive/independent 
representation (where there was often little or none on 
boards) is not slowing. However, this does not mean 
that the public policy pendulum cannot be adjusted 
back somewhat. 
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Appendix 
 
Extract of Internal Audit Survey 2003 relating to in-house internal audit arrangements. 
 
Question 5. How many staff are there in your in-house audit section/unit? 
___________________ 
 
Question 6. How many of the staff in your internal audit department have 
  i)  an accounting qualification?__________________________ 
  ii)  prior work experience in auditing?_____________________ 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the variables 
 
  PSAPA PSAQ 
scale point   N N 
1 
proportion<=0.1 1 
19 
1 
17 
0.1<proportion<=0.2 2 1 
0.2<proportion<=0.3 2 0 
0.3<proportion<=0.4 2 5 
0.4<proportion<=0.5 12 10 
2 
0.5<proportion<=0.6 2 
10 
3 
11 
0.6<proportion<=0.7 4 3 
0.7<proportion<=0.8 3 3 
0.8<proportion<=0.9 1 2 
3 0.9<proportion<=1.0 31 31 32 32 
   60  60 
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  ACI 
scale point   N 
0 
0.4<=proportion<0.5 1 
33 
0.5<=proportion<0.6 2 
0.6<=proportion<0.7 30 
1 
0.7<=proportion<0.8 18 
27 
0.8<=proportion<0.9 2 
0.9<=proportion<1.0 7 
   60 
   
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N = 60) 
 
     
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
     
     
ROA 0.047  0.057  0.253  -0.265  
PSAPA 2.200 3.000 3.000 1.000 
PSAQ 2.250 3.000 3.000 1.000 
ACE 0.450 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Growth  1.151 0.803 4.262 0.229 
Leverage 0.407 0.378 1.000 0.006 
INV/TA 0.133 0.069 0.990 0.000 
AR/TA 0.141 0.104 0.510 0.000 
NCL 0.145 0.075 0.790 0.000 
     
 
Notes: The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the 
proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit 
function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the 
proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 
if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of audit committee 
effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the audit committee), 
0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and 
non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account 
receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets. 
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Table 3. Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 
          
Variable ROA PSAPA PSAQ ACI Growth  Leverage INV/TA AR/TA NCL 
          
          
ROA 1  0.064  0.083  0.003  0.569*** -0.280** -0.020 0.188 -0.362*** 
PSAPA  1 0.738***  -0.055  -0.213 0.234* -0.268** -0.113 0.250* 
PSAQ   1 -0.104  -0.079 -0.176 0.266** 0.233* -0.181 
ACI    1 -0.067 -0.105 0.197 0.191 -0.125 
Growth      1 0.099 -0.271** -0.014 0.062 
Leverage      1 -0.027 0.200 0.538*** 
INV/TA       1 0.437*** -0.258** 
AR/TA        1 -0.195 
NCL         1 
          
Notes: *, **, *** two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. The variables are defined as 
follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work 
experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if 
proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size 
of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of 
audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the audit 
committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and 
non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided 
by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets.  
 
Table 4. Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality and Growth 
 
 Equation A Equation B 
 IAQ = PSAPA IAQ = PSAQ 
VAR Coefficients Coefficients 
   
Intercept 0.102**  0.051  
IAQ (X1) -0.030*  -0.007  
Growth (X2) -0.022  0.000  
IAQ*Growth (X1 X2) 0.028**  0.018*  
Leverage -0.047  -0.039  
INV/TA -0.028  -0.052  
AR/TA 0.087**  0.078**  
NCL -0.133**  -0.154**  
   
Adj.R2 0.291  0.276  
F. Value 4.455***  4.206***  
  . 
Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit 
staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 
0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting 
qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1;  
Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – 
inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by 
total assets. 
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Table 5. Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality, Growth and Audit Committee Independence 
 Equation A Equation B 
 IAQ = PSAPA IAQ = PSAQ 
VAR Coefficients Coefficients 
Intercept 0.167**  0.186***  
IAQ (X1) 
-0.053**  -0.064***  
Growth (X2) 
-0.059*  -0.071**  
ACI (X3) 
-0.178**  -0.304***  
IAQ*Growth (X1 X2) 
0.044***  0.049***  
IAQ*ACI (X1 X3) 
0.063**  0.123***  
Growth*ACI (X2 X3) 
0.160***  0.206***  
IAQ*Growth*ACI (X1 X2 X3) 
-0.062***  -0.085***  
Leverage -0.082  -0.054  
INV/TA -0.002  -0.054*  
AR/TA 0.090**  0.069*  
NCL -0.079  -0.080  
   
Adj. R2 0.302  0.383  
F. Value 3.322  4.333  
   
Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit 
staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 
0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting 
qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – 
indicator variable of audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in 
the audit committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - 
current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account 
receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets.   
 
Figure 1. Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on Firm‘s Growth (X2) 
  
Panel A: Internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing. (X1 = PSAPA) 
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Panel B: Internal audit staff with accounting qualification. (X1 = PSAQ) 
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Figure 2. Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on Firm‘s Growth (X2), for 
Different Levels of Audit Committee Independence (ACI) (X3) 
 
Panel A: Internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing. (X1 = PSAPA) 
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Panel B: Internal audit staff with accounting qualification. (X1 = PSAQ) 
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DOES THE MANDATORY BID RULE INCREASE VALUATION, 
LIQUIDITY, AND DECREASE RISK? 
 
Andre Carvalhal*, Julia Nicolau** 
 
Abstract  
 
This study analyzes whether the mandatory bid rule has an impact on firm valuation, liquidity and 
volatility. Using data from Brazilian firms that have voluntarily granted the bid rule, we provide 
evidence of a positive relation between bid rule, firm valuation and liquidity. In contrast, the bid rule 
does not decrease firm volatility. Our results support the hypotheses that the bid rule strengthens the 
protection for minority shareholders. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Corporate governance has attracted considerable 
attention following recent corporate scandals in 
developed countries. One key aspect of corporate 
governance is the degree of protection provided to 
minority shareholders. When investor protection is 
weak, conflicts of interest may arise between the 
controlling shareholder and outside shareholders due 
to the potential expropriation of private benefits by 
controlling shareholders.  
Our aim in this paper is to analyze the role of a 
specific regulation related to control benefits, namely, 
a mandatory bid rule. This rule implies that the 
acquirer of a control block is also obliged to offer 
minority shareholders the same (or partially the same) 
price for their shares. Despite its simple definition, the 
mandatory bid is one of the most controversial and 
debated rules developed to protect minority 
shareholders, because it presents several pros and cons 
(see Bebchuk (1994), Bergstrom, Hogfeldt, and Molin 
(1997), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Burkart and 
Panunzi (2004), Carvalhal da Silva and 
Subrahmanyam (2007), and Sepe (2008)).  
On one side, the mandatory bid rule protects 
minority investors because all shareholders are treated 
equally, share any control premium, and have an exit 
right in the event of a change of control. On the other 
side, the mandatory bid rule has been subject to severe 
criticism, because it fails to protect minority 
shareholders adequately, and does not prevent the 
extraction of private benefits. By raising the cost of 
acquisitions, the mandatory bid rule is likely to 
prevent value-increasing transactions, and reduce the 
value of the firm.  
This paper examines the effect of the bid rule on 
firm valuation, liquidity and volatility in Brazil. Brazil 
offers a unique case study given the presence of a 
large number of firms that have voluntarily decided to 
grant the bid rule for their minority shareholders. Our 
results indicate a positive relation between bid rule, 
firm valuation and liquidity. In contrast, the bid rule 
does not decrease firm volatility.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
presents a brief review of literature on the bid rule. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 
4 contains the results of the event studies. Section 5 
discusses our findings and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The mandatory bid rule has been vastly studied in the 
literature (Bebchuk (1994), Bergstrom, Hogfeldt, and 
Molin (1997), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Burkart and 
Panunzi (2004), Carvalhal da Silva and 
Subrahmanyam (2007), among others). This rule can 
be defined as the obligation imposed on the acquirer 
of the control of a company to make an offer to all or a 
part of the holders of all or a part of the securities 
issued by the company for a determined price.  
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There are two strong arguments in favor of the 
mandatory bid rule. First, all shareholders should be 
treated equally and share any control premium that is 
paid to controlling shareholders. Second, all 
shareholders should have an exit right in the event of a 
takeover.  
From these arguments, the mandatory bid rule 
would protect minority shareholders from value 
expropriations by opportunistic buyers, which would 
increase minority share value, and reduce the firm‘s 
cost for raising equity capital.  
Carvalhal da Silva and Subrahmanyam (2007) 
show that the mandatory bid rule strengthens the 
protection for minority shareholders in event of a 
takeover. This result is particularly relevant if the 
takeover increases private benefits of the controlling 
shareholders rather than all the shareholders' wealth 
(Bigelli and Mengoli (1999), Bae, Kang, and Kim 
(2002), and Shleifer and Vishny (2003)).  
On the other side, the economic literature has 
pointed out that the mandatory bid rule may prevent 
value-increasing sales of control. Burkart and Panunzi 
(2004) show that the mandatory bid rule eliminates 
inefficient control transfers at the cost of discouraging 
more efficient control transfers in firms with a 
dominant shareholder (Bebchuk (1994)). Further, the 
benefits but not the costs of the mandatory bid rule 
tend to disappear when control is consolidated via 
dual class shares or pyramids. They conclude that the 
mandatory bid rule strengthens minority shareholder 
protection at the expense of promoting efficient 
control transfers.  
On balance of all pros and cons, we hypothesize 
that the bid rule offers enough benefits that outweigh 
its costs, because its justifications seem more 
compelling than its criticisms regarding minority 
shareholder protection.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
Our sample includes 75 firms listed on Sao Paulo 
stock exchange (Bovespa) that voluntarily granted the 
bid rule for voting and/or non-voting shares. We 
exclude companies with incomplete or unavailable 
information and firms without share liquidity. Most of 
the data come from the Economatica, a financial 
database that contains a wide coverage of Brazilian 
stock market data.  
We perform an event study to determine the 
impact of the bid rule on the stock return, liquidity, 
and volatility. The event study methodology requires 
the precise identification of the event date. In the case 
of the bid rule, it is difficult to identify precisely the 
event date, because firms may discuss over time the 
possibility of voluntarily granting the bid rule for 
voting and non-voting shares.  
Since the voluntary adoption of the bid rule must 
be written on the company charter, we consider two 
events: the date on which the call for the shareholders‘ 
meeting becomes publicly available, and the date on 
which the shareholders approve the inclusion of the 
bid rule on the company charter.  
To be included in the event study, the company 
must have trading activity during the 250-day window 
before the voluntary adoption of the bid rule. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the bid rule must be the 
only relevant event approved by the shareholders‘ 
meeting.  
After imposing these constraints, we exclude 52 
companies that do not have the necessary data to 
conduct the event study. Our final sample consists of 
23 firms, which can be divided as follows: 19 firms 
granting the bid rule for voting shares, and 23 firms 
granting the bid rule for non-voting shares. Note that 
most of the excluded companies have voluntarily 
granted the bid rule since their IPO, so there was no 
trading activity before their going public.  
To calculate the abnormal returns, we estimate 
the market model using the Sao Paulo stock exchange 
index, and a 250-day estimation window from trading 
day –255 to –6 relative to the event date (t=0). On a 
particular day t, the abnormal return ARt is defined as 
the return in excess of its expected return calculated 
from the market model. Cumulative abnormal returns 
over days -1 to +1 (CAR [-1,+1]), -5 to +1 (CAR 
[-5,+1]), and -5 to +5 (CAR [-5,+5]) are calculated 
around the event date. To assess statistical significance, 
we use the traditional t-test for abnormal returns. Due 
to event clustering and possible event-induced 
volatility, we compute a bootstrap p-value (see 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), Aktas, 
DeBodt, and Roll (2004), and Elayan, Pukthuanthong, 
and Roll (2005)).  
In order to analyze the effect of the bid rule on 
firm liquidity (trading volume relative to the total 
market value) and volatility (annualized standard 
deviation of daily returns in the last 250 trading days), 
we run regressions in which the liquidity (volatility) of 
share i in day t depends on the liquidity (volatility) of 
share i in day t-1, and on the liquidity (volatility) of 
the market index in day t. We run the models using a 
501-day window from trading day –250 to +250 
relative to the event date (t=0). The following 
regressions are specified:  
 
 
where Liqi,t is the liquidity of firm i in day t, Liqm,t is 
the liquidity of the market index in day t,  
Voli,t is the volatility of firm i in day t, Volm,t is the 
volatility of the market index in day t, Bidi,t  
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm i 
voluntarily grants the bid rule in day t,  
e and u are error terms.  
 
4. Results  
 
The results of the event study for the relation between 
stock returns and voluntary adoption of the bid rule 
are reported in Table 1. The abnormal returns for 
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voting shares are positive (ranging from 0.03% to 
1.96%) during both events, and most of them are 
statistically significant. When the bid rule is for 
non-voting shares, they also present positive abnormal  
returns, but the statistical significance is lower when 
compared to that of voting shares.  
 
Table 1 
 
Overall, our results provide some evidence of 
positive abnormal returns when the firm announces or 
approves the bid rule in the shareholders‘ meeting. We 
can note that the market reacts to both the call for the 
shareholders‘ meeting and the shareholders‘ meeting 
itself.  
Although the call for a shareholder‘s meeting 
does not necessarily mean that the bid rule is going to 
be approved in the shareholders‘ meeting, it conveys 
information about the probability of the approval.  
The results for liquidity are shown in Table 2. 
The current share liquidity depends strongly on the 
previous share liquidity and on the current market 
liquidity. Most importantly, there is a strong increase 
in the liquidity when the firm calls and approves the 
bid rule in the shareholders‘ meeting.  
 
Table 2 
 
Table 3 reports the results for volatility. We see 
that the current share volatility depends on the 
previous share volatility, and on the current volatility 
of the market, but is not affected by the adoption of 
the bid rule.  
 
Table 3 
 
Overall, the event studies and provides evidence that 
the bid rule is positively associated with firm 
valuation and liquidity, but is not related to volatility. 
Our results support the hypothesis that the bid rule 
strengthens the protection for minority shareholders.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This paper analyzes whether the adoption of the bid 
rule has an impact on firm valuation, liquidity and 
volatility. Brazil offers a unique case study given the 
presence of a large number of firms that have 
voluntarily granted the bid rule for their minority 
shareholders. Our analysis shows that firm valuation 
and liquidity tends to increase when the firm 
voluntarily grants the bid rule for minority 
shareholders. In contrast, firm volatility does not 
decrease after the adoption of the bid rule. Overall, our 
results support the hypothesis that the bid rule 
strengthens the protection for minority shareholders.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm 
performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S&P 500 firm in 2005. 
The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample 
compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interest, 
and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by 
management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in the previous studies. Managerial 
ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the 
shape of firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects 
capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by 
both firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously 
determined by the other two variables. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The effects of managerial ownership on firm value 
have been of particular research interest in corporate 
finance (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The literature 
generally agrees that managers‘ and shareholders‘ 
interests are not fully aligned. The interest conflict 
between management and shareholders produces 
agency problem, which in turn reduce firm value. 
Thus, an increase of managerial ownership from a low 
level can help to connect the interests between insiders 
and shareholders, and also lead to better decisions, 
producing higher firm value. However, when the 
equity owned by management reaches a certain level, 
this increase in managerial ownership may give 
mangers greater freedom to pursue their own interests 
without considering a resulting decrease of firm value. 
Only when managerial ownership approaches a 
considerably high level, can the agency problem be 
mitigated, and the firm value maximized. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that managerial ownership and firm 
value have a nonlinear relationship. 
A series of researches examines the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm value. The 
literature provide evidence to support the nonlinear 
relationship hypothesis. Morck et al. (1988) conducted 
pioneering work, in which they used piecewise linear 
regressions to estimate the relationship between 
Tobin‘s Q and the shareholdings of the board of 
directors for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They 
found a nonlinear association between managerial 
ownership and firm value. McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) confirmed the nonlinear relationship in their 
investigation of the firms listed in either NYSE or 
AMEX in 1976 and 1986. Similar evidence of the 
nonlinear relationship was detected by Short and 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
72 
Keasey (1999) in UK firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange for the period 1988 to 1992, and by Miguel 
et al. (2004) on Spanish companies listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange. 
Further research shows that agency relationship 
between managers and shareholders has the potential 
to influence financial decision making, which in turn 
impacts on firm value. Equities held by management 
could motivate managers to make financial decisions 
that are either only in their own interests, or happen to 
coincide with shareholders‘ benefit, thereby leading to 
lower or higher firm value. Cho (1998) applied a 
cross-sectional data set of Fortune 500 manufacturing 
firms in 1991 to explore the relationships among 
ownership structure, investment and corporate value. 
He found that insider ownership affected investment, 
which in turn influenced corporate value. Davies et al. 
(2005) reached a similar conclusion with research on 
publicly listed UK companies, asserting that 
investment decision making is a function of 
managerial ownership and accordingly, determines 
firm performance. 
Leverage choice is another important financial 
decision in addition to investment policy, and has 
various effects on firm value. Since the inaugural 
literature by Modigliani and Miller (1963), the 
relationship between capital structure and firm 
performance has prevailed as a discussion topic in 
finance theory. It is often predicted that financial 
leverage influences agency costs and thereby affects 
corporate value because better leverage setting could 
help mitigate agency costs by the threat of acquisition 
and financial distress, which causes personal losses to 
managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. 
(Williams, 1987) This has been proved by Ross (1977) 
and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling 
hypothesis and Jensen‘s (1986) free cashflow 
hypothesis.   
Evidence about how managerial behavior arose 
from equity holding influences the choice of capital 
structure directly and indirectly has been put forward 
since the end of last century. Friend and Lang (1988) 
examined whether managerial entrenchment induced 
by insiders‘ equity holding ―at least in part‖ motivates 
capital structure decisions. Berger et al. (1997) applied 
cross-sectional analysis and found evidence that firm 
leverage is affected by the degree of managerial 
entrenchment. Entrenched managers seek to avoid 
debt, and therefore protect themselves and the 
company from external threat. In an Australian sample, 
Brailsford et al. (2002) found a nonlinear relationship 
between the level of equity stake owned by 
management and the capital structure measured by a 
debt/equity ratio. However, the prior referenced 
literature usually focused on the relationships between 
either managerial ownership and firm value (Morck et 
al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), or between 
managerial ownership and investment decision and 
firm value (Cho, 1998; Davies et al., 2005 etc.), or 
between managerial ownership and capital structure 
(Friend and Lang, 1988). 
In contrast, our research is conducted from a new 
angle. Based on investigations of the relationships 
between managerial ownership and firm value, and 
managerial ownership and capital structure, we 
detected interactive effects among the three proxies. 
We also employed a relatively recent data set 
comprising S&P 500 firms observed in 2005. We 
examined whether the early findings by Morck et al. 
(1988) and Cho (1998) using Fortune 500 data could 
be verified by using S&P 500 data in a relatively 
recent market environment. 
We obtained the following new findings. First, 
we used OLS regression, we replicated the nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value, which are discussed in research by Morck et al. 
(1988) and Cho (1998). However, we found that the 
turning points of managerial ownerships with respect 
to the firm value had moved upward. For example, the 
turning points in Morck et al. (1988) were 5% and 
25%, and in Cho (1998) at 7% and 38% respectively. 
By contrast, in our regression results, they were 17% 
and 67%. We therefore argue that managers need more 
ownership to control the firm for their own benefit, or 
need motivations to align with shareholders‘ interest. 
Second, we found that managerial ownership 
drove the capital structure as a nonlinear shape — also 
due to managerial entrenchment. However, we also 
found that the directions of the nonlinear shapes for 
managerial ownership and firm value, and for 
managerial ownership and capital structure, were 
oppositely related. Finally, the direct influence of 
managerial ownership on firm value became 
insignificant when capital structure was taken into 
consideration. The results from simultaneous 
regressions show that managerial shareholding 
significantly impacts capital structure, which in turn 
imposes effect on firm value. The results of 
simultaneous equations also demonstrate that capital 
structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical predictions 
about the relationships between managerial ownership, 
debt policy, and firm value. Section 3 explains the data 
sample and interprets the statistics. Section 4 describes 
the empirical specifications and results, and also 
discusses the methodology and models employed in 
this study. Section 5 concludes this research. 
 
2 Theoretical predictions 
 
Much of the literature indicates that managerial 
ownership affects corporate value because equity 
holding by management could motivate managers to 
make financial decisions in their own benefit or for 
shareholders‘ interest, thereby leading to decreased or 
increased firm value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999; Miguel et 
al., 2004), and according to Davies et al. (2005), ―The 
effectiveness of these incentives is potentially a 
function of the level of managerial ownership in the 
firm‖. When low levels of managerial ownership exist, 
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external discipline and internal monitoring dominate 
management behavior to promote maximization of 
corporate value, so we would expect a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value. At intermediate levels of managerial ownership, 
with greater power coming from greater ownership, 
managers may pursue their personal wealth at the 
expense of corporate value. As managerial ownership 
reaches a certain level, management interest converges 
to that of shareholders, which produces a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. 
Also important is the issue of how managerial 
ownership affects corporate value. Brailsford et al. 
(2002) argue that corporate managers and external 
block owners are two key groups of shareholders with 
a powerful influence on the decisions in a firm‘s 
resource allocation. Cho (1998) found that managerial 
ownership affects firm value because shareholding 
motivates management to make investment decisions 
to their own or to the shareholders‘ benefit, which 
consequently affects firm performance. Leverage 
choice is another important financial decision, and has 
various effects on firm value. Debt increases the 
bankruptcy risks of a firm, and self-interested 
managers have incentives to reduce corporate debt to a 
level that is less than optimal. However, from the 
managerial perspective, the capital structure decision 
is not only determined by the basic concerns of risk 
and controls — the values, goals, preferences and 
desires of managers are also important inputs in 
finance decision making. 
At low levels of managerial ownership, 
managers have limited voting power and influence; 
while external related beneficiaries, such as block 
holders and creditors, have the ability to monitor and 
restrict opportunistic behavior by managers. 
Managerial ownership is negatively related to a firm‘s 
debt ratio because of managers‘ risk averting 
possibility. However, with high levels of managerial 
ownership, external related beneficiaries may not have 
the ability to prevent self-interested managers from 
indulging in non-maximizing behavior. Debt is 
increased as managers begin to use leverage as an 
entrenchment tool to avert being acquired or 
purchased. Thus, we would expect a positive 
relationship between capital structure and managerial 
ownership in this interval. With managers having 
effective control in terms of a very high proportion of 
managerial shareholding, they seek to reduce their 
risks by decreasing the use of debt. Brailsford et al. 
(2002) provide empirical evidence for this scenario in 
their documenting of a nonlinear relationship between 
the level of equity stake owned by managers and 
capital structure measured by debt/equity ratio, which 
supports the findings of Friend and Lang (1988) and 
Berger et al. (1997). 
Many variables related to financial decision, firm 
value and managerial ownership are likely to be 
determined simultaneously, which may result in an 
even more complex relationship. The previous 
discussions propose that managerial ownership affects 
capital structure choice, and the capital structure is 
determined by many other factors. The resultant 
leverage affects how ownership is structured. Hence, 
questions arise over the possible endogeneity of 
ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1998). Cho 
(1998) used OLS regressions to test whether insider 
ownership affects investment, and therefore, corporate 
value. However, simultaneous regressions reveal that 
investment affects corporate value which, in turn, 
affects managerial ownership, but not vice versa. In 
contrast, Berger and Patti (2006) employed a 
simultaneous equation model to study the possibility 
of reverse causality from firm value to capital 
structure in the banking industry. 
On the basis of theoretical analyses and 
empirical evidence, the following hypothesis are 
discussed in this study: 
H1: A nonlinear relationship exists between 
managerial ownership and firm value, where: firm 
value first increases and, after a certain breakpoint, 
decreases, and then increases again as managerial 
ownership rises. 
H2: A nonlinear relationship exists between 
managerial ownership and capital structure, where: 
capital structure first falls, then rises, and finally 
continues to fall as managerial ownership increases. 
H3: Managerial ownership affects capital structure, 
which in turn, affects firm value. Managerial 
shareholding and leverage choice are endogenously 
determined. 
 
3 Data and statistics 
 
The sample was constructured from S&P 500 firms in 
2005. We extracted the data of board ownership from 
the RiskMetrics database. The financial structure and 
other data are collected from the database of 
COMPUSTAT North America. After rejecting firms 
with insufficient data items for our modeling, the final 
sample consisted of 353 S&P 500 firms. In the 
robustness test, we used the one-year lagged variables 
of managerial ownership in 2005 to study its effect on 
in 2006. There is not any missing value of calculating 
Tobin‘s Q and capital structure for the 353 sample 
firms in 2005. 
We mainly applied Tobin‘s Q as the measure of 
firm performance, which is the ratio of firm‘s market 
value to the book value of total assets (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997). The market value of assets was 
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock, less the sum of book value of 
common equity and deferred taxes. Holderness (2003) 
investigated the US evidences on equity ownership by 
insiders and blockholders, where insiders are defined 
as the officers and directors of a firm. Cho (1998) 
defines ―insider ownership as the fraction of shares, 
not including options, held by officers and directors of 
the board.‖ Davies et al. (2005) use the managerial 
ownership stake of all board members to represent 
managerial shareholding. After a considered reading 
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of the various definition, we‘ve decided to use the 
ownership stake of all board members as a proxy for 
managerial ownership. 
Table 1 describes managerial ownership, Tobin‘s 
Q, and capital structure for the sample of 353 S&P 
500 firms in 2005. The mean combined ownership of 
all board members is 4.6%. The median ownership, 
however, is only 1.3%, suggesting that the distribution 
is skewed. The Tobin‘s Q values in 2005 range from 
0.878 to 13.024, with a mean of 2.199. Capital 
structure ranges from nearly zero leverage ratio of 
0.084 to an over-leveraged ratio of 1.153. The mean 
capital structure is 0.572; that is, almost the same as 
the median value of 0.575. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the number of firms, 
values of Tobin‘s Q and capital structure, as classified 
by different ranges of managerial ownership. 
―MANA‖ indicates the proportion of managerial 
ownership. The distribution of firm number in the 
sample is skewed towards low levels of managerial 
ownership. In 282 firms, comprising 80% of the 
sample firms, board members owned less than 5% of 
the firms. In 28 firms, total board holdings constituted 
an equity in the range of 5% to 10%. In 13 firms (4% 
of the sample firms) board members had ownership 
levels in of between 10% and 15%. However, the 
managerial holdings did span a wide range in the 
remaining 25 firms. This distribution is consistent 
with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Morck et al. (1988), ―suggesting the prevalence of 
significant management ownership in the US‖ (Cho, 
1998). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 also suggests that there is a nonlinear 
relationship between levels of managerial ownership 
and Tobin‘s Q. The mean Tobin‘s Q increases from 
2.14 in the first range of managerial ownership to 2.42 
and 2.93 in the second and third ranges. Then the 
mean value of Tobin‘s Q declines to 2.51, 2.32, and 
1.98, until reaching 1.47 in the last range of 
managerial ownership of over 60%. This distribution 
is consistent with the descriptions in Cho (1998), 
where Tobin‘s Q has a similar inverse relationship 
with the level of managerial ownership. The 
association between the levels of equity stake owned 
by board members and capital structure measured by 
the debt/asset ratio is also non-monotonic, as shown in 
Table 2. At the level of managerial ownership below 
5%, the mean leverage ratio is 0.59. The leverage ratio 
subsequently decreases from between 5% and 10% 
managerial ownership to between 10% and 15%. 
Thereafter, the leverage ratio increases as managerial 
ownership increases. The leverage ratio approaches its 
highest level of 0.58 when managerial ownership is 
over 60%. Therefore, quadratic curves do exist 
between managerial ownership and Tobin‘s Q, and 
between managerial ownership and capital structure. 
The directions of the relationships between managerial 
ownership and Tobin‘s Q, and between managerial 
ownership and capital structure are opposite. 
 
4 Empirical specifications and results 
 
4.1 Managerial ownership and firm value 
 
In order to model the relationship between Tobin‘s Q 
and managerial ownership (MANA) and determine 
two extremum turning points of managerial ownership 
when Tobin‘s Q changes direction, we specify a cubic 
function
28
 as follows: 
Q = a + 1

 MANA + 2

 MANA2 + 3

 MANA3 + ε
                     (1) 
MANA stands for the proportion of managers‘ stock 
ownership, Q stands for Tobin‘s Q, namely firm value. 
The regression results are: 
 
The intercept coefficient, which is an estimate of 
Tobin‘s Q in firms with no managerial holdings, is 
1.99, which is similar to the 1.85 recorded in Davies et 
al. (2005). Each coefficient is of the expected sign, 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for constant, 
MANA and MANA
2
, and at the 5% level for MANA
3
. 
Although the adjusted R square is low, it is similar to 
those found in other relevant papers (for example, 
Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al,, 1999; Davies et al., 
2005). We then calculated turning points by 
differentiating Tobin‘s Q with respect to MANA. The 
two turning points are: 
MANA = 0.171 and MANA = 0.671 
As expected, Tobin‘s Q first increases when 
managerial ownership is less than 17.1%, and then 
declines until managerial shareholding reaches to 
67.1%. Tobin‘s Q rises again slightly as managerial 
ownership reaches over 67.1%. This result validates 
Hypothesis 1, discussed in the section on theoretical 
predictions. At low levels of managerial ownership, an 
increase in management equity holding closely aligns 
                                                   
28  For the number of turning points of managerial 
ownership to firm value, Morck et al. (1988) found two 
points; McConnell and Servaes (1990) model the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value 
as a quadratic function, which has only one turning point; 
Cho (1998) and Miguel et al. (2004) have two points, 
following Morck et al. (1988); while Davies et al. (2005) 
used a quintic equation and generated four turning points. 
The number of points probably does not matter; however, 
significance is of most importance, and determining how to 
explain the significance of each turning point. Considering 
the theoretical predictions and results of the descriptive 
statistics of this study, we decided to use a cubic model, 
which involves two extremum points and three intervals of 
managerial share ownership. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
75 
with the interests of managers and shareholders, 
thereby increasing corporate value. However, at 
relatively high levels of managerial ownership, an 
increase in management equity shareholding makes 
management more entrenched and less subject to 
market discipline, thereby reducing corporate value 
(Cho, 1998). When managerial ownership rises to a 
considerably high level, managers‘ interests fully align 
with shareholders‘ interests. In this situation, 
management pursue best firm performance and firm 
value is maximised. 
This nonlinear tendency is consistent with results 
from Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and so on; 
however, the turning points are different. Morck et al. 
(1988) used a piecewise regression on a sample of 
Fortune 500 firms and found two extremum values of 
managerial ownership: 5% and 25%. Cho (1998) used 
a grid searching technology with a sample of Fortune 
500 firms also, and found the turning points of 
managerial ownership at 7% and 38%. Miguel et al. 
(2004) used unbalanced panel data of 135 Spanish 
companies and found two turning points of 35% and 
70%. 
The sample differences in firms and markets may 
be one possible reason for the variation in pairs of 
turning points. However, we suspect that the sample 
differences in time are the main explanation for the 
differing turning points. For example, the study by 
Morck et al. (1988) used evidence based on 1980 data. 
Cho‘s (1998) finding resulted from 1991 observations. 
The data time horizon in Miguel et al. (2004) was 
from 1990 to 1999. Our finding was generated from 
the data for 2005. The turning points of managerial 
ownership with respect to firm values move upward as 
the sample time approaches the present. We strongly 
argue that, due to the evolution of corporate 
governances and regulations, the thresholds of 
managerial ownership for either self-interested 
decision making or interest alignment between 
managers and shareholders have moved up. In other 
words, managers need more ownership to obtain 
sufficient voting power to make decisions that are in 
their own interest. Furthermore, more managerial 
ownership is required for a full interest alignment 
between managers and shareholders. 
 
4.2 Managerial ownership and capital 
structure 
 
Based on the analysis of the theoretical predictions, 
we here examine the relationship between managerial 
ownership and capital structure. For the convenience 
of a further comparison, and according to the 
description in Table 2, we modified model (1) into 
model (2): 
CS (capital structure) = a + 1

 MANA + 2

 
MANA
2
 + 3

 MANA
3
 + ε  (2) 
where MANA = the proportion of managerial 
ownership, and CS = capital structure, which is 
defined as total debt divided by total assets. 
The results of model (2) are: 
 
 
All the coefficients are of the expected signs and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Then we 
calculate points of extremum and intersection via 
derivation. The two turning points are: 
MANA = 0.192; and MANA = 0.635 
The results of model (2) show negative 
relationships between managerial ownership and 
leverage ratios when managerial ownership is in the 
range from 0% to 19.2% or beyond 63.5%; while a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and leverage ratios exists when managerial ownership 
is in the range from 19.2% to 63.5%. This result 
validates our prediction and Hypothesis 2. First, when 
the level of managerial ownership is low, an increase 
in managerial ownership has the effect of aligning 
management and shareholders‘ interests (Brailsford et 
al., 2002). Consequently, the main objective of 
managers is to maximize shareholders‘ wealth and to 
achieve higher firm performance by using appropriate 
financial decisions to avert financial distress. Thus a 
negative relationship exists between managerial 
ownership and capital structure. 
Second, as the increase of managerial ownership, 
external block holders may not have the ability to 
prevent self-interested managers from indulging in 
non-maximizing behavior. Board members become 
entrenched with significant voting power and 
influence and began to manipulate the debt ratio to 
achieve self-interest. For example, they may increase 
debt to obtain more cash, therefore make suboptimum 
investment decisions or build a ―management empire.‖ 
However, when corporate managers hold a significant 
proportion of a firm‘s shares (over 63.5%), managers 
have their own interests aligned with those of 
shareholders. The entrenchment effect decreases, 
resulting in reduced debt ratio as managers seek to 
reduce bankruptcy risks, or alternatively, the 
agency-related benefits from the use of debt are 
substituted through managerial ownership. 
Brailsford et al. (2002) examined the relationship 
between ownership structure and capital structure with 
a sample of top 500 companies listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 1995. Their 
results indicate a nonlinear inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the level of managerial 
ownership and leverage ratios. The results of the 
present study could supplement the evidence from 
Brailsford et al. (2002). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The regression results of models (1) and (2) and 
the estimated turning points are shown graphically in 
Figure 1. The track generated by model (1) displays a 
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nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership 
and Tobin‘s Q, indicating that firm value increases as 
managerial ownership rises from zero to 17.1% of P1 
at point A. Firm value then decreases as board 
ownership increases, until another value of 67.1% of 
P4 at point D is reached. Finally, firm value increases 
slightly again for managerial ownership levels above 
67.1%. The relationship between capital structure and 
managerial ownership is also non-monotonic, as 
described by the track generated by model (2). The 
value of capital structure decreases in managerial 
ownership less than 19.2% as described of P2 at point 
B, then the value increases until managerial 
shareholding reaches 63.5% of P3 at point C; while 
the value of leverage goes down again when the stake 
of managerial ownership is over 63.5%. However, P1 
could be explained as the coincidence of P2; while P3 
and P4 could also be coincident. The occurrence of 
these small differences may be because of statistical 
error. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the three levels of 
managerial ownership. At a low level of managerial 
ownership (less than 20%), external discipline and 
internal controls or incentives dominate managers‘ 
behavior (Fama, 1980; Davies et al., 2005). 
Managerial labor markets operate on the principal that 
poorly performing managers can be removed and 
appropriately disciplined (Davies et al., 2005). Board 
members have sufficient incentive to adopt financial 
policies such as debt decisions that avert financial 
distress and achieve better firm performance. As the 
level of managerial equity ownership rises beyond a 
certain level (approximately 20%), managerial 
objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal mentoring 
and external discipline become weak. This lack of 
disciplinary control over management may strengthen 
managers‘ ability to pursue their own benefits at the 
cost of decreasing firm value by using suboptimal 
corporate policies. As the level of managerial 
ownership reaches a considerably high value 
(approximately 65%), managers align their interests 
with those of other owners, which leads to value 
maximization management behavior, as predicted by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Managers use less debt 
to avert being purchased or increase financial risk. 
According to the results of OLS regressions, we 
conjecture that managerial ownership affects capital 
structure, which in turn affects firm value. However, 
we could not confirm this transmitting association 
without a stricter test. Next, we estimate a 
simultaneous equations model to test this relationship. 
 
4.3 Managerial ownership, capital 
structure and firm value 
 
To capture the potential multiple relationship between 
managerial ownership, capital structure and firm 
performance, we applied a set of simultaneous 
equations using the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
method. 
Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital 
structure, ROE, liquidity)  (3) 
Firm value = g (managerial ownership, capital 
structure, investment, size)  (4) 
Capital structure = h (managerial ownership, firm 
value, ROE, liquidity)  (5) 
We estimate the simultaneous equations with 
control variables
29
. ROE in equation (3) and equation 
(5) is defined as earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total common equity. Liquidity is the 
common equity minus liquidation value. Although this 
paper discusses the intermediate function of capital 
structure, investment is nevertheless an important 
financial policy, so we used investment as a control 
variable of equation (4) and capital expenditure as a 
variable of investment, following Cho (1998) and 
Davies et al. (2005). Table 3 reports the regression 
results of the simultaneous equations. First, for the 
multiple relationships between managerial ownership, 
capital structure and firm value, as Cho (1998) and 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) document, once endogeneity 
is controlled, the perceived impact of managerial 
ownership on corporate value disappears. The results 
of the firm performance equation of model (4) in 
Table 3 suggests that the levels of board shareholding 
do not influence firm value directly, which contrasts 
with the OLS results of model (1). This evidence 
reflects the complicated causality between firm value 
and managerial ownership, and other variables may 
act as intermediates to assist managerial ownership, in 
turn imposing effects on firm performance. Capital 
structure has a negative influence on firm value, as 
described by the results of equation (4) — evidence of 
its intermediate function. Managerial ownership also 
has significant effects on capital structure, as shown in 
the result of capital structure
30
 equation (5) in the last 
column of Table 3. Therefore, the results address the 
influence of managerial shareholding on capital 
structure, which in turn affects firm value. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The results of equation (3) also suggest that the 
ownership of board directors is not significantly 
affected by Tobin‘s Q, which differs from the result 
found by Cho (1998), Kole (1994), and Davies et al. 
(2005), but is consistent with Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001). In equation (3), ROE has an insignificant 
coefficient, which suggests that earnings have 
insufficient influence on managerial ownership. Cho 
                                                   
29 This study also advances dummy variables representing 
industry effect, based on three-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. Because the variables of industry 
are not significant, we eliminated them. 
30 For the coefficients in the capital structure equation, each 
slope coefficient is of the correct sign and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The adjusted R square of model 
(5) is much higher than that of model (2). The extremum 
turning points of model (5) through a derivation are MANA 
= 20.8%, 61.9% — almost equal to that of model (2), which 
are 19.2% and 63.5%. 
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(1998) and Davies et al. (2005) used volatility in their 
managerial ownership equations and obtained similar 
results. Conversely, liquidity has a significant negative 
effect on managerial ownership in our model (3), 
while Cho (1998) found an insignificant effect and 
Davies et al. (2005) found positive effects from this 
variable. Thus, the relationship between managerial 
ownership and liquidity is controversial. Furthermore, 
the negative and significant coefficient of capital 
structure in model (3) suggests that board directors in 
firms with lower debt hold a larger fraction of their 
firm‘s shares. 
The second column of Table 3 represents the 
coefficients of model (4). Capital expenditure, which 
is a proxy of investment in this study, slightly 
influences firm performance, but not quite 
significantly. This is consistent with the results of Cho 
(1998) and Davies et al. (2005)
31
 and to some extent 
represents evidence of relationship between 
investment and firm value. Relevantly, asset size is 
quite a significant determination of firm performance. 
Therefore, we also used company size as a control 
variable in equation (4). We measured firm size as the 
logarithm of the replacement cost of assets, following 
Cho (1998), to alleviate the possible size effect 
problem. As expected, firm value turns out to be a 
decreasing function of company size. McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) used the estimated replacement value 
of assets as a proxy for size, and found a negative 
relationship with Tobin‘s Q for all categories 
according to P/E ratios. However, the negative 
relationship is insignificant, which echoes the findings 
of McConnell and Servaes (1990), Miguel et al. 
(2004), and Berger and Patti (2006). 
The significant negative coefficient of capital 
structure in equation (4) requires more discussion. 
Morck et al. (1988) found that leverage has a negative 
but insignificant impact on corporate value, and 
attributed this to the possibility that managers in 
highly leveraged firms might hold a higher than 
average level of ownership (Davies et al. (2005). 
However, contradicting these results, McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) report a positive significant coefficient 
for leverage ration on firm performance. Leverage is 
one way of imposing external discipline on 
management and, if effective, leads to increased 
corporate value. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
interpret the negative association between leverage 
and firm value as being due to the relative inflation 
between the current time period and the earlier time 
period when companies had issued much of their debt. 
In this study, the negative association between capital 
structure and firm value meets the requirement of 
being a transitional variable of managerial ownership 
on firm performance. Thus, we can take this negative 
relationship as indirect evidence of Hypothesis 2 and 
                                                   
31 Both these papers discuss the relationship of ownership 
structure and investment, which in turn affects corporate 
value. Therefore, we used the capital expenditure on firm 
value equation in this study as a control variable. 
Hypothesis 3, as discussed in theoretical predictions. 
ROE measures a firm‘s efficiency at generating 
profits from every dollar of shareholders‘ equity. It 
shows how well a company uses investment dollars to 
generate earnings growth. ROE was found to be 
positive and significant related to the level of capital 
structure for the results of model (5). This suggests 
that firms with higher earnings have a higher debt 
capacity due to lower bankruptcy risks. Noticeably, 
some of the literature uses the accounting profit rate to 
measure firm performance, such as ROE in Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), and profitability in Chaessens and 
Djankov (1999). However, some critics might say that 
accounting profit rate is backward-looking and Tobin‘s 
Q is forward-looking (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Most of the more recent literature use Tobin‘s Q as a 
proxy for firm performance. Therefore, the negative 
influence (-0.06) of Tobin‘s Q on capital structure and 
the positive effect (0.05) of ROE on capital structure 
are consistent with our expectation. Firm liquidity has 
a positive influence on capital structure, but the effect 
is insignificant. Cho (1998) examined the relationship 
of liquidity and investment, and produced a significant 
positive coefficient. We viewed the other important 
result from the simultaneous equations as being the 
endogeneity of capital structure. The regression results 
of the last column in Table 3 also indicate that Tobin‘s 
Q negatively affects capital structure. Added to the 
effect of capital structure on firm valuation, firm 
performance and capital structure have a mutual 
influence, which reflects the endogenous character of 
capital structure. Taken together, the capital structure 
is not only an intermediate variable of influence 
between managerial ownership and firm value, but 
also an endogenous variable which should not be 
neglected in financial research practices. 
Capital structure affects managerial ownership 
and firm value. Managerial ownership has an indirect 
influence on firm value, but has a significant effect on 
capital structure. Thereby, managerial ownership is not 
influenced by firm value, which is at odds with Cho 
(1998), Davies et al. (2005). The problem may rise 
from using different samples and data from former 
research. However, if the endogeneity of managerial 
ownership varies in different samples, it warrants 
further exploration and research. In summary, 
hypothesis 3 is partly proved by the results of the 
simultaneous equations. Managerial ownership affects 
capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. 
However, the endogeneity of capital structure is 
confirmed, while the endogenous managerial 
ownership is still controversial. 
 
4.4 Robustness tests 
 
Firstly, this section discusses the lagged dependent 
variables for model (1) and model (2). We examined 
the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm value above, as well as the relationship between 
managerial ownership and capital structure separately 
for S&P 500 firms in 2005. However, the function of 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
78 
managerial ownership on firm value and on capital 
structure may display a time effect. Therefore, we 
conducted estimations by using Tobin‘s Q and capital 
structure of S&P 500 firms in 2006 and managerial 
ownership in 2005. We assumed that the managerial 
ownership impacts mainly on the firm value and 
capital structure of the next year. The results are 
described in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
We used the value of the leverage variable and Tobin‘s 
Q for data from 2006 to build up a relationship with 
the one-year advanced value of managerial ownership 
in 2005. In model (1) of Table 4, significant 
coefficients and the predicted slope look similar to 
those without a time lag consideration, which is 
discussed in Section 4.1. The extremum turning points 
of managerial ownership with respect to firm value are 
0.1759 and 0.7016. In model (2) of Table 4, after 
considering the time lag, the coefficients are 
noticeably less significant than previously; also, all the 
coefficients for managerial ownership are still 
significant at the 10% significance level. In summary, 
the results indicate that time effects do not alter the 
influence of managerial ownership on firm value and 
capital structure. 
We also use piecewise regression with 
simultaneous equations to explore whether 
considering different ranges of managerial ownership 
produces results with significant differences from 
those estimated via models (3), (4), and (5). The 
sample consists of 353 S&P 500 companies in 2005. 
The models are as follows, and the estimations are 
reported in Table 5. 
Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital 
structure, ROE, liquidity)  (6) 
Firm value = g (piecewise managerial ownership, 
capital structure, investment, size) (7) 
Capital structure = h (piecewise managerial 
ownership, firm value, ROE, liquidity) (8) 
The piecewise managerial ownership (MANA) 
in the firm value model (7) is defined by the results of 
turning points (17.1%, 67.1%) from equation (1): 
MANA up to 17%   = managerial ownership if 
managerial ownership < 0.17,                           
= 0.17 if managerial ownership of firm >0.17.  
MANA 17% to 67%= 0 if managerial ownership < 0.17,                           
= managerial ownership minus 0. 17 if 0.17 < 
managerial ownership < 0.67,                           
= 0.67 if managerial ownership> 0.67.  
MANA over 67%    = 0 if managerial ownership of firm 
< 0.67,                           = managerial 
ownership minus 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67.  
In the capital structure model (8), the three levels 
of managerial ownership are defined by two breaking 
points of 19% and 64%, which resulted from model 
(2) of 19.2% and 63.5%: 
MANA up to 19%   = managerial ownership if 
managerial ownership < 0.19,                           
= 0.19 if managerial ownership of firm >0.19.  
MANA 19% to 64%= 0 if managerial ownership < 0.19, 
                          = managerial 
ownership minus 0. 19 if 0.19 < managerial ownership 
< 0.64,                    = 0.64 if managerial 
ownership> 0.64.  
MANA over 64%    = 0 if managerial ownership of firm 
< 0.64,                  = managerial ownership 
minus 0.64 if managerial ownership > 0.64. 
 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The results in Table 5 show that most coefficients are 
similar to those in Table 3. Managerial ownership in 
model (7), using three piecewise variables, remained 
an insignificant influence on firm performance. For 
the results in model (8), the coefficients of managerial 
ownership over 64%, and in the range between 19% 
and 64%, are insignificant in the 5% significant level. 
This may be due to the limited sample of firms in this 
range, compared to the multitude of sample firms in 
the range of managerial ownership up to 19%. 
However, the significant coefficient of MANA up to 
19% still offers powerful evidence for prior 
prediction. 
The other robustness test is for the measurement 
of firm performance. Cheng (2008) used a proxy of 
industry-adjusted Q, defined as the difference between 
the firm‘s Q and the average Q of the firms in the 
same two-digit SIC code industry in the same year. We 
used a similar method for calculation of 
industry-adjusted Tobin‘s Q, which is applied in model 
(1), and produced the following results: 
 
We then calculated points of extremum and 
intersection via derivation. The two extremum points 
are: MANA = 0.170 and MANA = 0.671 
For the simultaneous equations using 
industry-adjusted Q, we derived similar results, as 
shown in Table 3. This indicates that the relationship 
between firm value and managerial ownership is not 
affected by industrial diversity. Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) employed the data from Compustat firms over 
a three-year period from1982 to1984 to investigate the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. After controlling for fixed three-digit 
SIC effects for each regression, our results are almost 
the same after adjustment of industry effects. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper extends the previous research (Morck et al., 
1988; Cho, 1998; Short and Keasey, 1999; Davies et 
al., 2005) by introducing capital structure as an 
intermediate variable between managerial ownership 
and corporate value. Through a sample of 353 S&P 
500 firms in 2005, this study applied two cubic 
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equations to explore the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, and 
managerial ownership and capital structure. The study 
also applied simultaneous equations in order to detect 
the interrelationship between managerial ownership, 
firm value, and capital structure. 
First, we found a nonlinear relationship between 
Tobin‘s Q and the fraction of shares owned by a board 
of directors, which is consistent with the results of 
Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998), Short and Keasey 
(1999), and Miguel et al. (2004). Tobin‘s Q, which is a 
proxy of firm performance, increases as managerial 
ownership grows until it reaches 17.1%. Thereafter, 
Tobin‘s Q declines with the decline in managerial 
ownership until it reaches 67.1%. Tobin‘s Q rises 
again slightly as managerial ownership increases 
higher 67.1%. We found that the two turning points 
were higher than those detected by Morck et al. (1988) 
and Cho (1998), using early period data from the 
Fortune 500. We strongly argue that, due to the 
evolution of corporate governance and changes of 
regulation, the managerial control for pursuing 
self-interest and alignment of interests between 
managers and other shareholders can only be 
approached by management holding more ownership 
than that in early time. 
Second, the association between managerial 
ownership and capital structure is non-monotonic. A 
negative relationship exists between managerial 
ownership and leverage ratios when managerial 
ownership is below 19.2% or higher than 63.5%. 
Within the managerial ownership range 19.2% to 
63.5%, the leverage ratio increases as the managerial 
ownership increases. These results imply that a 
transitional relationship exists between managerial 
ownership, capital structure, and firm value. 
Third, by using a simultaneous equation 
regression, we found that managerial ownership does 
not influence firm value significantly when capital 
structure is added into the equation. However, 
managerial ownership significantly affects capital 
structure, and capital structure affects corporate 
performance directly. Meanwhile, capital structure is 
endogenously determined by both firm value and 
managerial ownership. Therefore, the results from this 
study address the influence of managerial 
shareholding on capital structure, which in turn affects 
firm value. 
Furthermore, three intervals of managerial 
ownership exist, which have different effects on 
managers‘ financial decision making; namely, their 
selection of capital structure. Ultimately, the different 
capital structures have varying influences on firm 
value. When managerial ownership is less than 20%, 
managerial labor market and external discipline 
dominate managers‘ behavior. The incentive against 
firm value maximization can be removed. Managers 
are motivated to adopt financial policies (such as 
leverage ratio) to avert financial distress and acquire 
better firm performance. When managerial ownership 
is between approximately 20% and 60%, internal 
monitoring and external discipline becomes less 
effective. The voting power of managers allows them 
to choose suboptimal capital structure for 
entrenchment and then decrease firm value. When 
managerial ownership exceeds a considerable level, 
perhaps 60%, management then has aligned interests 
with other shareholders, and managers choose optimal 
capital structure and thus increase firm value. 
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Appendices 
Table 1. Summary of main statistics 
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Managerial ownership 0.046 0.013 0.874 0.000 0.097 4.416 27.819 
Tobin‘s Q 2.199 1.707 13.024 0.878 1.431 2.866 15.87 
Capital structure 0.572 0.575 1.153 0.084 0.204 -0.062 2.621 
Notes: Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding. Tobin‘s Q is the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The 
sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
 
Table 2. Mean values of Tobin‘s Q and capital structure by managerial ownership levels 
 
Managerial ownership 
Number 
of firms 
Mean Tobin‘s Q 
Std. dev of 
Tobin‘s Q 
Mean capital 
structure 
Std. dev of capital 
structure 
0 < = MANA < 5% 282 2.1352 1.419 0.5934 0.1976 
5% < = MANA < 10% 28 2.4202 1.7988 0.4711 0.2039 
10% < = MANA < 15% 13 2.9270 1.2600 0.4657 0.1395 
15% < = MANA < 20% 12 2.5052 0.9719 0.4609 0.2794 
20% < = MANA < 40% 7 2.3214 1.5675 0.5336 0.2331 
40% < = MANA < 60% 4 1.9804 0.6132 0.5470 0.2152 
60% < = MANA 2 1.4696 0.6575 0.5847 0.2303 
Notes: MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total 
shares outstanding. Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
 
Table 3. Simultaneous regression analysis using two-stage least squares method 
 
Variable Managerial ownership (3) Firm value (4) Capital structure (5) 
Constant term 0.099558 (4.46)*** 7.135857(12.94)*** 0.729157 (35.42)*** 
Tobin‘s Q -0.004038 (-0.97)  -0.061894 (-8.75)*** 
ROE 0.004714 (0.76)  0.045399 (4.01)*** 
Liquidity -7.60E-07 (-2.07)**  -3.22E-07 (-0.47) 
Capital structure -0.070173 (-2.48)** -1.528850 (-4.09)***  
MANA  1.807075 (0.62) -1.457348 (-3.46)*** 
MANA2  -8.475954 (-0.70) 4.693926 (2.67)*** 
MANA3  5.985242 (0.53) -3.784003 (-2.31)** 
Capital expenditure  5.74E-05 (1.59)  
SIZE  -1.027659 (-6.71)***  
Number of firms 353 353 353 
Adj. R2 0.019141 0.269374 0.227331 
Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. ROE is earnings before interest and 
taxes, divided by total common equity. Liquidity is common equity minus liquidation value. Capital structure is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership — the ratio of shares owned by all board members 
to total shares outstanding. The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3. Size is the logarithm of total 
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assets. Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding. Capital structure 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4. Results of model (1) and model (2) by one-year lagged managerial ownership 
 
 C MANA MANA2  MANA3  
Adjusted 
R-squared 
Number 
of firms 
Model (1) Tobin‘s Q of 
2006 
2.005261 
(21.44)*** 
7.686971 
(2.56)** 
-27.32867 
(-2.18)* 
20.76365 
(1.77)* 
0.012911 353 
Model (2) capital 
structure of 2006 
0.592953 
(41.58)*** 
-0.839774  
(-1.83)* 
3.511276 
(1.82)* 
-3.165457 
(-1.75)* 
0.001471 353 
Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board 
members to total shares outstanding. The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3. The sample is 353 
S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5. Robustness test using simultaneous regression with two-stage least squares method 
 
Variable Managerial ownership (6) Firm value (7) Capital structure (8) 
Constant term 0.099558(4.46)*** 7.161043(13.19)*** 0.720942(35.67)*** 
Tobin‘s Q -0.004038(-0.97)  -0.062804(-8.87)*** 
ROE 0.004714(0.76)  0.045708(4.03)*** 
Liquidity -7.60E-07(-2.07)**  -2.20E-07 (-0.32) 
Capital structure -0.070173(-2.48)** -1.524488(-4.08)***  
MANA up to 17%  0.854469(0.52)  
MANA 17% to 67%  -1.852596(-1.18)  
MANA over 67%  1.125821(0.17)  
Capital expenditure  5.73E-05 (1.59)  
SIZE  -1.032152(-6.76)***  
MANA up to 19%   -0.743853(-3.42)*** 
 
MANA 19% to 64%   0.293408(1.23) 
MANA over 64%   -0.971243(-0.94) 
Number of firms 353 353 353 
Adj. R2 0.019141 0.269532 0.221598 
Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. ROE is earnings before interest and 
taxes, divided by total common equity. Liquidity is common equity minus liquidation value. Capital structure is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board 
members to total shares outstanding. MANA up to 17% = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.17, = 0.17 if 
managerial ownership of firm >= 0.17. MANA 17% to 67% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.17, = managerial ownership - 0. 
17 if 0.17 < managerial ownership < 0.67, = 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67. MANA over 67% = 0 if managerial 
ownership of firm < 0.67, = managerial ownership - 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67. MANA up to 19% = managerial 
ownership if managerial ownership < 0.19, = 0.19 if managerial ownership of firm > 0.19. MANA 19% to 64% = 0 if 
managerial ownership < 0.19, = managerial ownership - 0. 19 if 0.19 < managerial ownership < 0.64, = 0.64 if managerial 
ownership > 0.64. MANA over 64% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.64, = managerial ownership - 0.64 if managerial 
ownership > 0.64. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005. 
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Figure 1. Relationship among firm value, capital structure and 
managerial ownership 
P1 = 0.171 
P2 = 0.192 
P3 = 0.635 
P4 = 0.671 
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THE FAMILY BUSINESS: A UNIQUE PROFILE OF BEHAVIOUR, OR A 
PROFILE ADAPTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE FAMILY AND THE 
MARKET? 
 
Carmen Galve-Górriz*, Vicente Salas-Fumás* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper helps to theorize the link between family generation and the characteristics, behaviour, 
management and governance of the firm. The paper also answers the question: to what extent is 
competitive position affected by each generation? The paper overcomes the limitation of the 
cross-sectional data, since the investigation is applied to data from Spanish firms during the period 
1994 to 2005, which is much more appropriate when discussing developmental models. Our results 
confirm the greater degree of complexity of the family firm, as the ownership and the running of the 
business is passed to future generations. However, and contrary to all expectations, family firms in the 
sample have a high degree of concentration of ownership, regardless of the generation and  a greater 
complexity in the business does not give rise to the incorporation of external partners in the company’s 
share capital. In fact, third generation companies have no external partners, with 100% capital 
remaining in the family. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Family firms hold a particular position among all the 
different types of company, owing to the nature of 
their ownership structures, their leadership and their 
evolutionary dynamics. In contrast to other types of 
company, family firms constitute the basic foundations 
of the business community worldwide. Their creation, 
growth and longevity are critical to the success of the 
global economy, and the economic and social 
importance of family firms has been widely 
recognized at an international level. The proportion of 
family firms in relation to the total number of 
registered companies; their contribution to the GDP of 
a country and its levels of employment can be 
considered measures of their importance
32
.  
Although there is a unanimous belief about the 
quantitative and qualitative importance of family firms 
in the economy of any country, the controversy 
continues about how, and in what direction, family 
ownership affects the behaviour and the performance 
                                                   
32 Ward and Aronoff (1990); Shanker and Astrachan (1996); 
Gersick et al (1997); Laporta et al (1999); Upton and Petty 
(2000); Amat (2001); McConaughy et al (2001); Faccio and 
Lang (2002); Anderson and Reeb (2003); Chris-Graves 
(2006).  
of firms. Recent empirical conflicting evidence on the 
performance of family firms compared with that of 
non family one has raised the interest on this issue
33
. 
For some researchers the existing disparity of 
conclusions has to do with the heterogeneous 
definitions of family firms used in the different studies 
(Dyer, 2006; Miller et al, 2007).  
Dyer points out that classifying all family firms 
in one category may lead to misleading conclusions. 
Definitions of family firms based strictly on 
                                                   
33 Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Perez Gonzalez (2006), and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find 
that listed family firms are more profitable than other listed 
firms. Faccio et al (2001) find evidence of inferior 
performance in family firms. Barth et al (2005) find that 
family-owned firms are less efficient than non-family owned 
firms. 
On the other hand, there are studies that find no differences 
between the performance of family and non-family firms. 
Following the Comparative Institutional Economics Theory, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al 
(1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Galve and Salas 
(2005) find empirical support for the hypothesis that, 
controlling for the characteristics of the transactions that 
determine the choice of one form of governance or another, 
no differences in profitability are expected among firms of 
different ownership structure.  
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percentages of ownership and management control 
will likely not differentiate the various family effects, 
and thus will not accurately predict or explain 
differences in firm performance. These methodological 
problems suggest that researchers need to unravel the 
impact of the various factors affecting firm 
performance, including the family itself, such as: 
industry, governance, firm characteristics and 
management. A family may influence firm governance, 
its basic characteristics, the quality of its management, 
and possibly even an industry (Dyer, 2003; Morck 
&Jeung, 2003, 2004). Dyer (2006) suggests that it is 
also possible that a family may have a direct effect on 
a firm‘s performance that is not mediated through the 
other four variables. 
In order to increase the predictive power of the 
analysis there have been a few attempts to create 
typologies of family firms, such as the well- known 
development model of family firms of Gersick et al 
(1997), who consider a family firm as a system of 
overlapping circles labelled ―family‖, ―business‖, and 
―ownership‖; although the three circles provide a good 
foundation for examining family business, most of the 
problems and challenges of a family firm occur over 
the course of time. One reasonable starting point in the 
analysis of heterogeneous behaviour within family 
firms is to compare the behaviour of family firms in 
the first, second and multiple generations  
Surprisingly, only very limited research has been 
conducted in this area. Among the noteworthy 
exceptions are the works of Ward (1991), Gersick et al. 
(1997), Lansberg (1999), Van den Berghe & Carchon 
(2002), Dyer (2006), and Rutherford et al. (2006). 
There is very little empirical research on the 
differences in governance structures among family 
firms themselves. Additionally, scientific uncertainty 
remains within the heterogeneous group of family 
firms, with regard to how they behave. 
Van den Berghe & Carchon (2002), collecting 
data from a Belgian population of companies 
submitting their annual accounts, in 1997, to the 
National Bank of Belgium, attempt to identify 
differences in corporate governance practices between 
family and non- family firms, and investigate to what 
extent differences can be found within the group of 
family firms based on family ownership and family 
generation
34
. Although their study contributes to the 
corporate governance literature, to improve the 
understanding of family firm governance it is 
necessary to understand how the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of this type of firm‘s corporate 
governance affects its competitiveness, and for that it 
is necessary to answer the following question: to what 
                                                   
34 Attending to the generation of the family that is involved 
in the firm, they analyze whether there are differences in the 
family ownership policy, the family member independence 
ratio of the board of directors, the frequency of meetings of 
the board, and the accumulation of the functions of president 
of the board and representatives of the board of directors. 
 
extent is competitive position affected by each 
generation? 
The Catedra of family firms of Palmas de Gran 
Canarias (Spain), in collaboration with The Institute of 
Spanish Family Firms (IEF) and 
Price-WaterHouse-Coopers, carried out a study of a 
collective of 112 family firms belonging to 14 Spanish 
Territorial Associations of family firms. This work 
concerned differences in corporate governance 
mechanisms (family board and board of directors), in 
2000, between family firms of first, second and later 
generations. As in the previous work, this paper does 
not analyze the differences in business development 
and competitive position with regard to the generation 
that owns and runs the business. 
 Rutherford et al. (2006) provide an initial 
empirical examination of the Gersick et al (1997) 
developmental model of family business, through an 
analysis of the relationship existing between family 
development (first, second and further generations) 
and ownership (controlling owner, sibling partnership 
and cousin consortium) variables, and the variable of 
business development (measured by size and growth 
of the firm). They find a positive relationship between 
the generation and the business development but no 
relationship between the ownership dimension and the 
business development. The authors also identify 
additional key groups of variables (owner, firm, and 
family characteristics) that help to explain family 
business development. Although the authors point out 
that the primary strength of this research is that it 
provides additional insights into the developmental 
model of family firms, they recognize that the 
cross-sectional nature of the data is problematic when 
discussing developmental models, a result of a 
weakness of the survey: the historical growth rates 
were collected for only one year prior to the study 
This paper provides some answers to the 
questions raised by Van den Berghe & Carchon (2002), 
Dyer (2006) and Rutherford et al. (2006), and 
overcomes some of their limitations. First, this paper 
helps to theorize the link between family generation 
and the characteristics, behaviour, management and 
governance of the firm. Second, the paper answers the 
question: to what extent is competitive position 
affected by each generation? Third, the paper 
overcomes the limitation of the cross-sectional data, 
since the investigation is applied to data from Spanish 
firms during the period 1994 to 2005, which is much 
more appropriate when discussing developmental 
models. 
Our paper contributes to both Family Business 
and Corporate Governance Literature; the first by 
providing an empirical test of the developmental 
model of family business (DMFB, developed by 
Gersick et al. (1997), since the main objective of the 
paper is to check how the family and its business 
develop to a higher level of complexity as ownership 
and the running of the business are passed on to future 
generations, and the second by analysing the need for 
adequate governance practices when a family and its 
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business develop to a higher level of complexity.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section two, 
we focus on a theoretical discussion of the problems 
related to the growth of the family and the company 
over time, and of how the consequences of growth are 
successfully managed through the implementation of 
adequate governance practices. The third section 
presents the results of our empirical analysis of the 
sample of Spanish firms. The conclusions summarize 
the main results of the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
One of the main sources of problems for family firms 
is related to the growth of the family and the company 
over time. Gersick et al (1997) and Leon-Guerrero et 
al (1998) suggested that the nature of the family firm 
changes over time in response to the developmental 
dimensions of the family, the firm and the ownership, 
with varying impacts on the firm at different stages
35
. 
The growth of the family signifies a larger number of 
family members belonging to different branches of the 
same family dynasty. One of the changes brought 
about by family growth is the dispersion of 
shareholders, resulting from the transfer of shares from 
parents to children. This brings about a fragmentation 
of shareholders' power, which requires heavy doses of 
negotiation and consensus. A particularly difficult 
transaction for a company, in these circumstances, is 
the change from the first generation stage of 
controlling owner to the second generation stage of 
brothers' society [Levinson, 1971; Lansberg, 1988; 
Handler, 1990; Barach & Ganitsky, 1995; Cabrera 
Suarez et al, 2001]. Another point to take into account 
is that, as the family grows, not all shareholding family 
members will work in the company, and so active and 
non-active family shareholders must be differentiated, 
since their interests will not always coincide. While 
non-active family shareholders will be interested in 
obtaining returns on their investment in the company, 
the active family shareholders will also be interested in 
their careers in the company and their salaries [Gersick 
et al, 1997; Lansberg, 1999; Schulze et al, 2003]. Thus, 
a potentially difficult area for family firms is that 
interpersonal relationships are of the utmost 
importance, and family members involved in the 
running of the company cannot take business oriented 
decisions in isolation, without considering family 
matters. A lack of optimum interpersonal relations, or 
the existence of conflict between family members, will 
inevitably lead to these conflicts being transferred 
from the family to the company (and/or vice versa) 
[Hilburt-Davis & Dyer, 2003
36
; Lee, 2006
37
;]. This 
                                                   
35  Kotey (2005) examines differences in business goals, 
management practices, and performance between small 
family and non-family firms and changes in these differences 
as the firms grow. 
36  Hilburt-Davis &Dyer (2003) point out that family 
members may have competing goals and values, which may 
spring from complex conflicts and family dynamics that 
arise from a family‘s psychosocial history. 
may put the long-term survival of the company at risk: 
some members of warring family factions may block 
investment projects for the simple reason that they 
have been proposed by another faction, without 
determining whether the projects are really appropriate 
from a business perspective [Dyer, 1986; Kaye, 1991; 
Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 1987].  
It is also important to take into account that once 
the family has grown past the point where there is a 
clear identity among family members involved in 
management and family members who are owners, it 
is time to provide a clear and acceptable division 
between the Governing Body of the company and 
Family Deliberations. All members of the family with 
interests in the company should meet at regular 
intervals to discuss family and business matters 
(Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Sanchez-Crespo, 2003)
38
.  
A family forum means the generally accepted 
union between family and company, rather than simply 
a rapprochement between individuals belonging to the 
family. The forum provides a recognised means of 
communication between family and company. In these 
forums, non-active family members can ask questions 
about company policies and projects and express their 
points of view. Executive family members can explain 
policies and progress, and have the opportunity to gain 
the support of non-active family members for 
implemented policies and proposed changes. It is 
probable that the non-active family members, if they 
are well-informed and considerate, will support 
policies and changes proposed by executive family 
members, so long as they do not entail a break with the 
family's original company philosophy, culture and 
values. Among the specific mechanisms of governance 
of the business family, we can identify the Family 
Assembly and the Family Council.  
The discussion suggests the following 
hypotheses : 
H1: As the family grows over time, there will be 
a higher dispersion of shareholding, as a result of the 
transfer of shares from parents to children. Thus, first 
generation family firms will have a higher degree of 
concentration of family-held shares than second or 
later generation family firms. 
H2: As the family grows over time, not all 
shareholding family members will work in the 
company, and so active and non-active family 
shareholders must be differentiated. Thus, first 
generation family firms will have a lower proportion 
of non-active family shareholders than second or later 
generation family firms. 
H3: In order to successfully manage the 
consequences of complexity and growth of the family, 
                                                                              
37 For further information about the literature that researches 
the impact of family relationships see Lee, J. (2006). 
38 For more information about mechanisms of Governance 
in Spanish family firms, see the document published in 2002 
by the Institute of Spanish Family Firms, Price-WaterHouse- 
Coopers and the Network of Spanish Cátedras of Family 
Firms. 
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second and later generation family firms will provide a 
more clear culture of transparency than first generation 
family firms, through the implementation of the 
Family Assembly and the Family Council.   
According to company growth, although the 
growth goal may not feature strongly for family firms, 
some level of growth is required if the aim of the firm 
is to remain competitive and to assure its long-term 
survival, maintaining ownership and control of the 
firm within the family (Pollak, 1985; Casson, 1999; 
Chami, 1999).  Family firms, as any firm, face a 
dynamic, global and highly competitive market, which 
increasingly demands the incorporation of new 
products, new technologies, new organizational 
methods and new methods for competing in the 
market; further, in family firms, growth goals (in terms 
of internationalization, commercialization, and 
innovation), are likely to be pushed by second or later 
generation proprietors as they bring new perspectives 
to the firm (See Fernández-Nieto, 2005, and Gallo & 
Pont, 1996). Although life-cycle literature suggests 
that second and later generation family firms are likely 
to be more mature, and to be growing more slowly 
than founder-led firms, it should not be forgotten that 
there is a need of family owners of second or later 
generations to adopt new perspectives and new 
corporate strategies for growth, in order to guarantee 
the survival of the firm, to remain competitive, and to 
accommodate the needs of the extended family as 
other family units join the firm (Poza, 1988).  
As the firm grows in complexity over time, and is 
faced with the need to invest in growth strategies 
requiring a high level of investment, and thus a higher 
amount of funds than may be available within the 
family and the firm, it could be necessary to 
incorporate external partners in order to obtain 
additional funds without losing control of the firm.  
 Based upon this discussion, we present the 
following hypotheses: 
H4: Founder-led firms are likely to be in the 
founding and growth stages of their life-cycle and 
firms in the second and later generations are likely to 
be bigger, older and more mature. 
H5: In order to guarantee the survival of the firm 
and remain competitive, second and later generation 
family firms will invest more in growth strategies and 
in key factors to gain a competitive advantage (such as 
internationalization, commercialization, innovation 
and quality) than first generation family firms. 
H6: Taking into account the hypothesis 4 and 5, 
differences in growth rates between family firms of 
first, and second or later generations, are not expected. 
H7: Second and later generation family firms will 
have more non-family shareholders than 
first-generation family firms, to finance growth 
strategies without losing the family control of the firm. 
It is also important to take into account that the 
new demands of the dynamic, global and highly 
competitive market bring with them the need for new 
knowledge and skills. Gallo et al (2002) and King, 
Salomon & Fernald (2001), argue that, as the business 
grows and becomes more complex, the demand for 
role specialization and the number of required 
managerial layers increases, as does the complexity of 
the managerial roles. However, skills and knowledge 
are not always available among family members. The 
quality and experience of the family managerial labor 
pool may not be able to fulfil the range of specialist 
managerial functions that a competitive, growing, and 
complex firm requires (Casson, 1982). Obstacles to 
firm development may be overcome by investing in 
training to develop the skills and competencies of 
family members. However, it may be preferable for 
owners of some family firms to recruit non-family 
professional managers and directors to secure firm 
development. Outside directors and managers, and 
sometimes non-family shareholders, can provide firms 
with expert advice, specialist skills, and resources that 
a family firm does not necessarily possess (Kesner & 
Dalton, 1994; Blondell, Carlock, & Heyden, 2000). 
This, in turn, means that as the business grows and 
becomes more complex, the future of the family firm 
depends on its ability both to recruit and promote its 
most capable family members, and to offer attractive 
options (the possibility of a professional career) in 
order to attract and retain the best professionals from 
outside the family. Selection of family members often 
proves to be more complicated than recruitment of 
external professionals, as a result of the institutional 
overlap between family and company. There are two 
appropriate policies for the incorporation of family 
members into the business: i) Selective Policy, 
whereby the company only recruits those family 
members it considers to have a potential for promotion 
at a later date, and ii) Open Door Policy, whereby the 
company opts to accept any family member who is 
prepared to work hard and accept that promotion is not 
guaranteed (Cadbury, 2002).  
In addition to having, or obtaining, the 
managerial capacity and expertise, it is also important 
that firms utilize planning and control techniques that 
assist in monitoring and controlling performance as 
they grow. Leon-Guerrero (1998) and Reid and Adams 
(2001) argued that family firms are also pushed 
towards more formal practices as growth occurs. 
Growth requires formal management systems with 
clear definition of tasks, clear lines of responsibility 
and authority, and greater documentation of 
management decisions, procedures and achievements. 
Formal management systems provide greater 
transparency and ensure fairer treatment of employees. 
Tasks and responsibilities must be defined in order to 
establish objective bases for the evaluation of how 
they are carried out and remunerated. The Board of 
Administration provides the basis for the construction 
of a logical organisational structure, and defines clear 
lines of authority and responsibility. With growth, the 
need for more formal practices increases, since 
conflicts will occur between the requirements for 
effective management of growth and the preferred 
informal, personal and direct style of family owners 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Van Den Berghe & Carchon, 2002; 
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Cadbury, 2002). 
The Board of Administration should determine 
the company's long-term aims and objectives and the 
means by which they can be achieved, leaving 
day-to-day decision-making to the Committee of 
directors. In certain cases, the Board provides the ideal 
way to attract independent, external members. The 
nomination of an external member to the board means 
sharing the responsibility of directing the company 
with somebody who is neither a family member nor an 
executive. This can be vital to non-active family 
members when they do not have sufficient information, 
[Ward, 1991; Hoy and Verser, 1994; Harris et al, 1994; 
Cadbury,2002; Van Den Berghe & Carchon, 2002; 
Sirmon and Hitt, 2003].  
In order for the Board to accomplish its mission 
satisfactorily, it would seem necessary, according to 
certain codes of good government (Olivencia, 1998; 
Aldama, 2003; and Conthe, 2006, in Spain), that the 
roles of president of the board and that of chief 
executive officer, are separate. The main role of the 
President of the board is to hire, fire, evaluate and pay 
top management, thus making it extremely difficult to 
do so for him/her self. Concerning the size of the 
Board, the recommended number of members is 
between 5 and 9; fewer than five members limits 
creativity, while more than nine may lead to 
inefficiency. 
The discussion suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H8: In order to successfully manage the 
consequences of complexity and growth of the firm, 
second and third generation family firms will be more 
professionalized, with a higher number of non-family 
directors, and will have a higher ability to recruit, 
promote and retain the best professionals, than first 
generation family firms. 
H9: In order to successfully manage the 
consequences of complexity and growth of the firm, 
second and third generation family firms will provide a 
more efficient organizational structure than first 
generation family firms through the board. 
 
3. Empirical study of the running of 
Spanish family businesses in Aragon 
 
The sample was selected from a population of 85 
companies included in the SABI-Database
39
, who 
report their annual accounts in the Mercantile Register, 
according to the following criteria: i) the company 
should belong to the Autonomous Community of 
Aragón; ii) the number of employees of the firm 
should be at least 10, and the annual turnover of the 
firm should be at least 1,9 million of euros. The latter 
criterion, whose objective is to exclude the 
micro-firms from the sample, has also been used by 
Astrachan and Kolenko (1994).  
                                                   
39 The Sabi-Database is edited by Bureau Van Dick, Informa 
S.A, and Coface. It includes financial and shareholder 
information about Spanish and Portuguese Firms. 
Of the 85 companies with these characteristics, 
only 44 were family firms, these are:  the family had 
enough percentage of shares to exercise effective 
control over the firm and one or more family members 
held posts of management in the firm.  
Two types of information have been used in this 
research. Qualitative data (case-based data) from an 
extensive and complete questionnaire (related to 
ownership structure, size, growth strategies, 
management and governance practices in the firm over 
time) were completed with quantitative data collected 
from the balance sheet, income statements and annual 
reports of firms in the Spanish Mercantile Register.  
Before the survey was distributed, it was 
reviewed by a focus group of family business owners, 
belonging to the Association of Family Firms in 
Aragon and to the Family Firm Institute, and a pilot 
study was conducted. A total of 22 companies meeting 
the criteria responded to the questionnaire, a response 
index of 50%. Those completing the questionnaires 
occupied a key position in the decision-making 
process of their companies - general director, president 
of the board, president of the board of administration, 
executive director - and had received some kind of 
training course related to the concerns of the family 
business. The firms in the sample can be classified in 
three main industrial sectors, based on ISIC codes 
(manufacturing, wholesale/retail and services). The 
period of study was from 1994 to 2005, therefore the 
number of observations considered is 264.  
 
3.1 Family development and ownership 
structure  
 
Table 1, presents the distribution of businesses in the 
sample (differentiating between the generations 
leading the company) in terms not only of the nature 
and type of shareholders who participate in the share 
capital, but also their degree of participation in the 
share capital, which allows us to analyse the 
composition of shareholders. With regard to the nature 
or identity of the main shareholders of the family 
business, the following groups were identified: family 
owners, family holding company, other private 
individuals, financial entities, national companies, 
foreign capital, and non-family employees. In relation 
to the generation that runs the business, first, second 
and third generation family firms were identified. The 
variable generation was measured by the number of 
generations between the current chief executive officer 
(CEO) and the founder of the firm. 
The table shows that 27.3% of the total number 
of businesses in the sample are in the first generation 
businesses, 59.1% in the second generation and 13.6 % 
in the third generation. The date reveal that, on the one 
hand, in the majority of the businesses analysed (80%), 
independent of which generation runs the business, the 
family is the only shareholder in the company, with the 
proportion of companies having external, non-family 
member shareholders being small (only 18% of the 
businesses, on average). On the other hand, that a 
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greater complexity in the business does not give rise to 
the incorporation of external partners in the company's 
share capital. In fact, third generation companies have 
no external partners, with 100% of capital being in the 
hands of the family. Therefore, our results do not 
support hypothesis H7. 
Another relevant question is whether these family 
businesses have undergone important changes in 
ownership structure during the past twelve years. The 
answer can be found by comparing ownership 
structures at the end of 2005 with those existing at the 
end of 1994, table 2. From this comparative analysis 
(table 1 versus table 2) it can be seen that, during the 
period 1994-2005, regarding the nature of the main 
shareholders participating in the share capital of the 
businesses in the sample, seventy-three percent 
maintained their ownership structure and their main 
shareholders. Although 18.1% of the remaining 
businesses maintained their principal shareholders, one 
family sold shares to a company holding (in one case it 
sold 100% of its shares) belonging to the family. The 
holding was created in order to ensure the efficient 
growth of the company, both from the point of view of 
optimum resource management and from a legal-tax 
perspective. Contrary to expectation, 95% of family 
firms increased or maintained exactly the same level of 
ownership over the last twelve years. Five percent of 
the firms underwent only a little dispersion of 
ownership with the arrival of new partners. 
Additionally, it is also important to know what is 
the minimum number of family shareholders necessary 
to obtain complete control or a majority in the business. 
The greater this number is, the more difficult it will 
probably be to obtain a large enough majority to 
exercise effective control over the firm, and the greater 
will be the need for negotiation and consensus-seeking 
among family members. The relevant variable is the 
degree of concentration of family-held shares. This is 
measured, in the present study, by the percentage of 
shares in the hands of ―n‖, main shareholders, where n 
varies from one to eight. This variable is represented 
as ―An‖. Table 3 presents the degree of concentration 
of family-held shares (differentiating between first 
generation companies and second and third 
generation
40
). The date reveal that the group of family 
businesses analysed, regardless of generation, 
possesses an elevated concentration of ownership. One, 
two or three shareholders are enough to exercise 
effective control in 82% of the businesses. The 
remaining 18% are also characterized by a high degree 
of concentration of family shareholders, with 5, 6 or 8 
being sufficient to control. There is only one exception 
where the family has minority control.  
In addition, table 3 also presents the total number 
                                                   
40  From here on, the study will differentiate only two 
categories: first generation businesses, and second and third 
generation businesses, given that there are only 3 third 
generation companies and the transfer of leadership 
happened only recently  so there is no great difference 
between the two groups 
of shareholders in the business, allowing us to check 
for possible discrepancies. The table shows that the 
average total number of shareholders is less than or 
equal to five in approximately 82% of the businesses, 
including between 6 and 8 in 5% of the businesses, 
and higher than 26 in only three businesses. Thus, the 
data reveal a strong concentration of ownership, since 
the number of shareholders in most of the businesses 
in the sample is relatively small. There is a marked 
asymmetry in the distribution of share capital among 
shareholders, especially in those three businesses 
where the number of shareholders is greater than 26. 
Both facts suggest that the possibility of obstructing 
decision-making in the business, when there are 
differing opinions and conflicts of interest among 
shareholders, is minimal.  
We can conclude that our results do not support 
hypothesis H1. Second and third generation family 
businesses do not have a higher level of dispersion of 
ownership than first generation family businesses. 
Both collectives of family firms have a high degree of 
concentration of family-held shares.  
On the other hand, and with the aim of testing our 
hypotheses 2, and contributing information that will 
permit inferences to be made about the risks of 
conflicts of interest between different family parties, 
table 4 presents a ratio showing the existence of 
different groups: active family shareholders (88% of 
the total number of shareholders in first generation 
businesses and 65% of the total number of 
shareholders in second and third generation 
businesses), which supports our hypothesis 2 that, as 
the family grows over time, a lower proportion of 
family shareholders will work in the company, and so 
active and non-active family shareholders must be 
differentiated. 
Finally, and as a consequence of the last result, to 
manage the consequences of complexity and growth of 
the firm successfully, second and third generation 
family firms should provide a more clear culture of 
transparency than first generation family firms, 
through the implementation of Family Assembly and 
Family Council. Table 5 presents an analysis of 
governing mechanisms specific to the families of the 
sample businesses. Very few businesses in the sample 
make use of the Family Assembly as a vehicle for 
family deliberation about possible tensions, between 
different groups (active and non-active shareholders), 
that may put the survival of the business at risk. 
Concerning the Family Board, table 5 shows again that 
only a third of first generation companies have one, 
and that this percentage is even lower in second and 
third generation businesses (18.7%).  
We can conclude that the data do not support our 
hypothesis H3; a possible explanation for this result 
could be that family firms do not have an important 
need for these mechanisms of family governance, due 
to the high degree of concentration of family 
shareholders, and to the small average total number of 
shareholders (see table 3). Both facts suggest that the 
possibility of obstructing decision-making in the 
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business, when there are different opinions and 
conflict of interests among shareholders, is minimal. 
 
3.2 Business Development 
 
This section focuses on the empirical study of the 
heterogeneous characteristics and behaviour within 
family firms, analyzing how the firm changes in 
characteristics and behaviour over time (so as to make 
investment decisions related to growth strategies, and, 
in response to other key factors, to gain a competitive 
advantage: internationalization, commercialization, 
innovation and quality), depending on the particular 
stage in the family generation evolution. 
In order to test hypothesis 4, related to the 
life-cycle of firms, which predicts that ―founder-led 
firms are likely to be in the founding and growth 
stages of their life-cycle and firms in second and later 
generations are likely to be bigger, older and more 
mature, and growing more slowly or even declining‖, 
we present table 6. As dependent variables, we employ 
life-cycle variables, such as size, age, and growth. Size 
is measured in four dimensions: level of sales, assets, 
value-added, and the number of employees. Age is 
represented by the number of years the company has 
been in business. Growth is represented by the mean 
level of sales growth achieved during prior fiscal years. 
We use a historical measure of growth, rather than a 
perception of future growth, which provides the 
benefit of objectivity, as it is easier to measure past 
financial results than future projections of growth
41
. 
Furthermore, past growth has been shown to be highly 
correlated with future growth and perception of future 
growth (McMahon, 2001).  
The general information about the data set is 
compiled in table 6. The data are collected from the 
balance sheet, income statement and annual reports 
that firms reported to the Mercantile Register for the 
period 1994-2005. The table also shows the results of 
the test of equal mean and equal median of the variable, 
for first and second-third generation firms, with time 
and industry variables of control. Our results support 
hypothesis H4, for all the size variables, in terms of 
sales, assets, employees and value-added. First 
generation family firms are significantly smaller than 
second and later generation family firms, and are 
younger than second and later generation family firms.  
The test of equal growth cannot be rejected 
(hypothesis 6).This result of equal sales growth rates 
between families of first, and second-third generations, 
could be explained by the need of family owners of 
second-third generations to seek new perspectives and 
corporate strategies, in order to guarantee the survival 
of the firm and to remain competitive, as well as to 
accommodate the needs of the extended family as 
other family units join the firm. 
                                                   
41 This measure has been used in previous family business 
studies (Rutherford et al, 2006; Rutherford et al, 2003; 
Schulze et al, 2001) 
 
Another way to test whether first generation 
family firms grow at a higher or equal rate than 
second-third family firms (hypothesis 6), assuming 
that the size at the time they are created is similar, 
among firms of similar age, is by postulating a simple 
relation between size (Assets), age (T), and average 
growth rate (g), 
 
T
T gAssetsAssets )1(0   
(1) 
T
Assets  are the current total assets of the firm (in 
year 2005) and 
0
Assets  are the unknown assets 
when the firm was created in year 2005-T. Taking logs 
we have  
)1(0 gLnTAssetsLnAssetsLn T  . 
Therefore from the empirical model,    
 
)2(TationFirstGenercTba
T
AssetsLn 
                             
We can test the hypothesis that first generation 
family firms have a higher or equal growth rate in 
invested assets than second-third family firms. In terms 
of the model in equation (2) this implies that, 
  
MGGenerationationalMultigenerFGGenerationfirst
ggLnbggLnbc  )1()1()(
(3) 
Table 7 presents the results of the test of the 
prediction of the life cycle literature that first 
generation family firms are smaller in size than 
multigenerational family firms. The first column 
shows that, controlling for industry effect, the 
coefficient of the dummy first generation family firm 
is negative and statistically significant, which implies 
that first generation family firms have a lower stock of 
assets than multigenerational family firms. The 
conclusion changes, as expected, when we control for 
age, column 2, taking into account that both types of 
family firms are of different age (see table 6). The last 
column of table 7 explains the differences in size as a 
result of differences in age. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient of the variable ―FirstGenerationAge‖ is not 
statistically significant, which implies that first 
generation family firms grow at a rate equal to 
second-third family firms, again confirming our 
hypothesis H6. 
In an attempt to test our hypothesis 5, that is to 
see whether differences in the type of family firm, 
depending on the generation running the business, 
cause differences in the key factors to gain competitive 
advantage (specifically, factors related to investment 
decisions, commercialization and internationalization, 
innovation and quality) in the last twelve years, we 
present tables 8, 9 and 10.  
To analyse the possible differences: First, in 
commercialization, the variables used are the use of 
own brands, the percentage of own brand sales over 
total sales, and changes made in product/brand 
presentation. Second, in internationalization, the 
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variables used are the percentage of exports over total 
sales, the distribution of exports per country, the 
existence of affiliates and production plants abroad. 
Third, in innovation, the variables used are the 
percentage of sales of new products, the existence of R 
& D departments, the number of people working in R 
& D, and their level of education, the investment in R 
& D, and the number of patents per business. Finally, 
in quality, the variables used refer to whether the firm 
uses different models or certifications of quality, the 
percentage of total staff involved in quality teams or 
quality circles, and the percentage of returned 
products. 
Concerning the key factors to competitive 
advantage in ―Commercialization and 
Internationalization, table 8 reveals that: firstly, in 
terms of commercialization policy, one third of first 
generation family businesses, and 44% of second and 
third generation family businesses, provide their own 
brands, with the percentage of own brand sales over 
total sales being only 1% for the former and 30% for 
the latter. With regard to the variable, changes made in 
product/brand presentation, there are various 
differences depending on generation. The data show 
that about 60% of second and third generation 
businesses modify product/brand presentation, 
compared to 33.3% of first generation businesses. This 
implies that second and third generation businesses are 
more innovative and commercialize their own brands 
to a greater extent than first generation businesses.  
Secondly, regarding internationalization actions, 
second and third generation businesses are also better 
prepared, in terms of resources and products, than first 
generation businesses to compete in more developed 
markets. The table shows that 33% of first generation 
businesses export products, with the average level of 
exports over total sales being 25%. Exports are mainly 
distributed in Europe, (75%), Asia and Oceanía, 
(12.5%), África and South America (6.3% each). 
However, among second and third generation 
businesses, 62.5% export, and the level of exports over 
total sales is 27.3%. They export a larger proportion of 
their products to Europe, the USA and Canada than 
first generation family businesses and a smaller 
proportion to developing countries. Finally, only 
second and third generation family firms have 
affiliates and production plants abroad, 60% and 20%, 
respectively. 
Concerning the key factor to competitive 
advantage in ―Innovation‖ in the last twelve years, 
data in table 9 shows that only 33.3% of first 
generation family businesses innovate, with the level 
of sales of new products, (less than 5 years on the 
market), standing at 26%. The number of second and 
third generation firms who innovate is fifty% and the 
level of sales of new products stands at 42%. In 
addition, first generation businesses do not have R+D 
departments, and do not devote human or financial 
resources to these activities. In contrast, 50% of 
second and third generation businesses have a research 
and development department, with eight people 
working full time, 3 of whom have higher education. 
Finally, second and third generation businesses 
designate 1.2% of sales to internal R+D costs and 
0.8% to external R+D costs. Regarding patents, only 
31.3% of second and third generation businesses have 
them, with the average number of patents per business 
being 10.8. In contrast, none of the first generation 
businesses have patents.  
Finally, in terms of the key factors to competitive 
advantage in ―Quality‖, table 10 shows that, although 
there are no great differences in the number of 
businesses who have obtained ISO or similar 
certification, there are important differences in other 
variables relating to quality. Among first generation 
businesses, the level of total staff involved in quality 
teams or circles is 8.1%, compared to approximately 
36% in second and third generation businesses. In 
addition, none of the first generation businesses use 
European or non-European quality models, and only 
16.6% employ environmental protection policies. 
These levels are 25.0%, 13.0% and 75.0%, 
respectively, for second and third generation 
businesses. Finally, there are no differences in the 
quality of products among the two groups, the level of 
returned products is 0,5% in both.  
It may be concluded that our results support our 
hypothesis H5, as time passes and businesses become 
more complex, they invest more in commercialization 
and internationalization strategies and in technical or 
intangible resources, with the aim of obtaining a 
competitive position in the market and guaranteeing 
their survival as a family firm, in an increasingly 
complex, competitive and globalized environment.  
In order to manage the consequences of 
complexity and growth successfully, and guarantee 
survival, the family firm faces the need for adequate 
governance practices. In particular, the family firm has 
two organizational requisites: the ability to recruit, 
promote and retain the best professionals; and the 
implementation of a more efficient organisational 
structure. 
 
3.2.1 Analysis of personnel selection, 
recruitment, payment and training  
In relation to our H8, Table 11 also allows inferences 
to be made about recruitment policies in the company. 
It shows the following, by generation: i) the proportion 
of family directors out of the total number of directors 
contracted by the business. This reveals the degree of 
external professionalization in the business; ii) the 
proportion of family directors over the total number of 
family members active in the business. This indicates 
the existence of selection policies for family members, 
and enables us to see whether the recruitment policy 
applied is selective (only allowing qualified family 
members to become directors, thus avoiding possible 
problems caused by the heterogeneity of positions 
occupied by family members at different levels) or if, 
on the contrary, the business applies an open door 
recruitment policy which allows this sort of 
heterogeneity. iii) The number of family members 
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contracted, of the total number of active family 
members, who have technical or university level 
qualifications. This is an indication of the degree of 
professionalization among family members employed 
in the business. iv) The degree of job security among 
employees in the business, measured by the percentage 
of permanent contracts of the total number of 
employees at the end of 2005. Finally, v), it shows the 
proportion of expenditure devoted to training 
employees, which will provide information about 
employee policies.  
The degree of external professionalization 
increases over time as the business becomes more 
complex. The percentage of family directors is 72.6 in 
first generation businesses compared to 50.7 in the 
second and third generation. The table also reveals that, 
as the business becomes more complex over time, 
training and competence requisites increase for family 
executives; in first generation businesses, 47.2% of 
active family members have technical and/or 
university qualifications, compared to 60.7% of active 
family members in second and third generation 
companies.  
It is also interesting to note that second and third 
generation family businesses use a more selective 
recruitment policy for family members than do those 
of the  first generation. The table shows that 92% of 
active family members hold key positions in the 
business, compared to 55.1% of family members in 
first generation businesses. Another interesting point 
revealed in the table is that, with the passing of time, 
the family business becomes more committed to 
ensuring job security for its employees: 80.1% of 
personnel in second and third generation family 
businesses have permanent contracts, and 64.4% of 
personnel in first generation businesses.  
Finally, the table reveals a greater awareness of 
the need for training as the business grows in 
complexity over time. Second and third generation 
businesses devote 2% of their total personnel costs to 
training for employees, compared to 1% of first 
generation companies.  
According to the selection and promotion 
policies for directors, table 12 shows that the main 
selection criteria is professionalization, regardless of 
family relationship, in approximately 80% of second 
and third generation family businesses and 67% of first 
generation businesses. On the other hand, and 
independently of the generation leading the company, 
around 70% of businesses in the sample apply only 
one promotion policy, and give equal opportunity to 
the consideration of proposals made by all executives, 
regardless of family relationship.  
Secondly, with reference to the length of time the 
general director stays with the company, the time 
period is more than 15 years for 100% of the first 
generation businesses, and 60% of the second and 
third generation businesses. The lower percentage for 
second and third generation businesses can be 
explained by the fact that there are a group of 
businesses that have recently passed from second to 
third generation. Moreover, and regardless of 
generation, the family plays an important part in 
decision making in 80% of the sample.  
Finally, with regards to payment policies, 80% of 
first generation family businesses pay their executives 
a fixed salary and only 20% pay partly fixed and partly 
variable salaries, depending on profits. These 
percentages change radically in second and third 
generation businesses, where a fixed salary is applied 
in 50% of the companies, and a mixed salary in the 
remainder. The average level of variable salary, in 
businesses using this system, is 30% in first generation 
companies, and 24.3% in second and third. On the 
other hand, in 83.3 percent of first generation family 
firms, and in 75% of multigenerational family firms, 
there is more than one payment policy, dependent on 
kinship. Moreover, salary scales are fixed by the 
owners in 80% of the businesses, who are, in most 
cases, the directors of the business.  
The data support our hypothesis H8: as the 
business gains in complexity, and the degree of 
external and family directors professionalization is 
increasing, family firms use a more selective 
recruitment policy for family members and invest 
more in training employees. However, with regard to 
payment policies, and independently of the generation, 
more than 70% of family firms apply two different 
payment policies, depending on kinship. 
 
3.2.2 Analysis of the Formal Structure of 
the Organisation: The Board of 
Administration  
Concerning the composition of the Board of 
Administration, table 13 shows that the average 
number of members belonging to the Board of 
Administration is 4.7 in first generation family 
businesses (89.4% family member), and 4.8 in second 
and third generation businesses (77.1% family 
members). This table also shows information about the 
generation to which the family board members belong. 
In first generation family businesses, 71.4% of family 
board members belong to the first generation and the 
remaining 28.6% are second generation family 
members. In second and third generation businesses, 
different generations are also represented: 13.5% of 
board members are first generation, 73% are second 
generation, and the remaining 13.5% are third 
generation.  
The table 13 also shows the frequency per year of 
board meetings. Among first generation businesses, the 
board meets only once a year, or sporadically, in 50% 
of the companies; between one and eleven times in 
33.3% of the companies, and more than eleven times 
in only 16.7% of the companies. In second and third 
generation businesses, the board meets sporadically in 
40%, between two and eleven times in 33.3%, and 
more than eleven times in 26.7% of the companies.  
In addition, the table shows the degree of 
independence of the Board through the representation 
of family shareholders, measured by the proportion of 
family shareholders on the board and the total number 
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of family shareholders. Data obtained from this table 
reveals that all the family shareholders in first 
generation businesses have a place on the board, 
compared to 77.5% of family shareholders in second 
and third generation businesses. The ratio of 
independence of the board, measured by the proportion 
of independent board members among the total 
number of board members, is zero in first generation 
family businesses, and 0.6% for second and third 
generation businesses. Only one firm has an 
independent board member, who is not linked to the 
management or shareholders of the business. The table 
also shows that, in 67% of first generation businesses 
and 53% of second and third generation businesses, 
the president of the board is also the managing director 
of the business, which may put the effectiveness of the 
board at risk when it comes to supervising 
management.  
Regarding functions carried out by the Board of 
Administration, table 14 shows that, as the business 
gains in complexity, with transfers over generations, 
there is an increasing concern for Administration 
boards to be more formal and efficient in terms of 
management. Specifically, the data shows that, among 
second and third generation businesses, greater care is 
taken in the decision-making process; 86% of this 
group mark their boards as being responsible for the 
ratification and selection of strategies proposed by the 
management team and control of the results of these 
elected strategies, whereas the level of first generation 
businesses whose boards carry out these two functions 
is lower (16.7% and 33.3%, respectively). In addition, 
a greater concern can also be seen, in these more 
complex businesses, for the use of more formal 
organisational structures which help to prevent 
confusion and intrigue; 78.6% of second and third 
generation businesses mark the main task of the board 
as being the definition of lines of responsibility and 
authority. This level is 16.7% (only one business) 
among the group of first generation businesses.  
It is interesting to note that in half of the boards 
of first generation businesses, and a third of the boards 
of second and third generation, tasks are confused and 
involve day-to- day operative policy. In addition, the 
boards of first generation businesses pay little or no 
attention to tasks involving the selection, supervision, 
evaluation and control of the management team.  
Finally, with reference to payment policy, table 
15 shows that in approximately 70% of first generation 
family businesses, members of the board receive no 
payment for being board members and, in the 
remaining 30%, they receive a fixed amount. On the 
contrary, in 77% of second and third generation family 
businesses, members of the board are paid for being 
board members, a fixed amount in 30% of the 
businesses, fixed plus expenses in 40%, and a variable 
amount in the remaining 30% of the businesses. The 
average levels of fixed payment, fixed plus expenses, 
and variable out of total payment are, 65%, 23% and 
12%, respectively. These payments are fixed by the 
owners in all first generation businesses and in half of 
the second and third generation businesses, with the 
board establishing payment in the other half of the 
businesses. In conclusion, the information obtained 
from this table reveals that, as the business gains in 
complexity, there is an increasing concern for director 
boards to be more efficient in terms of payment policy 
to their members. 
Summarising the results obtained, we can 
confirm our hypothesis H9. We conclude that the data 
reveal that, as the business grows in complexity, there 
is an increasing concern for director boards to be more 
formal and efficient in management. The data show 
that, among second and third generation family 
businesses, greater care is taken in the 
decision-making process, there is greater concern for 
the use of more formal organisational structures which 
help to prevent confusion and intrigue, and greater 
care is taken concerning the composition, degree of 
independence and frequency of meetings of the board, 
along with a greater focus on efficiency in terms of 
payment policy to their members.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our results confirm the greater degree of complexity 
of the family firm, as the ownership and the running of 
the business is passed to future generations. However, 
and contrary to all expectations, family firms in the 
sample have a high degree of concentration of 
ownership, regardless of the generation; one, two or 
three shareholders are enough to exercise at least a 
majority control in 82% of the businesses. On the other 
hand, and also contrary to expectations, our results 
reveal that a greater complexity in the business does 
not give rise to the incorporation of external partners 
in the company‘s share capital. In fact, third generation 
companies have no external partners, with 100% 
capital remaining in the family.  The results reveal 
that the ownership structure remains stable and 
undergoes no important change over time, regardless 
of the generation. This result could be explain that 
very few businesses in the sample, independently of 
the generation running the business, make use of 
governing mechanisms specific to the families, as a 
vehicle for family deliberations concerning possible 
tensions between different groups. 
Family firms, as any firm, face a dynamic, global 
and highly competitive market, which increasingly 
demands the incorporation of new products, new 
technologies, new organizational methods and new 
methods for competing in the market. With the aim of 
maintaining a competitive position in the market, 
guaranteeing survival as a family firm, and to 
accommodate the needs of the extended family as 
other family units join the firm, family firms in second 
or later generations are larger, invest more in 
commercialization and internationalization strategies 
and in technical or intangible resources. However, 
there are no differences in the level of sales growth 
and in the quality of products between generations; the 
level of returned products is 0.5% in both cases. 
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The results also confirm that, as the business 
gains in complexity, the degree of external and family 
directors‘ professionalization increases, family firms 
use a more selective recruitment policy for family 
members, and they invest more in training employees. 
However, with regard to payment policies, and 
independently of the generation, more than 70% of 
family firms apply two different payment policies, 
depending on kinship. 
In addition to having managerial capacity and 
expertise, it is also important that firms utilize 
planning and control techniques that assist in 
monitoring and controlling performance, as they grow. 
Growth requires formal management systems with 
clear definition of jobs, clear lines of responsibility 
and authority, and greater documentation of 
management decisions. The results obtained reveal 
that, as the businesses grow in complexity, there is an 
increasing concern for director boards to be more 
formal and efficient in management. Data show that, 
among second and third generation family businesses, 
greater care is taken in the decision-making process, 
there is greater concern in using more formal 
organisational structures, helping to prevent confusion 
and intrigue, greater care is taken in the composition, 
degree of independence and frequency of meetings of 
the board, and there exists a greater concern to be 
more efficient in terms of payment policy to members 
of the board. 
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Appendices 
Table 1. Generational Distribution of Family Firms in terms of Identity and Participation of Principal 
Shareholders in Shares Capital of the Firm in 2005  
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FIRST GENERATION  
Only Family Shareholders (FA) 5 XFA = 100 - - - - - - 
Family, Family  Holding and 
Employees 
1 25 XFA< 
50 
25 XH< 
50 
- - 25 XEMP< 
50 
- - 
SECOND GENERATION  
Only Family Shareholders (FA) 9 XFA = 100 - - - - - - 
Family Holding (H) 1 - XH = 100 - - - - - 
Family and Private Individuals 
(FA, PART) 
1 25 XFA< 
50 
     XPARTi < 5* 
Family Holding and Other 
National Firm (FA, EN) 
1  XH = 50 XEN = 50     
Family, Family Holding, 
Foreign Capital,  Employees, 
Affiliates‘ Companies (FA, H, 
EXT, EMP, FIL) 
 
1 
 
25 XFA< 
50 
 
25 XH< 
50 
 
 
 
25 XEXT< 
50 
 
XEMP < 5 
 
XFIL < 5 
 
THIRD GENERATION  
Only Family Shareholders (FA) 2 XFA = 100 - - - - - - 
Family (FA) y Family Holding 
(H) 
1 XFA50 5 XH< 25 - - - - - 
T. Firms with no External 
Shareholders 
18  (81,8%) 
T. Firms with  External 
Shareholders 
 4   (18,2%) 
Own Elaboration; Note: XPART i < 5*, where i= 1 …91 
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Table 2. Ownership Structure of Family Firms According to Identity and Participation in share capital of 
Principal Shareholders in 1994  
 
 
 
NATURE OF THE 
SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Total 
Number 
of 
Firms 
XFA 
% 
Participation 
of the 
Family 
in 
Shares 
Capital 
XH 
%  
Participation 
of the  
Family 
Holding in 
Shares 
Capital 
XEN 
% 
Participation 
of Other 
National 
Firms 
in 
Shares 
Capital 
XEF 
%  
Participation 
of  
Financial 
Entity in 
Shares 
Capital 
XEMP 
% 
Participation 
of 
Employees 
 in 
Shares 
Capital 
 
XFIL 
%  
Participation 
of 
Affiliates 
Companies  
in 
Shares Capital 
 
XPART 
%  
Participation  
of 
Private 
Individuals in 
Shares Capital 
Only Family Shareholders (FA) 16 XFA = 100 - - - - - - 
Family (FA) and  Non-Family 
Executive Employees (EMP) 
1 XFA50 - - - 25 XEMP< 
50 
- - 
Family (FA) and Non-Family 
Executive Employees 
1 XFA50 - - - XEMP< 5 - - 
Family and  Private 
Individuals (FA, PART) 
1 5 XFA< 25 - - - - - XPARTi < 5* 
Family Holding and Other 
National Firms (FA, EN) 
1 XFA = 50 - XEN = 50 - - - - 
Family Holding,, Employees 
and Affiliates Companies (FA, 
H,  EMP, FIL) 
 
1 
 
25 XFA< 50 
 
25 XH< 50 
 
- 
 
- 
 
XEMP < 5 
 
XFIL < 5 
 
- 
Family, (FA) and Financial 
Entity 
1 5 XFA< 25 - - XEF50 - - - 
Note: XPART i < 5*, where i= 1 …91 
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Table 3. Generational Distribution of the Firms in terms of degree of Concentration of the Shares in the hands of 
Family Shareholders in 2005 
 FIRST GENERATION SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION  
TOTAL 
 Number of 
Firms 
 
 
% 
Number of 
Shareholder 
On Average 
Number of 
Firms 
 
 
% 
Number of 
Shareholder 
On Average 
Number of 
Firms 
 
 
% 
Number of 
Shareholder 
On Average 
A1 
Only one Shareholder 
Exercising Majority 
Control 
 
 
2 
 
 
33,3 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
25,0 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
27,4 
 
 
 
3 
 
A2 
Two Shareholders 
Exercising Majority 
Control 
 
 
3 
 
 
50,0 
 
 
3,7 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
43,8 
 
 
 
3,7 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
45,5 
 
 
 
4 
 
A3 
Three Shareholders 
Exercising Majority 
Control 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
12,5 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
9,1 
 
 
 
4 
 
A5 
Five Shareholders 
Exercising Majority 
Control 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
6,3 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
4,5 
 
 
 
48 
 
A6 
Six Shareholders 
Exercising Majority 
Control 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
6,3 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
4,5 
 
 
 
27 
 
A6 
Six Shareholders 
Exercising Effective 
Control (with a 
percentage of capital of 
less than 50%) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
6,3 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
4,5 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
A8 
Eight Shareholders 
Exercising Majority 
control 
 
 
1 
 
 
16,7 
 
 
8 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
4,5 
 
 
 
8 
 
Table 4. Differences in the percentage of Active Family Shareholders between Generations  
 
 
 
FIRST 
GENERATION 
 
SECOND & THIRD 
GENERATION 
 
)( percentagein
rsShareholdeFamilyTotal
rsShareholdeFamilyActive
 
 
88,1 
 
 
65,1 
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Table 5. Mechanisms of Governance of the Business Family (2005) 
 
 
 FAMILY ASSEMBLY & FAMILY BOARD 
1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS 
N % N % 
Firms with Family Assembly 1 16,6 4 26,6 
Firms with Family Board 2 33,3 3 18,8 
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Table 6. Means, medians and statitstics from tests of differences in means and medians for size, age and growth 
variables between first generation and multigeneration family firms  
(1994-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Generation Family 
Firms 
Second-Third Generation 
Family Firms 
    
Mean Median Mean Median t-student 
differ 
(means)© 
Kruskal 
Walis Test 
Chi-Square 
differ 
(medians) 
       
Sales  4.594 3.755 42.308 12.702 -4.3
*** 50.9*** 
Assets  4.709 3.890 57.718 13.389 -3.7
*** 29.7*** 
Value Added  1.601 1.182 15.451 3.579 -4.0
*** 47.0*** 
Employees 41 20 213 73 -4.3*** 44.6*** 
Age of the Firm 21 21 36 32 -7,5*** 33.3*** 
[Sales‘s GrowthT-Sales‘s Growth(T-1)]/Sales‘s Growth (T-1) 0,03 -0,08 0,03 -0,07 0,3 0,2 
 
Number of Observations 
 
264 
  
264 
   
 
Note: 
The  number of firm-year observations totals 264 for the period 1994-2005. Data collected from the balance sheet, 
income statement and annual reports that firms have to report to Spanish Mercantile Register. 
©Control variables of time and industry dummies in all regressions although the coefficients are not reported.  
 Millions of Euros 
***
  p  1%;  
**
 p  5%; 
* 
p  10%
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Table 7. Growth and size of first and second or more generation family firms (1994-2005) 
 
The table presents the results from tests for differences in size and growth between firt and second or more 
generations family firms. The dependent variable is Log Assets in year 2005.Model 1 tests for differences in size. 
Model 2 tests differences in size controlling for age. Model 3 tests for differences in growth rate. In all models. 
control variables of industry. T-student in parenthesis. 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Constant  16.79
*** 
(29.8) 
15.4*** 
(16.7) 
16.2*** 
(17.7) 
GenerationFirst  -1.59
*** 
(-2.2) 
-0.98 
(-1.3) 
 
Age  - 
 
0.03** 
(1.9) 
0.04*** 
(2.3) 
AgeFG  - 
 
- 
 
-0.03** 
(-1.0) 
    
 
nsObservatio  
 
22 
 
22 
 
22 
 
2R  
 
0.12 
 
0.22 
 
0.20 
 
F  
 
2.2** 
 
2.7*** 
 
2.9*** 
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***
  p  1%;  
**
 p  5%;   
* 
p  10% 
 
Table 8. Commercialization and Internationalization 
 
KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATION 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
COMMERCIALIZATION     
Promotion of Own Brands 2 33,3 7 43,8 
Percentage of Sales Destined to Promotion of Own Brands  1,0  30,0 
Have changed Presentation of Products/Brands in last Three Years 2 33,3 10 62,5 
INTERNATIONALIZATION     
Export 2 33,3 10 62,5 
Percentage of Exports over Sales:  25,0  27,3 
Distribution of Exports by Country     
                                                 Europe  75,0  83,6 
                                                 United States and Canada  0  2,0 
                                                 Latin-American  6,3  3,4 
                                                 Asia y Oceania  12,5  6,4 
                                                 Africa  6,3  4,6 
Firms has Commercials Affiliates Abroad 0 - 6 60,0 
Business has Production Plants Abroad 0 - 2 20,0 
Own Elaboration 
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Table 9. Innovation 
 
KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATION 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
INNOVACIÓN     
Firms having New Products (less than 5 years) 2 33,3 8 50,0 
Percentage of Sales of New Products (less than 5 years)  26,0  41,9 
Use Patents in the Sector 0 - 5 31,3 
Have R+D Department 0 - 8 50,0 
   
Number of Patents 0 10,8 
Number of Persons dedicated full time to R+D 0 8,1 
Graduates dedicated full time to R+D 0 2,5 
Persons with Vocational Training dedicated full time to R+D 0 0,8 
)( prrcentagein
SalesTotal
DIExpensesInternalTotal 
 
 
0 
 
1,2 
)( percentagein
SalesTotal
DIExpensesExternalTotal 
 
 
0 
 
0,9 
 
Table 10. Quality 
 
KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
QUALITY     
Has ISO or other quality certification 4 66,7 13 81,3 
Percentage of staff participating in Quality Teams  8,1  35,58 
Uses European quality model as reference 0 - 4 25,0 
Uses other quality management models 0 - 2 13,0 
Applies environmental protection policy 1 16,7 12 75,0 
Percentage of Products returned  0,44  0,5 
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Table 11. Family Recruitment Policies and Job Security 
 
 
RECRUIMENT  POLICY 
 
FIRST 
GENERATION 
 
 
SECOND & THIRD GENERATION 
 
 
)( percentagein
rsShareholdeFamilyTotal
rsShareholdeFamilyActive
 
 
88,1 
 
 
65,1 
 
)( percentagein
ExecutivesTotal
ExecutivesFamily
 
 
72,6 
 
 
50,7 
 
 
)( percentagein
rsShareholdeFamilyActiveTotal
ExecutivesFamily
 
 
55,1 
 
 
91,8 
 
 
(%)
FamilyActiveTotal
EducationHigherorThecnicalwithFamilyActive
 
 
47,2 
 
 
60,7 
 
)(
2004
2004
percentagein
ofEndtheatEmployeesTotal
ofEndtheatEmployeesPermanent
 
 
64,4 
 
 
80,1 
 
)( percentagein
ExpensesPersonnalTotal
ExpensesEmployeesTraining
 
1,1 
 
2,1 
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Table 12. Recruitment, Promotion, Payment and Permanence Policies for Directors 
 
RECRUITMENT, PROMOTION AND PAYMENT POLICIES FOR DIRECTORS AND 
PERMANENCE OF DIRECTORS 
FIRST 
GENERACIÓN 
SECOND &THIRD 
GENERACION 
 
N 
 
% 
 
N 
 
% 
RECRUITMENT AND WORKING CRITERIA     
Main Selection Criteria is Professional Capacity. Family Relation is not taken into account. 4 66,7 11 78,6 
There is only One Promotion Policy. Family Relation is not taken into account. 4 66,7 10 71,4 
The same weight of consideration is given to Proposals from both Family and Non-family 
Directors. 
4 66,7 10 71,4 
PERMANENCE OF GENERAL DIRECTOR     
Six to ten years 0 - 3 18,7 
Eleven to fifteen years 0 - 3 18,8 
More than fifteen years 4 100 10 62,5 
TOP MANAGEMENT PAYMENT POLICY     
Receives Fix Salary 4 80,0 8 53,0 
Receives Fix Salary + Variable Salary 1 20,0 7 47,0 
SalaryVariablewithFirmsofNumber
SalaryVariableofsPercentagetheofSum
 
 
 
 
30,0 
 
 
 
24,3 
Identical payment, regardless of kinship 1 16,7 4 25,0 
Pay scales fixed by owners 5 83,3 12 75,0 
Pay scales fixed by Board 1 16,7 4 25,0 
Own Elaboration 
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Table 13. Composition of the Board 
COMPOSITION 1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS 
Size and Members of Board of Administration Mean % Mean % 
Total Members belonging to board 4,7 100 4,8 100 
Total Family Members on Board 4,2 89.4 3,7 77.1 
          First Generation Family Members 3 71.4 0,5 14.2 
          Second Generation Family Members 1,2 28.6 2,7 73 
          Third Generation Family Members 0 - 0,5 13.5 
Total NonFamily Members on Board 0,5 10.6 1,1 22.9 
DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF BOARD (in percentage) Mean Median Mean Median 
Independent Members/Total Members 0 - 0,6 0 
CEO is President of Board 66,7 100 53,0 100 
rsShareholdeFamilyTotal
BoardonrsShareholdeFamily  100 100 77,5 100 
Own Elaboration 
 
Table 14. Tasks of the Board of Administration and Annual Frequency of Meetings 
TASKS CARRIED OUT BY THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION  
1ª GENERATION 2ª & 3ª GENERATION 
N % N % 
Definition of lines of responsibility and authority  1 16,7 11 78,6 
Selection, Supervision, Evaluation and Control of managers 1 16,7 7 50 
Play an important role in operative policy 3 50 4 33,3 
Identify principal risks facing the company 1 16,7 7 50 
Ratify and select strategies proposed by management 1 16,7 12 85,7 
Control Results of selected strategies and their implementation by the management team 2 33,3 12 85,7 
Determine Information and communication policies with all interested parties, ―Stakeholders‖ 1 16,7 2 14,3 
Responsible for electing President of the Board 3 50 13 92,9 
Ensure Succession in top management 3 50 7 50 
FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETINGS     
Once a year 1 16,7 0 - 
Sporadic and unplanned. 2 33,3 6 40 
Between 2 and 11 times a year 2 33,3 5 33,3 
More than 11 times a year 1 16,7 4 26,7 
Own Elaboration 
Table 15. Payment Policy to the Members of the Board 
PAYMENT  POLICY 1ª GENERACIÓN 2ª & 3ª GENERACION 
N % N % 
Payment received 2 33,3 13 76,9 
        Fix Payment 2 100 4 30,0 
        Fix Payment + Expenses - - 5 40,0 
         Variable Payment depending on Results - - 4 30,0 
)( percentagein
PaymentTotal
PaymentFix   
 
100  65,0 
)( percentagein
PaymentTotal
PaymentVariable    
- 
  
23,0 
)( percentagein
PaymentTotal
PaymentExpenses    
- 
  
12,0 
Own Elaboration 
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THE NON-LINEAR EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKET 
 
Rami Zeitun* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the non-linear effects of ownership structure (variables) on corporate 
performance. The data used in this study are derived from 167 publicly traded companies quoted on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2006. The ownership structure is measured by 
the percentage of shares held by each type of owner (state, institution, foreign concentrated owners, 
and individuals). Results in this study confirm earlier findings of a curvilinear relationship reported for 
larger markets. The results also show that the relationship between government ownership and ROA 
and MBVR is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a firm increases when government ownership is low, 
but the value of a firm decreases when it is high. As the government reduces its stake in a privatised 
company to below a specific point, perhaps market monitoring become ineffective and this increases 
the agency costs. The results also document that the relation between institutional ownership and ROA 
and Tobin’s Q is a hump-shaped curve. When institutional ownership increases above a specific point, 
institutional shareholders negatively influence a firm’s activities. Findings in this study contribute to 
the growing body of international evidence that the non-linear cubic relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance is robust to differences in governance structures across markets. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance has been an important research topic 
during the last three decades, and has produced 
ongoing debate in the literature of corporate finance. 
Theoretical and empirical research on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance 
was originally motivated by the separation of 
ownership and control identified by Berle and Means 
(1932). Berle and Means (1932) suggested that an 
inverse correlation should be observed between the 
diffuseness (concentration) of shareholdings and firm 
performance, in which ownership structure affects 
firm performance. The financial literature assumes 
that managers are imperfect agents for investors, as 
managers may attempt to pursue their own goals 
rather than shareholders‘ wealth maximisation. Also, it 
has been stated that there may be a conflict of interest 
between outsiders (shareholders) and insiders 
(managers), as managers may have incentives which 
serve their own benefit rather than maximising 
shareholders wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
One approach that may control this conflict, 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is to 
increase the equity ownership of managers in the 
firms, therefore encouraging managers to work more 
efficiently to maximise shareholders‘ wealth and carry 
out less activities of self-interest (see Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983); Shleifer 
and Vishny, (1986)). However, it may also work in the 
opposite direction, as large shareholders may use their 
control rights to achieve private benefits. 
Nevertheless, this view has been challenged by 
Demsetz (1983), who argued that the ownership 
structure of a company should be thought of as an 
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the 
influence of shareholders on a firm‘s performance. 
According to Demsetz (1983) there should be no 
systematic relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. For instance, even if a manager 
owns only a small stake, market control, including the 
managerial market, and the market for corporate 
control, may force him toward the firm‘s value 
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maximisation, as a manager wants to guarantee his 
employment. On the contrary, a manager with a high 
ownership percentage may have enough votes to 
guarantee his employment without any market control 
(see Fama, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). A firm‘s 
ownership structure is affected by the firm-specific 
risk, as firms have different characteristics and operate 
in different environments, so the optimal ownership 
structure varies across firms. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) extend 
the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study by adding new 
variables to explain the variation in ownership 
structure. In order to control for various possible 
unobserved heterogeneities, a fixed effects panel data 
model and instrumental variables are used. Ownership 
structure is measured by the shareholdings of insiders. 
Their results showed that insider ownership is 
negatively related to the capital-to sales ratio, but 
positively related to the advertising-to-sales ratio and 
operating income to sales ratio. After controlling for 
these variables and fixed firm effects, changes in 
ownership holdings were found to not have a 
significant impact on firm performance. However, a 
quadratic relationship between ownership and firm 
performance was found when they controlled for the 
endogeneity of ownership. 
More recently, the focus of literature has shifted 
and several theories have been proposed to show the 
ambiguity of the effect of ownership concentration. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
argued that the agency problem in many emerging 
markets is relatively severe due to the absence of 
strong legal protection and other governance 
mechanisms. The monitoring manager is not the main 
problem of corporate governance but the main 
problem is the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
In this case, the legal protection of the minority is the 
main issue. 
The relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate value could be non-linear. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) point out that a manager 
responds to two opposing forces. At a lower level of 
managerial ownership share, managers tend to allocate 
a firm‘s resources for their own benefit and at the 
expense of the outside shareholders. However, when 
the level of managerial ownership increases, a 
manager‘s interests become more associated with the 
outside shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) ignore the endogeneity issue altogether and re-
examine the relationship between corporate ownership 
structure and performance. A cross section of 371 
Fortune 500 firms was taken in 1980. They measured 
performance by Tobin‘s Q, and managerial ownership 
as the combined shareholdings of all board members 
who have a minimum share of 0.2% of ownership. 
They find a positive relationship between management 
ownership and firm value in the 0% to 5% ownership 
range and beyond the 25% ownership range. But at 
moderate levels of management ownership, between 
5% and 25%, firm performance decreased. A study by 
Cho (1998), using cross-sectional data and ownership 
information from value line replicates the Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study and finds a similar 
nonmonotonic relationship between Tobin‘s Q and 
management share holdings. 
In contrast to findings in Morck et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) reported a quadratic 
functional form and do not detect any inverse 
relationship especially over the 5–25% ownership 
range. McConnell and Servaes (1990) used the US 
data for more than 1000 firms from the Compustat 
database to investigate the relationship between 
Tobin‘s Q and managerial share ownership. They 
found a positive relationship between management 
ownership and firm performance in the 0% to 40% - 
50% ownership range. McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
replicated and extended their earlier study but over a 
later time period and obtain similar results to 
McConnell and Servaes (1990)
42
. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) estimated the effect of managerial 
ownership and board composition on Tobin‘s Q using 
panel data for five years. They found no relationship 
between board composition and performance, but 
found a significant non-monotonic relation between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance, a 
positive relationship between 0% and 1%, a 
decreasing relationship between 1% and 5%, an 
increasing relationship between 5% and 20%, and 
decreasing beyond 20%. 
Furthermore, recent findings in Davies et al. 
(2005) for UK firms are even more disturbing. Using a 
simultaneous equations framework in the presence of 
conflicting managerial incentives, Davies et al. (2005) 
report that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value is essentially quintic 
(double-humped) and not just cubic as reported in 
Short and Keasey (1999). Collectively, these 
conflicting findings suggest that the debate over the 
precise functional form of the insider ownership–firm 
value relationship is far from conclusive. 
In Australia, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell 
(1997) investigated the relationship between the 
distribution of equity ownership and a firm‘s 
                                                   
42  Steiner (1996), and Han and Suk (1998) obtained a 
similar conclusion. Their results confirm the existence of 
managerial entrenchment when insider ownership is beyond 
36.6% and 41.8%, respectively. 
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performance using 349 publicly traded firms in 1986 
and 1989. Their results are weakly supportive of a 
curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate performance. Also, institutional ownership 
was not found to be an important determinant of 
Australian corporate performance. Short and Keasey 
(1999) provided evidence for the curvilinear effects 
(non-linear relationship) between insider ownership 
and firm performance in UK firms, but that insider 
ownership becomes entrenched at higher levels of 
ownership (the breakpoints were 12% and 41%) than 
their US counterparts (see Morck et al., 1988). 
Aldamen (2002) provided evidence from the 
Jordanian market. He investigated the impact of 
foreign ownership on firm value for a sample 
consisting of 46 industrial and service companies 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) covering 
the period between 1990 and 2000. In order to 
investigate the impact of foreign ownership on a 
firm‘s performance he used a cross-sectional, time-
series ordinary least squares (OLS) piecewise 
regression. Four variables were used in his study to 
represent ownership on the basis of the proportion of 
foreign held shares. Aldamen (2002) found that the 
relationship between firm value and foreign ownership 
in the Jordanian case is non-linear. His results reveal 
that the value of Jordanian firms rises as foreign 
ownership increases from 0% to 1%, firm‘s value 
decreases as foreign ownership rises from 5% to 20%, 
and firm‘s vale increases as foreign ownership moves 
beyond 20%. 
Zeitun and Tian (2007) examined the impact of 
ownership structure on Jordanian firm's performance 
and the default risk using a matched sample of 59 
publicly listed firms in Jordan for the period 1989-
2002. This paper investigates the effect of ownership 
structure on a firm‘s performance and its failure in 
Jordan using panel data of 167 firms. 
A number of reasons make the choice of Jordan 
interesting. First, Jordan is a much smaller market 
than the US, UK, China, or Australia, which were the 
subjects of prior studies, and hence it is likely that 
managerial actions will be more translucent that may 
lead to a less conflict of interest between insiders and 
outsiders. Second, since 1990 privatisation of publicly 
held shares is an ongoing program in Jordan. 
Managing state holdings in Jordanian listed companies 
has become a top government priority, with the 
government supporting the private sector to takeover 
and participate more in economic growth
43
 (see, for 
                                                   
43 Privatisation is part of the overall economic package that 
the government has adopted since the economic adjustment 
program of the early nineties, and self-reliance in the 
example, CBJ (2003, 2006)); World Bank (2000)). So, 
it could be anticipated that privatisation in Jordan 
would affect a firm‘s performance and failure as it 
changed the ownership structure of firms and 
ownership concentration. 
Third, the Jordanian Government undertook 
major reforms of the legislation that governs securities 
the law 22 of 1997, which is most recently amended in 
the law 76 of 2002, provides basic Company Law or 
Securities Law. This reform was intended to 
strengthen internal control, shareholders rights, and 
the protection of minority shareholders and, therefore, 
potentially could have an impact on the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm value. For 
example, shareholders have the right to take part in 
discussing matters presented thereto, and in voting on 
the resolutions adopted by assembly regarding this 
matter (see, for example, JSC (2001, 2004). In the 
event of bankruptcy or liquidation65, ―if the 
company's assets are insufficient to meet its 
obligations as a result of the negligence of its 
Chairman, members of the Board, the General 
Manager, or its auditors, the court may charge those 
responsible for the deficit jointly and severally‖ (JSC, 
2001, p.23). Furthermore, ―shareholders representing 
not less than 15% of the subscribed share capital can 
require the Controller of Companies to inspect the 
company for possible violations‖ (JSC, 2001). 
Finally, the ownership of ASE listed firms is 
highly concentrated. It is feasible that this significant 
concentration may help to increase the firm's 
performance, as the large shareholders may help 
reduce the free-rider problem of small investors. For 
example, the fraction held by companies seems to be 
on the rise; for instance, it increased from 26.4 percent 
in 1996 to 30.5 percent in 2006 (See Zeitun 2009).  
This paper examines the non-linear effects of 
ownership structure (variables) on corporate 
performance. To the best of the author‘s knowledge, 
this is the first study that real figures about ownership 
structure (mix and concentration) to investigate the 
non-linear effects of ownership structure (variables) 
on corporate performance for Jordanian companies 
using a large sample. It is worth noting that collecting 
the data on ownership structure (mix and 
concentration) for each firm and for each year over the 
period 1989-2006 constituted a large part of the 
research for this thesis as the data were collected 
manually. This vast effort made this research possible. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive discussion 
                                                                             
aftermath of the economic crisis in 1989 that befell the 
country. 
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about ownership concentration and ownership mix for 
the Jordanian companies used in the study. Section 3 
introduces the estimation method. Section 6.4 introduces 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper 
 
2.   Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: a Descriptive Discussion 
 
The corporate governance mechanisms vary around 
the world which could affect the relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For example, in Europe 
and Japan, there is less reliance on elaborate legal 
protection, and more reliance on large investors while, 
in the US, firms rely on legal protection. So, due to the 
differences between US corporate governance and 
other systems, a different relationship between 
ownership and firm value could be expected. Also, 
recent studies of corporate governance suggest that 
geographical position, the tax system, industrial 
development, and cultural characteristics, along with 
other factors, affect ownership structure which in turn 
impacts on a firm‘s performance and its failure 
(Pedersen and Thompson, 1997). Therefore, this study 
is important as it provides evidence from the emerging 
markets and, more specifically, from Middle Eastern 
countries using Jordan as a case study
44
. 
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) provides 
some evidence about the ownership structure of the 
companies traded on the ASE. There are five types of 
shares. First, government shares are those held by the 
central government. Government shares are not 
available for trading on the ASE, but government 
ownership has fallen during the last ten years as a 
result of privatization. Second, government agency 
shares are shares owned by the government agencies. 
Third, company shares are shares owned by domestic 
institutions. The company is defined as a legal person 
or a non-individual legal entity or institution. Fourth, 
individual shares are held and traded by individuals. 
Fifth, foreign and Arab shares are those held by Arabs 
and foreign owners. All these shares entitle 
shareholders and have the same voting rights and 
dividend payment. 
Table 1 shows the average ownership mix of 
stock companies listed on the ASE. The fraction of 
government shares appears to have declined from 
1994 to 2006. The fraction of Arab ownership appears 
to have increased from 10.20 percent in 1994 to 13.5 
percent in 2006. The fraction of foreign owned shares 
                                                   
44 For more details about the effect of corporate governance 
on the incentives for the private sector to invest, see Stone, 
Hurly and Khumani (1998). 
appears to have been unstable as it both increased and 
decreased over this time period. However, it appears 
to have increased to 15 percent in 2006. The fraction 
held by companies seems to be on the rise; for 
instance, it increased from 26.4 percent in 1996 to 
30.5 percent in 2006. 
Foreign ownership has been on the rise since the 
beginning of the 1990's. The ASE has categorized the 
foreign (Non-Jordanian) ownership as Arab and 
non-Arab investors. Foreign investors can trade (buy 
and sell) on the ASE without any restriction. 
Furthermore, non-Jordanian investors are also allowed 
to invest in any project within any sector according to 
regulation No. 54 of the year 2000 (Non-Jordanian 
Investment Regulation). This regulation allowed 
foreigners to own up to 100% of any investment 
project in any sector, with the exception of the mining 
sector, trade and industry sector, transport sector, and 
clearance services, and allowed foreign investors to 
own a high percentage of the traded companies on the 
ASE (World Bank, 2003).  
Table 2 shows the percentage of foreign 
ownership in the shareholding listed companies by 
sector as a percentage of capital market capitalisation 
for the period 1999-2008. According to Table 2, the 
year 1999 recorded the highest foreign ownership 
percentage in the financial sector at 56.65 percent; 
while the year 2008 recorded the highest foreign 
ownership percentage in the industrial sector at 53.35 
percent of the total market capitalisation (MC). The 
foreign ownership increased by more than 20 percent 
in both industrial and services sectors during the 
period 1999-2008. For example, the highest foreign 
ownership percentage in the service sector reached 
36.55 percent in 2006 compared with 13.98 percent in 
1999.
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Table 1. Ownership Structure of ASE Listed Companies at the End of the Year (%)* 
 
Year 
Gov. 
Agency Government Companies Individual Arab Foreigners 
2006 
4.5 6.3 30.5 47 13.5 15 
-14.8 -12.8 -19.4 -25.3 -11.4 -10.8 
2005 
5.5 6.4 30.2 46.3 13.1 14.2 
-21.4 -22.1 -21.3 -25.3 -12.3 -13.7 
2004 
7.5 10.2 28.2 46.5 13.3 13.2 
16.3 18.5 27.4 55 9.5 11.3 
2003 
9.5 12 27.9 46.7 12.8 7.5 
-12.3 -16.1 -22.1 -26.1 -18.7 -15.1 
2002 
8.3 18 28 46 10.8 11.9 
-12.4 -24.3 -22.2 -25.3 -15.6 19.2 
2001 
7.6 16.4 28.4 46.3 13.8 7.4 
-8 -22.2 -22.1 -25.1 -17.9 -13.1 
1997 
10.6 16.6 27.4 50.7 7.9 9.3 
-11.4 -23.1 -20.3 -25.1 -11 -13.5 
1996 
15.2 16.2 26.8 51.9 7.1 9.6 
-14.4 -22.2 -18.9 -25.1 -10.2 -14.4 
1995 
15.3 16.5 26.4 53 8.5 7.3 
-14.8 -23.8 -19.1 -25 -11.4 -11.8 
1994 
22 15.6 24.6 52.8 10.2 7.4 
-20.7 -22.7 -19.3 -25.3 -13.6 -13 
*Cross-firm average with standard deviations in parentheses. Calculated by the author based on data from ASE 
Statistics and Annual Reports. 
Sources: Annul reports of listed companies 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Foreign Ownership in the Shareholding Companies by new sectoral specification 
(1999-2008) * 
 
Period  Financial Services  Industrial General  
1999 56.647 13.977 30.483 43.099 
2000 55.181 21.257 30.213 41.672 
2001 47.426 19.676 27.872 38.507 
2002 47.564 26.792 26.093 37.43 
2003 46.275 24.285 30.098 38.844 
2004 47.441 25.593 36.791 41.264 
2005 49.77 26.185 38.088 45.043 
2006 47.733 36.553 43.709 45.531 
2007 50.733 36.152 51.881 48.947 
2008 52.102 33.811 53.347 49.247 
*As a percentage of market capitalization 
Sources: Amman Stock Exchange 
 
However as reported by Zeitun (2009), despite 
its privatisation program, the government still holds a 
large stake in Media, Utility and Energy, and Steel, 
Mining and Heavy Engineering companies (43.20%, 
33.70 %, and 22.04 %, respectively) because they are 
considered strategic industries. Table 3 shows the 
trading activity of foreign investors for the period 
2001-2008. For example, the value of shares 
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purchased by foreign investors amounted to USD 
5943.4 million in 2008, representing 20.8 percent of 
total trading volume, with a 2.29 percent decrease 
from 2007. The percentage of total buying to the total 
trading reached its highest percentage in 2007, at 
about 22.88 percent. Net foreign investment showed 
negative balances of USD 151.4 million in 2001. The 
net foreign investment reached the highest in 2007 
amounted USD 656.6 million.
  
Table 3. Trading of Non-Jordanian (Foreign) Investment during 2001-2008 
 
Year 
Foreign Ownership 
of Market 
Capitalisation. (%) 
Total Buying 
(USD million) 
Total Selling 
(USD million) 
Net Investment 
(USD million) 
Market 
Capitalization 
/ GDP (%) 
2001 38.5 147.2 298.6 -151.4 75.7 
2002 37.4 328.7 327.5 1.3 80.4 
2003 38.8 395.9 280.7 115.2 116.8 
2004 41.3 535.6 438.6 97.2 184.7 
2005 45 3031.3 2449.6 581.7 326.6 
2006 45.5 2810.0 2555.6 254.4 233.9 
2007 48.9 3979.3 3322.7 656.6 289 
2008 49.2 5943.4 5507.0 436.3 226.3 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange 
 
The ownership structure in the ASE is highly 
concentrated (the median largest shareholder in Jordan 
is large by Anglo-American standards but within the 
range of those in France and Spain, 20 and 34 percent 
respectively (see e.g. Becht and RÖell, 1999)
45
. In 
theory, the concentration of control in the hands of a 
few shareholders can reduce the agency problem. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the agency 
problem comes from the conflict between controlling 
owners and minority shareholders, instead of between 
managers and diffuse shareholders, which reflects the 
legal protection of minority investors. Corporate 
governance systems are affected by several 
institutional factors such as the legal protection of 
investors, the level of ownership concentration, the 
level of capital market development, the role of the 
market for corporate control, and the effectiveness of 
boards (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000).  
Table 4 reports the ownership structure of listed 
companies in 2006 by sectors, namely the Industrial, 
Services, Insurance, and Banking sectors. Table 4 
shows that the government holds a large stake in the 
Industrial and Services sectors, while it holds a small 
stake in both Insurance and Banking sectors. This is 
because the government participates in utility 
companies such as electricity companies and mining 
industries. For instance, in 2006, the government 
shares in the electricity were about 30 percent of the 
total shares in this sector. The average proportion of 
institutional shares is greater in Services and Industrial 
                                                   
45 For more detail about the ownership concentration in the 
ASE, see Zeitun (2009). 
than in the Banking and Insurance sectors. Arab 
investors have their largest stake in the Banking sector 
and then the Insurance sector. The average proportion 
of foreign shares is greatest in the insurance sector, 
while it is still very low in all sectors. 
Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the largest five 
shareholders
46
 own more than 50 percent in the four 
sectors. This indicates that ownership of ASE listed 
firms is highly concentrated. It is feasible that this 
significant concentration may help to increase the 
firm's performance, as the large shareholders may help 
reduce the free-rider problem of small investors and 
therefore decrease the likelihood of default. 
                                                   
46 The threshold of ownership used by the ASE in 2002 was 
5%. 
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Table 4. Ownership Structure and Concentration of Listed Companies in 2006 by Sector* as a (%) 
 
  Government** Companies Individual Arab Foreigners 
Largest 5 
Shareholders 
Industrial 
9.2 30.3 45 12.2 10.3 53.9 
-33.1 -22.3 -26.4 -14.9 -13.6 -25.6 
Services 
15 35.5 40.4 12.1 12.3 63.2 
-27.3 -22.3 -27.2 -15.1 -11.4 -22.2 
Insurance 
3 21.9 49.7 14.7 20.2 59.9 
-4.5 -19.7 -22.3 -18.2 -17.3 -24.7 
Banking 
4.7 16.8 40.1 30.5 13.9 56.9 
-3.7 -22.6 -23.9 -26.5 -7.2 -22.5 
*Cross-firm average with standard deviations in parentheses. Calculated by the author based on data from ASE 
Statistics and Annual Reports of listed companies, 2006. ** includes government and government agencies. 
Government includes both government shares and government agency shares. 
 
3.  Data and Estimation Method  
 
3.1   Data 
 
The data used in this study is derived from publicly 
traded companies quoted on the Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2006. The data 
set contains detailed information about each enterprise. 
The major items of interest are: balance sheets, 
income statements, ownership structure, and the 
percentage holdings of all direct shareholders
47
. The 
full balance sheets and income statements are usually 
available from firms as the law requires disclosure.  
The ownership data was collected manually, as it 
is not available for all firms and for all years from the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) reports. Collecting 
this data on ownership structure and concentration for 
each firm and for each year constituted a large part of 
the research for this thesis. This vast effort made this 
research possible, since the analysis uses real figures 
rather than dummy variables for ownership structure. 
Furthermore, the changes in real figures over years are 
more valuable, as they shed light on the effect of 
changes in ownership structure on both the firm‘s 
health and failure. It is worth noting that the 
unavailability of data for the managerial ownership 
and ownership held by outside block holders 
prevented the researcher from further investigation for 
the effect of these variables. 
The sample includes pooled cross-sectional and 
time-series data for 167 firms (47 defaulted and 120 
non-defaulted) over the period 1989-2006. These 
firms ranged from old to newly established ones.  
                                                   
47 The ownership concentration is defined as any owner 
possessing more than 5% and 10% of the company's shares. 
 
3.2   Variables Selection  
 
Four ratios to measure firms‘ performance were 
calculated for both the panel data sample and matched 
sample, namely return on equity (ROE), return on 
assets (ROA), Tobin‘s Q, and MBVR. Tobin‘s Q and 
MBVR are used to measure the market performance 
of firms, while the ROE and ROA are employed as 
measures representing accounting performance 
measures. The explanatory variables are ownership 
fractions, concentration ratios, and other control 
variables.  
The ownership fraction (mix) is divided into the 
fraction owned by government (GOV), GOV the 
fraction owned by the foreigner (FORG), the fraction 
owned by companies (INSTIT), and the fraction 
owned by individuals (CITIZEN). By controlling for 
both ownership concentration and mix, we hope to be 
able to distinguish which factors are more significant 
in poorly performing enterprises.  
Factors other than ownership structure may also 
affect a firm‘s performance and health. To take them 
into account, we introduce a set of control variables. 
Dummy variables for industries are used to control the 
difference between sectors, DUMi, i= 1, 2,...,5, for 
Manufacturing, Trade, Steel and Mining, Utility, and 
Real Estate in the matched sample, and 16 industrial 
dummy variables in the panel data regressions (see 
Table 6-2 for sector definitions). To control for other 
factors with potential to affect firm value, I include the 
following variables that proxy for these factors. Firm 
size (SIZE)
48
, according to Short and Keasey (1999) 
                                                   
48 In the previous work, the value of total assets is used to 
control size effect (see e.g. Morck et al., 1988 and 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Other studies used sales to 
control for size (see e.g. Xu and Wang, 1997). The logarithm 
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size has a significantly positive effect on firm 
performance, since larger firms have access to the 
external sources of funds. firm‘s age (AGE), capital 
structure variable (DEBT), which is defined as total 
debt to total assets (TDTA), following McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Morck et al. (1988), Short and 
Keasey (1999) includes a control variable to proxy for 
the level of indebtedness.. Growth opportunity 
(GROW) is defined as growth in sales (GROW1), or 
net income to capitalisation (NICAP)
 49
.  
Table 5 and Table 6 presented the descriptive 
statistics of firm-specific variables used in the 
analysis. 
Table 7 presented a correlation matrix for the 
variables of interest. Consistent with Scott (1976), size 
is positively correlated with leverage but contrary to 
intuition I find a positive association between size and 
the price to earnings ratio. Larger firms also seem to 
be more profitable, as the correlation between log of 
sales and return on equity is significantly positive. 
 
3.3   Non-Linearity of Ownership 
 
The primary hypothesis I examined was that the value 
of Jordanian firms is non-linearly related to the 
percentage of equity held by government and 
institutional. A non-linear relation between a firm‘s 
value and ownership structure has been theoretically 
predicted, and empirical evidence has shown the 
non-linearity of this relationship (Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishney (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and 
Lodered and Martin (1997)). Following Lodered and 
Martin (1997), and McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
the squared values of government and institutional 
ownership are included as independent variables to 
capture the non-linear relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Four measures of 
performance are used: ROA, ROE, Tobin‘s Q, and 
MBVR. The logarithm of total assets is used to control 
for size, growth in sales is used to control for growth, 
and the debt level is used to control for leverage. In 
order to investigate if there is a non-linear relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance 
pooled and panel regressions are carried out using the 
                                                                             
of total sales is used in this research. It has lower 
explanatory power than assets, and its inclusion in 
regressions of ROA and ROE makes the results not 
significant. 
49 The growth in total assets and the book value of total 
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of 
equity divided by book value of total assets are used in this 
study. However, while all the measures of growth are found 
to have a similar result, the growth in sales and NICAP are 
provide the best results regarding the model explanatory 
power. 
random effects model to estimate the following 
equations: 
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                                     (1) 
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                                     (3) 
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SIZE DEBT GROW
   
   
    
  
                                       
                                     (4) 
 
Based on theoretical and empirical studies, 
government ownership is hypothesised to have a 
negative impact on a firm‘s performance as 
government has other objectives rather than firm value 
maximisation. Previous research, such as Boardman 
and Vining (1989), Megginson and Netter (2001), and 
Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2005), found that government 
ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. 
However, other studies, such as Anderson, Lee 
and Murrell (2000) and Gupta, Ham and Svejnar 
(2001) found that government ownership has a 
positive impact on firm performance in a transition 
economy. Institutional ownership is expected to have a 
positive impact on firm performance as institutional 
ownership motivation is to maximise a firm's profit.
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Table 5. Description Statistics for the Variables Used in The Study 
 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max CV Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro-Wilk  Probability 
ROA 1586 0.012 0.152 -4.071 0.681 12.6667 -13.460 343.435 465.132 0.000 
ROE 1586 -0.142 4.195 -159.39 1.998 -29.542 -35.248 1317.897 930.45 0.000 
Tobin‘s 
Q 1408 1.701 15.443 0.000 538.734 9.0788 31.815 1066.859 840.099 0.000 
MBVR 1277 1.947 12.636 -2.556 450.000 6.4900 34.959 1239.922 758.284 0.000 
TDTA 1586 0.357 0.268 0.0002 2.600 0.7507 2.184 15.356 128.768 0.000 
Growth 1270 0.716 8.633 -1.000 292.979 12.0573 30.888 1037.096 736.898 0.000 
SIZE 1450 14.81 2.0564 0.000 20.4917 0.1389 -0.5394 5.6287 26.154 0.000 
AGE 1575 14.625 12.903 1.00 65 0.8823 1.3301 4.3507 123.389 0.000 
           
 
Table 6. Ownership Structure for the Sample 
 
Table 7. Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the study 
 
 
 Mean  Median Std.Dev Maximum Minimum 
Government 14.88 2.40 23.87 100 0 
Companies 25.29 25.41 17.72 85.26 0 
Individual 
(Citizen) 44.36 47.50 24.56 97.77 0 
Foreign 9.89 5.20 15.04 96.017 0 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results that consider the relationship 
between government ownership and firm performance 
are presented in Table 8. From the pooled data sample, 
it is documented that government ownership is 
significantly positively related to ROA and MBVR, at 
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This finding is not 
consistent with our hypothesis, or with previous 
findings such as Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2005). 
The results also show that the relationship 
between government ownership and ROA and MBVR 
is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a firm increases 
when government ownership is low, but the value of a 
firm decreases when it is high. As the government 
reduces its stake in a privatised company to below a 
specific point, perhaps market monitoring become 
ineffective and this increases the agency costs. 
Therefore, after some point, firm value will decrease 
as government ownership declines. However, this 
effect does not exist for the ROE and Tobin‘s Q 
regressions in the panel data. Also, it does not exist for 
any regression using the panel random effects model. 
Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Morck 
et al. (1988) about how inside ownership affects a 
firm‘s value. However, these results are inconsistent 
 TDTA SIZE AGE GOVE INSTIT FOREIG 
TDTA 1      
SIZE 0.227 1     
AGE 0.165 0.430 1    
GOVE 0.079 0.053 0.123 1   
INSTIT -0.095 -0.126 -0.075 0.135 1  
FOREIG -0.003 0.203 0.005 0.226 -0.236 1 
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with previous findings such as Tian (2003) and Wei, 
Xie and Zhang (2005). 
Furthermore, the results show that foreign 
ownership is negatively significantly related to firm 
value Tobin‘s Q, and firm performance ROA, 
indicating that foreign investors may influence 
management of the firm negatively. It may also 
indicate that the presence of foreign ownership forces 
management to allocate resources for their own 
benefit as they are not sure about the foreigners‘ 
strategies. However, this result is inconsistent with 
previous findings such as Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec 
(1997), who find a positive and significant 
relationship between firm performance and foreign 
ownership. 
 
Table 8. Ownership Structure and Firm‘s Performance: Non-linear Specification for Government and Institutional 
Ownership 
 
Pooled Data Panel Data 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin‘s Q MBVR Variables ROA ROE Tobin‘s Q MBVR 
SIZE 
 
0.057 
(9.23)*** 
0.053 
(0.65) 
-0.057 
(-0.06) 
0.371 
(3.62)*** SIZE 
0.054 
(5.00)*** 
-0.035 
(-0.21) 
-0.136 
(-0.13) 
0.476 
(2.87)*** 
DEBT 
 
-0.192 
(-16.65)*** 
-0.643 
(-4.2)*** 
-0.848 
(-0.47) 
-0.385 
(-1.68)* DEBT 
-0.163 
(-10.69)*** 
-0.469 
(-2.18)** 
-0.851 
(-0.45) 
-0.328 
(-1.22) 
GROW1 
 
0.001 
(2.6)*** 
0.003 
(0.56) 
-0.051 
(-1.01) 
-0.012 
(-0.59) GROWT 
0.001 
(2.48)** 
0.002 
(0.45) 
-0.048 
(-0.94) 
-0.005 
(-0.25) 
GOV 
 
0.118 
(2.68)*** 
0.290 
(0.5) 
0.620 
(0.09) 
1.510 
(2.05)** GOV 
0.086 
(1.17) 
-0.073 
(-0.07) 
0.595 
(0.08) 
0.377 
(0.34) 
GOV2 
 
-0.148 
(-2.62)*** 
0.030 
(0.04) 
-1.000 
(-0.11) 
-2.003 
(-1.99)** GOV2 
-0.035 
(-0.38) 
0.590 
(0.44 
-1.009 
(-0.1) 
-0.853 
(-0.59) 
FORG 
 
-0.038 
(-1.75)* 
0.120 
(0.41) 
-6.925 
(-2.00)** 
-0.355 
(-1.04) FORG 
0.043 
(1.45) 
0.169 
(0.41) 
-7.440 
(-2.01)** 
-0.290 
(-0.65) 
Constant 
 
-0.381 
(-7.97)*** 
-0.332 
(-0.52) 
87.020 
(10.42)*** 
-1.572 
(-1.86)* Constant 
-0.382 
(-4.4)*** 
0.198 
(0.13) 
85.751 
(9.46)*** 
-2.300 
(-1.68)* 
F-statistic 
 
19.15 
(0.00)*** 
2.17 
(0.00)** 
12.81 
(0.00)*** 
5.88 
(0.00)*** Wald test 
170.12 
(0.00)*** 
31.23 
(0.06)* 
230.72 
(0.00)*** 
31.83 
(0.06)* 
R-square 0.2313 0.019 0.1755 0.0842 R-square 0.2084 0.0249 0.1904 0.0942 
Pooled Data Panel Data 
Variables ROA ROE Tobin‘s Q MBVR Variables ROA ROE Tobin‘s Q MBVR 
SIZE 
 
0.066 
(10.71)*** 
0.102 
(1.25) 
-0.009 
(-0.01) 
0.407 
(3.97)*** SIZE 
0.066 
(6.07)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
-0.050 
(-0.05) 
0.410 
(2.42)** 
DEBT 
 
-0.190 
(-16.38)*** 
-0.627 
(-4.05)*** 
-1.534 
(-0.85) 
-0.392 
(-1.71)* DEBT 
-0.169 
(-10.99)*** 
-0.479 
(-2.18)** 
-1.674 
(-0.88) 
-0.266 
(-0.98) 
GROW1 
 
0.001 
(2.49)** 
0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.053 
(-1.03) 
-0.009 
(-0.46) GROWT 
0.001 
(2.41)** 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-0.050 
(-0.97) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
INSTIT 0.133 
(2.95)*** 
0.039 
(0.06) 
-16.006 
(-2.23)** 
0.708 
(0.97) GOV 
0.037 
(0.58) 
0.113 
(0.13) 
-19.882 
(-2.55)** 
1.191 
(1.21) 
INSTIT2 -0.189 
(-3.11)*** 
-1.108 
(-1.37) 
15.775 
(1.62) 
0.314 
(0.31) GOV2 
-0.115 
(-1.34) 
-0.594 
(-0.5) 
19.755 
(1.88)* 
-0.718 
(-0.54) 
FORG 
 
-0.036 
(-1.61) 
-0.138 
(-0.47) 
-8.595 
(-2.44)** 
-0.121 
(-0.35) FORG 
0.023 
(0.78) 
0.070 
(0.17) 
-9.536 
(-2.53)** 
-0.051 
(-0.11) 
Constant 
 
-0.449 
(-9.4)*** 
-0.554 
(-0.87) 
88.785 
(10.56)*** 
-2.021 
(-2.38)** Constant 
-0.452 
(-5.29)*** 
0.029 
(0.02) 
87.473 
(9.5)*** 
-2.081 
(-1.5) 
F-statistic 
 
20.22 
(0.00)*** 
2.63 
(0.00)*** 
13.090 
(0.00)*** 
6.25 
(0.00)*** Wald test 
185.08 
(0.00)*** 
31.96 
(0.06)* 
234.27 
(0.00)*** 
33.48 
(0.04)** 
R-square 0.2427 0.0265 0.18 0.0905 R-square 0.229 0.0267 0.1945 0.1028 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Statistical significance t-statistics 
is determined with White (1980) standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Industrial dummy variables 
are included in the regression. 
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Table 8 presents the empirical results of the 
regression that investigates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance using 
the pooled and panel data. The results show that 
institutional ownership is positively related to the firm 
value and the results for the pooled sample are 
significant at the 1% and 5% level for the ROA and 
Tobin‘s Q, respectively. These results show that 
government ownership and institutional ownership are 
positively related to the firm‘s value. The results also 
document that the relation between institutional 
ownership and ROA and Tobin‘s Q is a hump-shaped 
curve. When institutional ownership increases above a 
specific point, institutional shareholders negatively 
influence a firm‘s activities. Thus, increasing 
institutional ownership will decrease the firm‘s value 
and firm performance, measured by Tobin‘s Q and 
ROA, respectively. The non-linear relationship 
between firm value and Tobin‘s Q is documented by 
using the panel random effects model. Furthermore, 
foreign ownership is found to have a negative effect 
on the firm value Tobin‘s Q.  
The adjusted R-squared statistics show that the 
independent variables combined can explain a 
substantial amount of the variation in firm value, 
ranging from 3% in the ROE to 24% in the ROE. 
Furthermore, as the effect for the same proportion of 
government or institutional ownership may be 
different in one industry than in others, 15 industrial 
dummy variables were used to control for potential 
industry effects. During the sample period of 
1989-2003, Jordanian macroeconomic variables, such 
as interest rate, GDP, unemployment, and other 
economic variables, were different from one year to 
another. Controlling for the effect of time-series, 
dummy variables for the years were used in both the 
pooled and panel sample. When the time dummy 
variables were added to the model, the ownership 
structure variables became insignificant. 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
The possible impact of ownership structure on a firm‘s 
performance has been central to research on corporate 
governance, but evidence on the nature of this 
relationship has been decidedly mixed. While some 
theories and empirical investigations suggest that 
ownership structure affects firm performance, others 
suggest the irrelevance of the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. 
Furthermore, most of the studies are conducted in 
developed countries and in some Asian countries 
where the characteristics of ownership structure are 
different from Middle Eastern countries. So, 
implications from the theory may not be applicable to 
other countries. This study provides evidence from 
Middle Eastern countries and expands the previous 
studies by investigating the effect of ownership 
structure on the firm‘s failure.  
This paper examines the non-linear effects of 
ownership structure (variables) on corporate 
performance. The data used in this study are derived 
from 167 publicly traded companies quoted on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period 
1989-2003. The ownership structure is measured by 
the percentage of shares held by each type of owner 
(state, institution, foreign concentrated owners, and 
individuals). Results in this study confirm earlier 
findings of a curvilinear relationship reported for 
larger markets. The results also show that the 
relationship between government ownership and ROA 
and MBVR is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a 
firm increases when government ownership is low, but 
the value of a firm decreases when it is high. As the 
government reduces its stake in a privatised company 
to below a specific point, perhaps market monitoring 
become ineffective and this increases the agency costs. 
Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Morck 
et al. (1988) about how inside ownership affects a 
firm‘s value. However, these results are inconsistent 
with previous findings such as Tian (2003) and Wei, 
Xie and Zhang (2005). 
The results also document that the relation 
between institutional ownership and ROA and Tobin‘s 
Q is a hump-shaped curve. When institutional 
ownership increases above a specific point, 
institutional shareholders negatively influence a firm‘s 
activities. Findings in this study contribute to the 
growing body of international evidence that the non-
linear cubic relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate performance is robust to differences in 
governance structures across markets. 
 
References 
 
1. Aldamen, H. M., 2002, Foreign Ownership and Firm 
Value: A Case of Jordanian Companies, Masters 
Thesis, Yarmouk University, Jordan, Irbed. 
2. Anderson, J. H., Y. Lee, and P. Murrell, 2000, 
Competition and Privatization Amidst Weak 
Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia. Economic 
Inquiry 38, 527-549. 
3. Becht, M., and A. RÖell, 1999, Blockholding in 
Europe: An International Comparison, European 
Economic Review 43, 1049-1056. 
4. Berle, A., and G. Means, 1932, The Modern 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
115 
Corporation and Private Property, Harcourt, Brace, & 
World, New York. 
5. Boardman, A. E., and A. R. Vining, 1989, Ownership 
and Performance in Competitive Environments: A 
Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and 
State-Owned Enterprises, Journal of Economics and 
Law 32, 1-33. 
6. Central Bank of Jordan, 2003, Annual Report, 
(Amman, Jordan). 
7. Central Bank of Jordan, 2006, Annual Report, 
(Amman, Jordan). 
8. Cho, M. H., 1998, Ownership Structure, Investment, 
and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121. 
9. Craswell, A., S. Taylor, and R. Saywell, 1997, 
Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: 
Australian Evidence, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 5, 
301-323. 
10. Davies et al., 2005 D. Davies, D. Hillier and P.M. 
McColgan, Ownership structure, managerial behaviour 
and corporate value, Journal of Corporate Finance 11 
(2005), pp. 645–660. 
11. Demestz, H., 1983, The Structure of Corporate 
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Law 
and Economics 26, 375-390. 
12. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn, 1985, The Structure of 
Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 
Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177. 
13. Fama, E., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of 
the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88, 288-307. 
14. Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, 301-325. 
15. Gupta, N., J. C. Ham, and J. Svejnar, 2001, Priorities 
and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence 
from the Czech Republic, Working Paper, William 
Davidson Institute, University of Michigan. 
16. Han, C. K., and D. Y. Suk, 1998, The Effect of 
Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Additional 
Evidence, Review of Financial Economics 7, 143-155. 
17. Hermalin, B. E., M. S. Weisbach, 1991, The Effects of 
Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm 
Performance, Financial Management 20, 101–112. 
18. Himmelberg, C., R. G. Hubbard, and D. Palia, 1999, 
Understanding the Determinants of Managerial 
Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and 
Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 
353–384. 
19. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 
3, 305-360. 
20. Jensen, M. C., R. Ruback, 1983, The Market for 
Corporate Control: the Scientific Evidence, Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 5-50. 
21. Jordan Securities Commission, (JSC), 2001, The 
Jordan Securities Market: A guide for Foreign 
Investors, [online], (www.JSC.gov.jo, Amman, 
Jordan). 
22. Jordan Securities Commission, (JSC), 2004, Report on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), 
Corporate Governance Country Assessment, [online], 
(www.JSC.gov.jo, Amman, Jordan). 
23. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shlefer, and R. 
Vishny, 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
24. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. W. 
Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political 
Economy 106, 1113–1155. 
25. La Port, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shlefer and R. W. 
Vishny, 2000, Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance, Journal of Finance, 58, 3-27. 
26. Loderer, C., and K. Martin, 1997, Executive Stock 
Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces, 
Journal of Financial Economics 45, 223-255. 
27. McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes, 1990, Additional 
Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
28. McConnell, J. and H. Servaes, 1995, Equity 
Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt, Journal of 
Financial Economics 39, 131-157. 
29. Megginson, W. L., and J. Netter, 2001, From State to 
Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39, 
321-389. 
30. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1988, 
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 
20, 293-315. 
31. Pedersen, T., and T. Thompson, 1997, European 
Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve Country 
Study, Journal of International Business Studies 28, 
759-778. 
32. Scott, J. H., 1976, A Theory of Optimal Capital 
Structure, Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 7, 33-54. 
33. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders 
and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy 
94, 461-488. 
34. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52, 
737-783. 
35. Short, H., and K. Keasey, 1999, Managerial 
Ownership and the Performance of Firms: Evidence 
from UK, Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 79-101. 
36. Smith, S., B. Cin, and M. Vodopivec, 1997, 
Privatization Incidence, Ownership Forms and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Slovenia, Journal of 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
116 
Comparative Economics 25, 158-179. 
37. Steiner, T. L., 1996, A Re-examination of the 
Relationships between Ownership Structure, Firm 
Diversification, and Tobin's Q, Quarterly Journal of 
Business and Economics 35, 39–48. 
38. Stone, A., K. Hurly, and R. Khumani, 1998, Business 
Environment and Corporate Governance: 
Strengthening Incentives for Private Sector 
Performance, The World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings. 
39. Tian, G. L., 2003, Government Shareholding and the 
Value of China's Modern Firms, Working Paper, 
Peking University. 
40. Wei, Z., F. Xie, and S. Zhang, 2005, Ownership 
Structure and Firm Value in China‘s Privatized Firms: 
1991-2001, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 40, 87-108. 
41. White, H., 1980, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817-838. 
42. World Bank, 2000, World Bank Development 
Indicators Database. 
43. World Bank, 2003, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
Country Assistance Evaluation, Report No.26875-JO. 
44. Zeitun, R. and Tian, G. (2007), "Does ownership affect 
a firm's performance and default risk in Jordan?" 
Corporate Governance, International Journal of 
Corporate finance in Business Society (forthcoming) 
(Volume: 7 Issue: 1 Page: 66 – 82). 
45. Zeitun, R. (2009), ―Ownership Structure, Corporate 
Performance:  Evidence from Panel Data of Emerging 
Market the Case of Jordan‖ Corporate Ownership & 
Control (2009, forthcoming). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
117 
РАЗДЕЛ 3 
 КОРПОРАТИВНОЕ 
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ В ЯПОНИИ 
SECTION 3 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MERGERS DECISION IN JAPANESE SMALL MUTUAL BANKS: 
EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT OR EMPIRE BUILDINGS?# 
 
Nobuyoshi Yamori*, Kozo Harimaya**  
 
Abstract 
 
With the number of bank consolidations increasing around the world since the 1990s, several 
studies have examined what factors drive banks to consolidate, and some argue that bank 
managers who have a motive of empire buildings choose mergers. In this study, we deal with 
mergers among Japanese small mutual banks (credit associations or Shinkin banks) during the 
period 1996 to 2005. Japanese credit associations have been experiencing an unprecedented wave 
of consolidation, with their number decreasing from 410 (March 1996) to 292 (April 2006). 
Interestingly, unlike stock companies, mutual companies are often expected to be weak in terms of 
disciplining managers. If so, mutual banks tend to choose inefficient mergers at the expense of 
other stakeholders. Here, we use the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to obtain “cost efficiency” 
proxy. We find that while the efficiency of acquiring credit associations decreases during the 
merger period, mergers do ultimately improve efficiency. Based on our results we find that raising 
efficiency, not for building empires, is an important goal for such credit association mergers.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Efficiency, Mergers, Japanese credit associations 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial services industry has been subject to 
consolidation around the world since the 1990s, and 
Japan has been no exception to these developments 
with megabank groups in particular having been 
established through mergers and acquisitions among 
city banks. Japan‘s 13 city banks of the early 1990s 
were gradually reduced to the present four city bank 
groups. In addition to these megabank mergers, the 
number of small and medium financial institutions 
such as credit associations (Shinkin banks) has also 
been decreasing through a rise in mergers and 
acquisitions in recent years (from 410 (March 1996) to 
292 (April 2006)). 
 The underlying motivation for mergers of credit 
associations may be different from that of banks, 
however, given that credit associations are ―mutual‖ 
organizations (Davis, 2001). More precisely, 
irrespective of the size of the individual member‘s 
deposits and loans, ―one member, one vote‖ remains 
the basic principle guiding these institutions‘ actions. 
Furthermore, the fundamental objective of credit 
associations is maximization of members‘ benefits 
rather than institutional profits. Despite this, however, 
the managerial environment of Japanese financial 
institutions—including credit associations—has 
changed considerably in recent years. Credit 
associations have traditionally been classified as 
cooperative regional financial institutions serving 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and local 
residents, which were underserved by private stock 
banks. As large firms turn to the financial markets in 
recent years, banks are increasingly focusing on SMEs 
and the retail market. This has led to increasingly 
severe competitive pressure on credit associations to 
the extent that while mutuality remains a basic 
principle of such associations, the revenue structure of 
cooperative financial institutions has deteriorated. The 
recent increase in consolidation of credit associations 
might be a response to such environmental changes. If 
so, it is likely that seeking an improvement in 
efficiency is the main purpose behind this recent wave 
of consolidations among Japanese credit associations.  
Studies that examine the causes and 
consequences of consolidation in the U.S. banking 
industry often highlight improvements in profit 
efficiency and risk diversification, although 
improvements in cost efficiency are harder to find 
(Berger et al., 1999). In contrast to these findings, and 
while the evidence remains limited, studies dealing 
with ―mutual‖ financial institutions obtain quite 
different results. A study of U.K. building societies 
found significant efficiency gains following 
acquisitions (Haynes and Thompson, 1999). A U.S. 
study of credit unions similarly found that mergers 
resulted in improved efficiency, whereas roughly half 
of acquiring credit unions and roughly 20% of 
acquired credit unions experienced a decline in 
efficiency after a merger (Fried et al., 1999) Similarly, 
another study of Australian credit unions revealed that 
some mergers do produce efficiency benefits (Ralston 
et al., 2001; Worthington, 1999, 2001). In contrast, a 
study of Japanese credit associations found that the 
cost efficiency of consolidated institutions was 
significantly lower than that of non-consolidated 
institutions shortly after the merger, while the cost 
efficiency of consolidated institutions improves over 
time (Yamori and Harimaya, 2008). These suggest that 
it is therefore premature to conclude that mutual 
institutions inevitably choose value-decreasing 
mergers.  
 This paper aims to provide new evidence by 
focusing on the efficiency effect of mergers of 
Japanese credit associations during the period 1996 to 
2005
50
. Specifically, we examine why credit 
associations choose consolidation and whether 
consolidation actually improves efficiency. If any 
efficiency improvements were not realized, the recent 
unprecedented wave of consolidation have been 
considered to be occurred by a sacrifice of member's 
interests. Thus, the motivation for empire buildings 
seems to be a critical factor.  
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. Cost 
efficiency scores were calculated by employing a 
stochastic frontier approach in the first stage, and 
regression analysis was then applied to investigate the 
efficiency effect in the second stage. The analytical 
method we employ in this study has been widely used 
in previous studies investigating efficiency gains of 
consolidation in the financial sector
51
. 
This paper is divided into six sections. Sections 2 
and 3 describe the methodology and data used in this 
study. Section 4 outlines the efficiency scores, and 
Section 5 presents and interprets the estimation results. 
A summary and conclusions are given in Section 6.  
 
2. Empirical methodology 
 
Two main approaches have been adopted in the 
literature studying efficiency in the public and private 
sector - a parametric and non-parametric approach. In 
sharp contrast to the non-parametric Data 
                                                   
50 Credit associations are not marginal institutions: Their 
loans amounted to 63.5 trillion yen or about 12.6% of 
Japanese loan markets (as of March 2007). 
51 See Amel et al. (2004) for a more detailed survey of the 
available empirical evidence.  
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method, which does not 
require any statistical assumption, the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) focuses on the distribution 
of the error term, a part of which is considered to be 
inefficiency. While no consensus has been reached on 
the best frontier approach for efficiency analysis, the 
SFA is consistent with production theory and is 
flexible
52
. In this paper, we therefore employ the 
parametric Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). 
In an attempt to estimate the stochastic frontier 
model, we first need to assume a functional form. In 
this study, we employ the standard translog function in 
contrast to the Fouier-flexible functional form that has 
been employed in recent literature, which requires a 
large sample size to obtain accurate results and is 
more suitable when applied to large banks (McAllister 
and McManus, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). In 
addition, although the mean difference in average 
efficiency is statistically significant, efficiency 
rankings are virtually identical to the results of the 
standard translog function (Berger and DeYoung, 
1996). 
We specify the frontier cost function as:  
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where C is total costs, Yi are the outputs and Pk 
are the input prices, v is statistical noise, assumed to 
be distributed as a two-sided normal with zero mean 
and variance ζ
2
, u is the inefficiency term, assumed to 
be distributed as a one-sided positive disturbance, and 
α, β, and δ are coefficients to be estimated. The SFA 
requires a priori distributional assumptions regarding 
the inefficiency term, u. Following previous studies 
(Mester, 1996; Allen and Rai, 1996, Altunbas et al., 
2000), we specify the distribution to be half-normal. 
Furthermore, the usual symmetry and linear 
homogeneity restrictions are imposed a priori.  
Estimates of this model can be carried out 
through the maximum likelihood procedure
53
. As 
Jondrow et al. (1982) pointed out, 
observation-specific estimates of inefficiency are 
obtained as the mean of the conditional distribution 
(i.e., E[ui|εi] (εi = vi + ui)). In this study, we employ the 
alternative point estimator proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1988), which can be expressed as follows: 
                                                   
52 Although several studies attempt to compare analytical 
techniques, the results differ with regard to efficiency scores 
and rank correlations (Berger and Mester, 1997; Bauer et 
al.1998; Weill 2004).  
53 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for more details.  
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where μ*i = εiζ
2
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and ζ* = ζuζv/ζ (ζ
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2
v). 
The efficiency scores obtained from (2) have a value 
of between 0 and 1.  
After obtaining a ―cost efficiency‖ measurement, 
we then employ a multinomial logit regression to 
investigate whether the efficiency could be considered 
as a determinant of merger activity. We identify an 
acquiring credit association as a legally surviving 
institution and an acquired credit association as an 
institution that has legally disappeared. Accordingly, 
the dependent variable of the multinomial logit model 
is divided into the following three groups: Taking 
value zero if a credit association was not involved in a 
merger; value one if a credit association acquired 
another credit association (acquiring); and value two if 
a credit association was acquired by another credit 
association (acquired). In addition to the pre-merger 
investigations, we also empirically examine the 
post-merger efficiency gains. To avoid a shortage of 
degree of freedom, we pool our data from the period 
1996 to 2005. Table 1 shows fluctuations in numbers 
of each group for the sample period. As shown in 
Table 1, there are 410 credit associations for the 
sample from 1996, while recent consolidation reduced 
the sample size to 292 credit associations by 2005
54
.  
 
3. Data  
 
With regard to the input and output specification, we 
employ the intermediation approach commonly used 
in the literature on modeling bank behavior (e.g., 
Sealey and Lindley, 1977). We define three inputs and 
outputs, so that credit associations are viewed as 
financial intermediaries that use labor, capital, and 
funds as inputs and produce loans and securities 
services as outputs. Here, we use interest income on 
loans and discounts (Y1), other interest income (Y2), 
and fees and commissions (Y3) as output variables. 
Three input prices are defined as follows: The labor 
price (P1) is the ratio of personnel expenses to the 
number of employees, the price of capital (P2) is the 
ratio of non-personnel expenses to the value of 
movable and immovable capital, and the price of 
funds (P3) is the ratio of interest expense on deposits 
to the total amount of deposits. Total costs are defined 
as a sum of labor expenses, interest expenses, and 
capital expenses. All the data used in this study are 
taken from The Analysis of Financial Statement of All 
                                                   
54 In this paper, all years are expressed in fiscal years. For 
example, the Japanese fiscal year 1999 runs from April 1, 
1999 to March 31, 2000. 
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Credit Associations for the period 1996 to 2005. Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics of the relevant 
variables for fiscal 1996 and 2005.  
For the second stage multinomial logit regression, 
we chose financial health, market power, and 
profitability in addition to the cost efficiency discussed 
above as important independent variables. For the 
financial health variables, we use the capital ratio (CPR), 
which is defined as the ratio of total capital to total 
assets
55
. We expect that acquired credit associations are 
financially unhealthy and acquiring credit associations 
are financially healthy.  
We use the share of loans of associations within 
each prefectural market (LMS) for the market power 
proxy. If size is an important factor in credit association 
mergers, a positive coefficient is expected in terms of 
regression in acquiring credit associations and a 
negative coefficient for acquired credit associations. For 
profitability variables, we use the following two 
variables: The loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) and the 
general and administrative expenses ratio (GAER). The 
first measure (LDR) relates to differences in demand for 
loans, quality of borrower, and management skill in 
lending. A positive (negative) coefficient is thought to 
exist ex-ante for acquiring (acquired) credit associations. 
The second measure (GAER) is defined as the ratio of 
administrative expenses to total income. That is, it 
captures the possibility that an association‘s operating 
costs exceed its revenues. We expect that acquiring 
(acquired) credit associations have lower (higher) GAER. 
Moreover, for the variable reflecting mutual financial 
characteristics of credit associations, we have included 
the degree of dependence on interest on deposits with 
banks (DDID), which expresses dependency on the 
Shinkin Central Bank, which serves as the central bank 
for credit associations
56
. If a credit association with 
profitable loan opportunities does not make deposits to 
the Shinkin Central Bank, a higher DDID suggests 
lower profitability. We therefore expect that acquired 
(acquiring) credit associations are likely to have a 
higher (lower) DDID. Finally, as control variables, we 
use the logarithm of the number of cooperative 
members (LCM), and dummy variable (DDM), which 
takes one for the deficit credit association and zero 
otherwise.  
 
                                                   
55 As credit associations were not obligated to disclose the 
amount of non-performing loans until recently, we were 
unable to take the bad loan ratio into account. 
56 The main role of the Shinkin Central Bank lies in the 
effective investment of the credit associations' surplus funds, 
adjusting supply and demand for funds among the credit 
associations, and functioning as a clearing bank for credit 
associations. 
4. Summary of cost efficiency scores 
 
Due to space limitations, we do not include details of 
the parameters of the frontier cost function in this 
study
57
. The majority of the parameters, including those 
of dummy variables, are approximately estimated. The 
regularity conditions of the cost function evaluated for 
the mean values are also satisfied. Furthermore, results 
of the LR test for the presence of a stochastic element of 
inefficiency reject the null hypothesis of no inefficiency 
at the 1% significance level.  
Table 3 shows the time-varying average cost 
efficiency scores. In addition to the results of 
pre-merger credit associations, the table also displays 
those of the just-merged credit associations in each year. 
Results from the full sample indicate that cost efficiency 
scores vary only very slightly around the 90% mark. 
With regard to a comparison between pre- and 
post-merger values, average cost efficiency is generally 
higher in pre-merger credit associations, whereas that 
for post-merger credit associations is usually lower. The 
latter results are highly consistent with the findings of 
Yamori and Harimaya (2008) that institutions subject to 
merger experience significant declines in their DEA 
efficiency scores in the year of amalgamation. In 
contrast, however, the yearly average measures of 
acquiring credit associations are more efficient than 
those of acquired credit associations in 7 out of 10 years, 
while these differences between average efficiencies are 
statistically insignificant
58
. 
 
5. Empirical results of credit association 
mergers 
 
The estimated coefficients for the multinomial logit 
regressions are presented in Table 4. In these regressions, 
credit associations that have not been subject to any 
consolidation are provided as a reference group. We 
initially pay attention to the coefficient of the cost 
efficiency (CE), which is considered an important 
determinant of credit association consolidation. In an 
attempt to verify the consistency of the results, we also 
estimate a reduced model formed by omitting the CE 
variable. As shown in the results of the full model, our 
findings reveal that the estimated coefficient of the cost 
efficiency (CE) is significant with the hypothesized sign 
only for acquiring credit associations. It should 
                                                   
57  Estimation results are available from the authors upon 
request. While not shown in (1), annual dummy variables 
(reference year: 1996) are employed. 
58 A study of Australian credit unions found that acquired 
credit unions are less efficient than acquiring credit unions 
(Worthington, 2004). A study of U.S. credit unions, in contrast, 
found the exact opposite result (Fried et al., 1999). 
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therefore be noted that more cost efficient credit 
associations are more likely to acquire other credit 
associations. This suggests that credit associations under 
good management tend to improve the efficiency of 
their acquired institutions by using their inherent 
management skills. Expected efficiency-gains can 
therefore be seen as an important motive behind credit 
association mergers; thus, empire buildings motives are 
not revealed. These results are consistent with the 
findings of a study of Australian credit union mergers 
(Worthington, 2004).  
Turning to the other results regarding the full 
model, in the case of the probability of acquiring 
credit associations, the coefficients relating to the 
loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR), the general and 
administrative expenses ratio (GAER), and the number 
of cooperative members (LCM) are significant with 
positive signs. The fact that the capital ratio (CPR) 
and the share of loans within each prefectural market 
(LMS) are insignificant, however, indicate that both 
financial health and market power are not relevant 
determinants for credit associations in deciding 
whether to acquire other institutions. We observed an 
interesting result in terms of the coefficient of the 
GAER variable; its sign is opposite to the ex-ante 
prediction. The results for the LCM variable indicate 
that larger credit associations are more likely to 
acquire other credit associations. 
In looking at acquired credit associations, we find 
that the estimated coefficients are significant for all 
factors but the LDR variable. In particular, and in sharp 
contrast to the results from acquiring credit associations, 
the variables for financial health and market power 
conform to the hypothesized sign. These results suggest 
that credit associations in a relatively weak financial 
condition and with a small market share are more likely 
to be acquired compared to a credit association that does 
not involve consolidation. Furthermore, the positive 
coefficient of the GAER is identical to the results 
provided by acquiring credit associations. We found it 
noteworthy that the coefficient of the degree of 
dependence on the Shinkin Central Bank (DDID) is 
negative - its sign is also the reverse of the ex-ante 
prediction. The results for the LCM and the DDM 
variables are consistent with our general expectations - 
the smaller and less profitable the credit association, the 
more likely it is to be acquired.  
Finally but equally importantly, we investigate the 
post-merger performance of the acquiring credit 
associations. In order to examine the post-merger 
efficiency improvement, we use a simple OLS 
regression analysis method with cost efficiency scores 
as the dependent variable and the time dummy variables 
indicating the years after the merger as independent 
variables. As part of the regression analysis we also use 
the cost efficiency rank as the dependent variable on the 
basis that the efficiency scores obtained from SFA are 
not statistically consistent. By using the cost efficiency 
scores for each year, the ranks are converted to a 
uniform scale over the [0, 1] interval using the formula 
(orderit-1)/(nt-1), where orderit is the order rank of the i
th
 
credit association in the t
th
 year evaluated from the cost 
efficiency scores, and nt is the number of credit 
associations in year t. The credit association with the 
lowest cost efficiency score therefore has the worst rank 
of 0, and the credit association with the highest cost 
efficiency score has the best rank of 1 in each year.  
Results of the regression analysis are presented in 
Table 5. As the table shows, we consider a set of dummy 
variables for years t, t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 – namely, 
from the year of merger to four years after the merger. 
Despite the low explanatory power and insignificant 
estimates, some interesting results can clearly be 
observed.  
First, in terms of the results of cost efficiency 
scores, the estimated coefficients are clearly negative in 
the period t to t+2 but positive in the periods t+3 and 
t+4. This indicates that mergers experience efficiency 
declines over periods of up to two years following a 
merger, and become relatively efficient as time passes. 
The former findings are in contrast to the findings of 
Fried et al. (1999) regarding U.S. credit unions. Such 
differences may be caused by different adjustment 
speeds between Japan and the U.S. It generally takes 
longer to rebuild and reallocate management resources 
such as branch offices and employees in Japan than in 
the U.S. Indeed, it is extremely rare to observe any 
substantial reduction in management resources 
following mergers between Japanese financial 
institutions, so it should be noted that efficiencies are 
temporarily reduced due to the small cost reduction at 
the initial stage of the merger process
59
. However, as 
shown in the coefficients on the year dummy variables 
for t+3 and t+4, we find that there is a tendency for such 
institutions to increase in efficiency over time. Although 
it may take several years to realize the benefits of 
mergers, these results are consistent with our previous 
findings that most Japanese credit associations chose 
mergers to enhance their efficiency. The results of cost 
efficiency ranks also present the same findings - the 
efficiency effect of credit association mergers is 
apparent several years later.  
In sum, although mutual companies are said to be 
weak in corporate governance, managers in Japanese 
                                                   
59 Some U.S. banking studies also found that acquirers 
failed to improve efficiency after the merger (Rhoades, 
1993; DeYoung, 1997; Peristiani, 1997; Berger, 1998). 
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mutual banks are actually well disciplined. One of 
reasons is that recent severer market competition in 
Japan does not allow managers to choose inefficient 
mergers. Another interesting finding is that Japanese 
mutual bank managers can implement mergers from the 
long-term perspective. If stakeholders has short-term 
horizon, they may make an objection of managers‘ 
merger decisions, which erode short-term profitability. 
We need further research on whether stakeholders have 
similar long-horizon or managers have strong discretion 
power.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this present study we set out to investigate the 
underlying motives of mergers by Japanese credit 
associations during the period 1996-2005 and also 
consider the consequences of these mergers. Our 
findings can be summarized as follows.  
First, the cost efficiency obtained from SFA is an 
important factor on mergers between credit associations, 
and cost efficient credit associations tend to be acquirers 
of other associations. Second, the cost efficiency of 
acquiring credit associations declines over a period of 
up to two years following a merger, and become 
relatively efficient as time passes.  
These results suggest that efficiency improvement 
is one of the important motives for credit associations in 
undertaking mergers. In other words, as sound corporate 
governance in mutual institutions in Japan is confirmed, 
our results supports that empire building of bank 
managers is limited regarding Japanese small banks. 
Also, we find that it may take several years to achieve 
an improvement in efficiency. This means that Japanese 
mutual banks managers are allowed to have a long-term 
perspective, while managers in stock companies are 
under strong pressure of short-term profits 
maximization. We need further research on these 
interesting facts. 
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Table 2 
     
Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Variables used for DEA to Measure Efficiency (millions of yen) 
 
Variable 
1996   2005 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
Y1 Interest income on loans and discounts 5,901 7,429 
 
5,300 6,764 
Y2 Other interest income  2,209 3,223  
1,653 1,971 
Y3 Fees and commissions 420 527 
 
755 976 
P1 Labor price 6.6384 0.7731  
0.0006 0.0004 
P2 Physical capital price 0.4514 0.1596 
 
7.1657 0.8996 
P3 Deposit interest price 0.0067 0.0010  
0.3756 0.1492 
C Total costs 5,944 7,793 
 
5,105 6,064 
       
Number of observations 410   292 
       
Table 3 
      
Time-Varying Average Cost Efficiency  
    
Year Total 
  Pre-merger   
Merged 
  Acquiring Acquired   
1996 0.9002  
 
0.9087  0.9233  
 
0.8010  
1997 0.9000  
 
0.9075  0.8959  
 
0.7724  
1998 0.8997  
 
0.9089  0.8625  
 
0.7970  
1999 0.8977  
 
0.9116  0.8824  
 
0.7195  
2000 0.8976  
 
0.9216  0.8953  
 
0.8612  
2001 0.8961  
 
0.9035  0.8991  
 
0.7952  
2002 0.8942  
 
0.9034  0.8893  
 
0.7679  
2003 0.8931  
 
0.9065  0.9097  
 
0.7661  
2004 0.8957  
 
0.9119  0.9099  
 
0.7603  
2005 0.8963  
 
0.8792  0.8989  
 
0.8455  
 
 
Appendices 
Table 1.      
Database Sample Size of Credit Association Merger Study, 1996-2005 
Year Total 
  Pre-merger 
  Acquiring Acquired 
1996 410 
 
8 9 
1997 401 
 
3 5 
1998 395 
 
5 9 
1999 386 
 
7 7 
2000 370 
 
11 16 
2001 343 
 
14 17 
2002 326 
 
14 20 
2003 306 
 
7 7 
2004 298 
 
5 6 
2005 292 
 
3 5 
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Table 4 
               
Multinomial Logit Regressions Results 
          
  Full model   Reduced model 
Variable 
Acquiring 
 
Acquired 
 
Acquiring 
 
Acquired 
Coefficient   Std. error   Coefficient   Std. error   Coefficient   Std. error   Coefficient   Std. error 
CONS. -20.8832  *** 3.9666  
 
3.3187  
 
2.9585  
 
-14.0595  *** 2.4811  
 
5.9807  *** 1.8842  
CE 7.0100  ** 3.1674  
 
2.8163  
 
2.4230  
        
CPR -0.7819  
 
6.0270  
 
-21.2692  *** 4.2955  
 
2.3410  
 
6.1480  
 
-20.0980  *** 4.2057  
LMS -0.0436  
 
0.0454  
 
-0.7764  *** 0.1745  
 
-0.0494  
 
0.0465  
 
-0.7829  *** 0.1738  
LDR 2.7897  ** 1.3494  
 
-0.7058  
 
1.0270  
 
3.2217  ** 1.3258  
 
-0.4102  
 
0.9872  
GAER 3.3379  ** 1.5394  
 
2.4135  * 1.2523  
 
2.2704  
 
1.4644  
 
1.9429  
 
1.1871  
DDID -5.5851  
 
5.6530  
 
-18.9671  *** 6.1745  
 
-7.2935  
 
5.6718  
 
-19.8826  *** 6.1218  
LCM 0.7341  *** 0.1553  
 
-0.8893  *** 0.1702  
 
0.7095  *** 0.1565  
 
-0.8955  *** 0.1692  
DDM -0.3563  
 
0.4179  
 
1.2686  *** 0.2398  
 
-0.3493  
 
0.4160  
 
1.2837  *** 0.2387  
 
Table 5 
            
OLS Regressions 
Results            
Variable 
  
Coefficient   Std. error Coefficient   Std. error Coefficient   Std. error Coefficient   Std. error 
Const. 0.8989  *** 0.0030  0.8974  *** 0.0031  0.5145  *** 0.0176  0.5045  *** 0.0182  
Yeart -0.0533   
0.0510  -0.0518  
 
0.0510  -0.1104  
 
0.1679  -0.1004  
 
0.1680  
Yeart+1 -0.0045   
0.0203  -0.0030  
 
0.0204  -0.0383  
 
0.1405  -0.0283  
 
0.1405  
Yeart+2 -0.0330  *** 0.0096  -0.0315  *** 0.0097  -0.2445  *** 0.0537  -0.2345  *** 0.0539  
Yeart+3    
0.0137  
 
0.0134  
   
0.1008  
 
0.0890  
Yeart+4    
0.0270  ** 0.0107  
   
0.1690  ** 0.0860  
             
Adj. R
2
    0.0280    0.0320    0.0245     0.0316  
        
** Significance level at the 5% level. 
          
*** Significance level at  
the 1% level.           
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ACT OF 2006*  
 
Kosuke Seino and Fumiko Takeda** 
 
Abstract 
 
This article investigates stock market reactions to announcements related to the introduction of the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Law or the so-called Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley Act (J-SOX), which 
was enacted to reinforce corporate accountability and responsibility. We find that the announcements 
leading to the passage of the J-SOX raised stock prices of firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. Another finding is that firms with a high ratio of foreign shareholders or leverage 
experienced more positive stock price reactions. By contrast, whether the firm was audited by Big 4 
audit firms did not seem to matter to investors. In addition, large firms tended to have more negative 
stock price reactions than small firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The high-profile corporate scandals in Japan after the 
fall of 2004 generated discussion on reinforcing 
corporate governance and the accounting profession. 
In order to restore investors‘ confidence and regulate 
internal control over financial reporting, the Japanese 
Diet passed bills in June 2006 called the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL),
60
 or the 
so-called the Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley Act (J-SOX). 
Although the J-SOX has induced significant benefits 
to investors, anecdotal evidence indicates that the 
J-SOX has imposed substantial compliance costs. For 
instance, the Nikkei newspaper reported on August 12, 
2009 that audit fees paid by 297 major Japanese 
companies increased by 32% from the previous year 
in March 2009 as the internal control reporting system 
requirements went into effect in fiscal year 2008. 
Several studies have examined shareholder 
wealth effects of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and determinants of such effects. However, it is still 
controversial whether the U.S. SOX positively 
affected stock markets: Jain and Razaee (2006) and Li 
et al. (2008) found a total positive effect of the U.S. 
SOX on stock prices, while Zhang (2007) reported a 
                                                   
60 To be more precise, the FIEL, or the J-SOX, incorporates 
the Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Law, which 
was approved and enacted at the 164th Diet session on June 
7, 2006 and promulgated on June 14, 2006.  
total negative effect of the U.S. SOX on stock prices. 
The difference in results is partly due to the fact that 
these studies identified different key dates; hence, 
their interpretation differed as to whether the events 
on these dates would have been interpreted by 
shareholders as increasing or decreasing the likelihood 
of passage of the U.S. SOX. 
Studying the Japanese case enables us to avoid 
such an identification problem associated with the 
interpretation of the events. Because the U.S. had 
already enforced the SOX and because Japan was also 
experiencing high-profile corporate scandals after the 
autumn of 2004, there was little uncertainty over 
whether the J-SOX would be introduced. However, 
shortly after the enactment of the J-SOX, the U.S. 
SEC relieved smaller public companies from 
responsibility for compliance to Section 404 of the 
U.S. SOX. In addition, the Japanese Financial Service 
Agency (FSA) attempted to incorporate the criticisms 
of the U.S. SOX concerning the large costs of 
implementation by employing a more concise and 
efficient way of implementing the regulation. Thus, 
key events prior to the enactment of the J-SOX can be 
expected to have had positive effects on the Japanese 
stock market, since presumably the J-SOX would lead 
to an increase of future firm values, while the market 
reaction to events between the enactment (June 2006) 
and the enforcement (September 2007) is an empirical 
question, because these actions may reduce both the 
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benefits from improved financial reporting and the 
costs that arise from preparation for the J-SOX 
compliance. 
The objective of this article is twofold. First, it 
complements existing studies by examining the 
Japanese case. We investigate stock market reactions 
to news leading to the introduction of the J-SOX. In 
contrast to the existing U.S. studies, our sample 
includes not only events leading to the passage of the 
J-SOX but also the events between the enactment and 
the enforcement. The latter events include the U.S. 
regulator‘s attempts to revoke some of the regulations 
set by the U.S. SOX and the Japanese FSA‘s attempts 
to set the guidelines on the implementation standards 
of the J-SOX by taking into account criticism against 
the U.S. SOX for imposing large implementation 
costs.  
Second, we examine whether firm-specific 
attributes (corporate governance, audit functions, and 
financial conditions) are associated with their 
individual market reactions. In particular, it is quite 
valuable to examine how abnormal stock returns are 
associated with the governance structure of firms 
during the period of legal and economic changes.
61
 
Traditionally, Japanese firms depend upon a 
bank-centered governance system, in which main 
banks provide debtor firms with both monitoring and 
certifying services, with a quite limited role of 
independent auditors. However, recent legal and 
economic changes in Japan, including the revision of 
the Commercial Code in 2002 and the enactment of 
the new Company Law of 2005, have enhanced the 
role of auditors. Because Japan was in a transitional 
period, we investigate how shareholder composition 
and audit quality affect stock returns during the events 
leading to the introduction of the J-SOX. 
We find that the announcements that increased 
the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX raised stock 
prices of firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE). Another finding is that firms 
with a high ratio of foreign shareholders or leverage 
experienced more positive stock price reactions, 
perhaps because these firms were more prepared for 
J-SOX compliance. On the other hand, whether the 
firm was audited by a Big 4 audit firm did not seem to 
matter to investors. In addition, large firms tended to 
have more negative stock price reactions than small 
firms, perhaps due to the high costs of preparing for 
the J-SOX compliance. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides a literature review, background, 
and hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4 
describe methodology and data, respectively. A 
discussion of empirical results is provided in Section 4. 
                                                   
61  Numata and Takeda (2008) explain details about the 
changes associated with the main bank system and the role 
of auditors. 
Concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review, background, 
and hypotheses development 
 
2.1 Literature review 
 
Several papers have discussed stock market reactions 
to the U.S. SOX of 2002. Two papers in particular 
reported that the passage of the U.S. SOX had a 
positive effect on stock markets. Jain and Rezaee 
(2006) and Li et al. (2008) found a positive abnormal 
return after legislative events that increased the 
likelihood of the passage of the U.S. SOX. In addition, 
Jain and Rezaee (2006) reported that abnormal returns 
were more positive for firms that were closer to 
compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of the U.S. SOX prior to the bill‘s passage. Li et al. 
(2008) found that the positive return was associated 
with the extent of earnings management. However, 
Zhang (2007), who selected different event dates and 
used non-U.S.-traded foreign firms as a control group, 
showed that stock prices reacted negatively to news 
related to the U.S. SOX.  
These prior studies provide mixed results on 
whether the U.S. SOX increased stock prices. As 
mentioned by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and 
Wintoki (2007), these studies suffered from 
identification problems - i.e., these studies identified 
different key dates and news items; hence their 
interpretation differed as to whether the U.S. SOX was 
likely to pass. The Japanese case provides a favorable 
opportunity to avoid such identification problems. 
Because the U.S. had already enforced the SOX and 
because Japan had also experienced high-profile 
corporate scandals after the fall of 2004, there was 
little doubt about the introduction of the J-SOX. 
However, shortly after the enactment of the J-SOX, 
the U.S. SEC relieved smaller public companies from 
compliance to Section 404 of the U.S. SOX. In 
addition, the Japanese FSA attempted to incorporate 
criticism of the U.S. SOX concerning large costs of 
implementation by employing a more concise and 
efficient way of implementing the regulation. Thus, 
we expect that key events prior to the enactment of the 
J-SOX were likely to have positively affected stock 
prices of listed Japanese companies, assuming that the 
J-SOX was expected to enhance the future firm value. 
By contrast, the effect of the events after the 
enactment is an empirical question, because the 
actions taken by the U.S. SEC and the Japanese FSA 
may reduce both the benefits from improved financial 
reporting and the costs that arise from preparation for 
the J-SOX compliance. The next subsection describes 
the background of the development of the J-SOX in 
more detail. 
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2.2 Japanese context   
 
Similar to the Enron/Andersen scandal in the U.S., 
Japan experienced high-profile corporate scandals 
after the fall of 2004, which generated doubts about 
firms‘ compliance in financial reporting. In particular, 
accounting frauds committed by Seibu Railway Co. 
and Kanebo
62
 led to a discussion of the introduction 
of J-SOX by councils of the FSA. In order to restore 
investors‘ confidence and ensure credible disclosure 
on financial and corporate information, the working 
group of the Financial System Council of the FSA 
proposed a mandatory requirement for listed 
companies. These requirements included managers‘ 
evaluation of the validity of internal control over 
financial reporting, which would be subject to audits 
by certified public accountants or auditing firms, and 
managers‘ submission of ―certification,‖ stating that 
descriptions in financial statements are appropriate 
and in compliance with laws and regulations (FSA, 
2006). Then, the subcommittee of the Financial 
System Council released a report, titled ―Legislation 
for ‗the Investment Services Law (provisional title),‘‖ 
on December 22, 2005. 
Following the debates in councils of the FSA, 
the Japanese Diet approved and enacted the 
Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Law on 
June 7, 2006, and promulgated it on June 14, 
2006. Later, it was incorporated into the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Law, the so-called J-SOX. 
The J-SOX required listed companies to submit to a 
quarterly reporting system, an internal control 
reporting system, and certification by a management 
system, which were enforced on September 30, 2007 
and were applicable from the fiscal year beginning on 
or after April 1, 2008.  
However, around the enactment of the J-SOX, 
the U.S. SEC looked for a way to offer further relief 
from Section 404 compliance for smaller public 
companies and many foreign private issuers to the U.S. 
SOX and published a final rule, titled ―Management's 
Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports,‖ in December 2006, which 
exempted IPO companies from submitting reports for 
the first year.  
Taking into account the criticism of the U.S. 
SOX for imposing huge implementation costs on 
listed companies, the FSA looked for more concise 
and efficient way to implement the J-SOX. There are 
four major differences between the U.S. SOX and the 
J-SOX. First, the J-SOX employs a top-down risk 
approach, which enables firms to focus on major risks 
rather than to evaluate all the detailed check items 
under the baseline approach employed by the U.S. 
SOX. Second, the J-SOX employs only two criteria 
for deficiencies in internal control – material weakness 
and control deficiency - while the U.S. SOX uses 
                                                   
62  Numata and Takeda (2008) analyze the impact of 
Kanebo/ChuoAoyama scandal. 
these two categories plus another, ―significant 
deficiency.‖ Third, the U.S. SOX requires independent 
auditors to directly evaluate and report the internal 
control system of the listed companies. By contrast, 
under the J-SOX, evaluation of the validity of internal 
controls over financial reporting is conducted by 
managers and then checked by independent auditors. 
Fourth, in the U.S., different auditors audit internal 
controls and financial reporting separately, despite the 
fact that these audits overlap in some part. The J-SOX 
allows the same auditor to audit both internal controls 
and financial reporting, cooperating with internal 
auditors, in order to reduce audit fees.  
Incorporating these concise and efficient ways, 
in February 2007, the Business Accounting Council of 
the FSA published a recommendation, titled ―On the 
Setting of the Standards and Practice Standards for 
Management Assessment and Audit concerning 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (Council 
Opinions).‖ This recommendation became a guideline 
for implementing a new system of internal control 
reporting. Although the J-SOX currently requires all 
listed firms to be subject to the standards for 
management assessment and audits concerning 
internal control over financial reporting, an attempt to 
offer relief for small firms may be discussed in the 
future, since the large costs associated with internal 
control reporting deter small firms from their IPOs 
(Osaki, 2008). 
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
In the present study, we first test whether the 
announcements related to the J-SOX affected the stock 
prices of Japanese firms. As shown in Table 1, we 
select 12 events that are expected to have had a 
potentially great impact on Japanese firms.
63
 Events 
G1 to G5 correspond to general news leading to the 
passage of the J-SOX. These events occurred between 
December 2005 and June 2006. Events A1 to A3 
correspond to the U.S. announcements. These events 
occurred between August 2006 and December 2006. 
Events I1 to I4 are announcements regarding 
guidelines for the implementation of the J-SOX. These 
events happened between November 2006 and 
February 2007.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
If investors expected that the introduction of the 
J-SOX would lead to better internal control over 
financial reporting practices, stock prices of Japanese 
firms should have increased in Events G1 to G5. Thus, 
our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: The stock market reacted 
                                                   
63 We do not include September 30, 2007, when the J-SOX 
was enforced. This is because the stock market was 
damaged by subprime loan problems in the world‘s major 
countries. 
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positively to the news, indicating an increase of the 
possibility of enactment of the J-SOX. 
By contrast, the effect of the events between the 
enactment and the enforcement is an empirical 
question, because the measures taken by the U.S. SEC 
and the Japanese FSA were likely to reduce both costs 
and benefits of the compliance of the regulations on 
internal control over financial reporting. Thus, the null 
hypothesis associated with Events A1 to A3 and I1 to 
I4 becomes: 
Hypothesis 2: The stock market did not react to 
the news that the regulations included in the U.S. SOX 
would be loosened for small firms and the news 
concerning guidelines of the implementation of the 
J-SOX.     
Finally, we examine what factors contributed to 
individual stock price fluctuations. In particular, we 
are interested in how firms‘ governance structure is 
associated with stock price reactions. Considering the 
fact that the J-SOX attempts to discipline firms‘ 
internal control and financial reporting practice, we 
expect that firms with better governance are likely to 
experience more positive stock market reactions, 
because such firms would bear low costs of the J-SOX 
compliance. Thus, our final hypothesis becomes: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive market reactions were 
larger for firms that had more effective governance 
structure. 
The next section describes the methodology and 
data used to test the above hypotheses. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Univariate Stock Price Analysis 
 
In order to examine stock price reactions to the 
J-SOX-related news, we employ event study 
methodology. Because the J-SOX is applicable to all 
listed firms in Japan, the entire market is expected to 
have been affected by the announcements related to 
the introduction of the J-SOX. If we employ a simple 
event study methodology in which the abnormal 
returns of individual stocks are aggregated, we would 
face a clustering problem in evaluating the 
market-wide effect. That is, the cross-sectional 
dependence among abnormal returns can generate the 
bias in test results. In order to avoid the bias from the 
test, we employ a portfolio approach using two market 
portfolios – namely, the Tokyo Stock Price Index 
(TOPIX), which is the market capitalization of all 
floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE,
 
and the other market index, which is the equally 
weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on 
the First Section of the TSE. Then, we estimate the 
following model. 
                                                          
(1)
 
where mtR  represents a return of a market 
portfolio, which is the TOPIX or equally weighted 
market index, on day t . jD  is a dummy variable 
equal to one for the three-day event window 
( 2,1,0t ) of Event j  ( 1,2,...,12j  ) and zero 
otherwise. t  represents the zero mean disturbance 
term.  
We use least squares estimation with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance to estimate the model over the 531 trading 
days from January 2005 to February 2007. The 
intercept (  ) represents the average daily stock 
return across the 495 nonevent trading days. The 
coefficient on each event dummy variable ( j ) 
represents an estimate of the average daily abnormal 
return related to the event. We also estimate (1) for our 
three event classifications: (a) general news leading to 
the passage of the J-SOX (Events G1 to G5); (b) U.S. 
news (Events A1 to A3); and (c) announcements 
regarding guidelines for the implementation of the 
J-SOX (Events I1 to I4). 
 
3.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
In order to investigate what factors contribute to 
individual stock price fluctuations, we employ a 
standard event study methodology for the 
cross-sectional analysis to estimate abnormal returns 
( itAR ) for each firm as follows.  
                        
(2) 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i 
during period t and Rmt represents the return of the 
TOPIX. i̂  and i̂  are parameters estimated by 
the standard market model, per MacKinlay (1997), for 
an estimation window from February 10, 2005 to 
December 22, 2005, which corresponds to 200 
transaction days prior to the first event (Event G1). 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is then 
calculated by summing up the ARs over the event 
window ( 2,1,0t ):  
2
0
(0,2)i it
t
CAR AR

 .                            
                         (3) 
We next conduct cross-sectional analysis for the 
four G events, which could have been interpreted as 
increasing the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX, 
in order to investigate what factors affect the mean 
CAR. We estimate the following multivariate 
regression models by using the least squared 
estimation with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 



N
j
tjjmt DR
1

)ˆˆ( mtiiitit RRAR  
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standard errors and covariance. 
 
i
i
uBetaLeverageROAhSalesgrowtAsset
FreeForeignIFRSGAAPBigCAR


1110987
654321 4

         
                                         (4) 
where:  
CAR = mean cumulative abnormal return. 
Big4 = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit 
firm, 0 otherwise. 
GAAP = 1 if the firm is listed on the U.S. market, 0 
otherwise. 
IFRS = 1 if the firm is listed on the European or 
Singaporean market, 0 otherwise. 
Foreign = foreign shareholders‘ share of total 
shareholders (%). 
Free = weight of listed shares available for 
trading in the market (%). 
Asset = logarithm of total assets. 
Salesgrowth = rate of change in sales from the previous 
settlement (%). 
ROA = net profit divided by total assets (%). 
Leverage = liabilities divided by assets (%). 
Beta = stock‘s beta (  ), estimated using a 
standard market model. 
   
To test Hypothesis 3 on the effect of the 
governance structure, we include five variables (Big4, 
GAAP, IFRS, Foreign, and Free). The first Big4 
dummy variable becomes 1 if the firm is audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. We expect positive 
coefficients for this variable, because the Big 4 audit 
firms are supposed to provide better audit quality to 
clients than the non-Big 4 audit firms.  
The following two variables, GAAP and IFRS, 
are dummy variables, which take 1 if the firm is listed 
on the U.S., European, or Singaporean markets and 0 
otherwise. The firms listed there have to prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP 
and/or International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Because the U.S. GAAP and IAS require 
greater disclosure to listed firms than the Japanese 
accounting standards, we expect positive signs for 
these two variables. In other words, firms listed on the 
U.S. are likely to react positively to the news leading 
to the passage of the J-SOX because they are expected 
to be more prepared for the J-SOX compliance. 
The next two variables are included to capture 
the effect of shareholder composition. Foreign is the 
percentage of foreign shareholders among total 
shareholders, and Free is the free float ratio, which is 
the weight of listed stocks available for trading in the 
market. Firms with high ratios of foreign shareholders 
are required to provide disclosure that is more 
demanding than that required by domestic investors 
and thus could have reasonably been expected to be 
more prepared for the J-SOX compared with firms 
that have low foreign shareholders‘ ratio. The effect of 
the free float ratio is ambiguous. If blockholders, 
including main banks, provide better governance than 
other short-sighted investors, CAR should be 
negatively associated with the free float ratio. 
However, if short-sighted investors are more 
concerned about firms‘ performance than blockholders, 
CAR should be positively correlated with the free 
float ratio. Thus, whether there is a positive 
correlation between CAR and the free float ratio is left 
as an empirical question. 
Asset is a logarithm of total assets. We include 
this variable to capture the size effect. We predict that 
Asset is negatively associated with CAR, because 
investors could have reasonably assumed that large 
firms conduct more complex operations than small 
firms and would therefore incur higher costs in 
preparing for J-SOX compliance. Salesgrowth is a rate 
of change in sales, and ROA is the return on asset ratio, 
which is net profit divided by total assets and is used 
for measuring a firm‘s profitability. If investors regard 
firms with higher sales growth or ROA as more 
capable of preparing for the J-SOX compliance, the 
estimated coefficients of these variables should be 
positive.  
Leverage is calculated as liabilities divided by 
assets. The sign of Leverage is an empirical question. 
Firms with a high leverage ratio may lack resources to 
prepare for J-SOX compliance, so that the news on the 
introduction of the J-SOX would affect them more 
negatively. This would result in a negative sign for 
Leverage. However, if main banks provide debtor 
firms with better governance, the news on the 
introduction of the J-SOX is likely to positively affect 
firms with high debt-equity ratio. This would result in 
a positive sign for Leverage. Thus, whether firms with 
high leverage ratio experienced positive or negative 
stock price reactions is tested.  
The last variable, Beta, is stock‘s beta (  ), 
estimated using a standard market model. This 
variable is included to capture the firm‘s sensitivity to 
systematic risk. 
 
3.3 Data 
 
Our sample for univariate analysis consists of 1526 
firms listed on the First Section of the TSE
64
 for 
which stock price data are available throughout both 
event and estimation windows. For cross-sectional 
analysis, we delete firms that lack the financial data 
needed to estimate equation (4). This elimination 
process gives us 1339 firms with available data. We 
note that firms in the financial industry, such as banks 
and security companies, are eliminated in this process. 
                                                   
64 We limit our sample to firms listed on the First Section of 
the TSE, because the stock price data of the other markets 
are less useful due to the fact that stocks on the other 
markets are less actively traded, with many days without any 
deals. 
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We rely on Toyo Keizai’s Kabuka CD-ROM and Toyo 
Keizai’s Kaisha Shikiho (Japan Company Handbook) 
CD-ROM to obtain stock price data and other financial 
variables, respectively. 
 
[Tables 2 & 3 here] 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics 
and correlation matrices for the variables used in our 
cross-sectional analysis. We note that the correlation 
between Foreign and Asset is 0.51%. This indicates 
that large firms tend to have higher ratios of foreign 
shareholders than small firms. By contrast, Free is 
negatively associated with Asset, with correlation 
coefficients of -0.31%. This means that small firms 
tend to have a higher free float ratio than large firms. 
As a result, the correlation between Foreign and Free 
is negative, with correlation coefficients of -0.49%. 
 
4. Discussions  
4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results during 12 event 
windows. Panel A reports results for each event date, 
and Panel B reports results for aggregated events G, A 
and I.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
We first discuss the results presented by Panel A. 
The coefficients on Events G2 and G3 are 
significantly positive at a 1% level for both the TOPIX 
and equally weighted market portfolio results. The 
coefficients on Event G1 are also positive but 
insignificant for both portfolio results. This is 
probably because the possibility of the introduction of 
the J-SOX was not clear at Event G1, when it was 
announced that a discussion of the J-SOX would take 
place. The coefficients on G4 are insignificant for both 
portfolio results. This may indicate that the passage of 
the J-SOX was not big news compared with the 
approval by the Cabinet Office. 
By contrast, the coefficients on Event G5 are 
significantly negative at a 1% level for both portfolio 
results. This is surprising, since Event G5 is when the 
J-SOX was finally approved by the Diet on June 7, 
2006 and thus should have positively affected the 
stock market. We suspect that stock prices are affected 
by other confounding events, because on the same day, 
stock prices declined in all major markets after Ben 
Bernanke, chairman of the U.S. FRB, had warned of 
the risk of inflation on June 5. Thus, we eliminate 
Event G5 from Event G in Panel B and from the 
cross-sectional analysis in the next subsection. As 
shown in Panel B, overall, the coefficient on Event G 
is significantly positive at a 1% level for both portfolio 
results. This indicates that the TSE on average reacted 
positively to the news that led to the introduction of 
the J-SOX. In other words, our results are consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. 
The next events, A1 to A3, are related to the 
news that the U.S. SEC was loosening the regulations 
established by the U.S. SOX. The results are 
ambiguous. Panel A shows that the coefficients on 
Event A1 are significantly negative for both portfolio 
results, while the coefficient on Event A2 is 
significantly positive for the TOPIX but is 
insignificant for the equally weighted market portfolio 
result. The coefficients on Event A3 are insignificant 
for both portfolio results. In addition, Panel B shows 
that the coefficient on Event A is insignificant for both 
portfolio results. These results indicate that the TSE‘s 
reaction to the announcement of the U.S. loosening 
the regulation was not obvious, perhaps because it was 
not clear that the Japanese government would follow 
the U.S. in making relief from the J-SOX compliance.  
Lastly, we discuss stock market reactions to 
Events I1 to I4, the news on the guidelines for 
implementation of the J-SOX. Panel A shows that the 
coefficients on Event I1 are significantly negative at a 
1% level for both portfolio results, while the 
coefficients on Events I2 to I4 are insignificant. In the 
aggregated table, Panel B also shows that the 
coefficients on Event I are insignificant for both 
portfolio results. These results indicate that the effects 
of the announcement of the guidelines of the J-SOX 
were not obvious, perhaps because the guidelines 
would have reduced both the benefits and the costs of 
the J-SOX compliance.  
In summary, our univariate analysis provides 
evidence to support the notion that the events that 
increased the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX 
positively affected the stock market in Japan. This 
result indicates that investors were confident that the 
J-SOX would increase the future value of Japanese 
firms. By contrast, neither the events that loosened the 
regulation set by the U.S. SOX nor the events that set 
the guidelines for the implementation of the J-SOX 
had obvious influence on stock market. The next 
section will examine what factors contributed to the 
stock market reactions for Events G1 to G4 using 
cross-sectional analysis. 
 
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
Table 5 shows the regression results obtained by 
employing mean CARs for a three-day event window 
(0,2) as dependent variables. The F-statistics of all 
regressions are statistically significant at a 1% level, 
with explanatory power ranging from 0.8% to 6.1%.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
We first discuss the effect of a Big4 dummy 
variable on the CARs. All coefficients are 
insignificant for Events G1 to G4. This means that 
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whether firms were audited by a Big 4 audit firm or 
not did not affect the extent of stock price increases 
caused by the J-SOX-related news. In other words, 
Japanese investors appeared to regard Big 4 auditors 
and non-Big 4 auditors as providers of similar-quality 
auditing with regard to internal controls over financial 
reporting, which were new to all audit firms in Japan. 
The coefficients on GAAP and IFRS provide 
inconclusive results. For GAAP, the coefficient is 
significantly positive for Event G3 and insignificant 
for the other three events. For IFRS, the coefficient is 
significantly negative for Event G2 and insignificant 
for the other three events. It should be noted that our 
sample contains only 26 firms listed on the U.S. 
markets and 33 firms listed on the European or 
Singaporean markets. Reliance on such a small 
number of firms may lead to ambiguous results in the 
present study. 
With regard to the foreign shareholder 
composition, the coefficients of Foreign are 
significantly positive for two regressions and 
insignificant for two regressions. This result weakly 
supports our prediction that firms with a higher ratio 
of foreign shareholders would experience more 
positive stock market reactions to the J-SOX-related 
news. In fact, the presence of foreign shareholders in 
the Japanese stock market has increased dramatically 
in the past 10 years (Takahashi and Oyama, 2000; 
Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). According to the TSE, 
the ratio of foreign shareholders in the five Japanese 
stock exchanges increased from less than 10% in 1995 
to 28% in 2006. Foreign investors are likely to 
demand greater transparency in financial reporting 
practices and auditing independence. Thus, our results 
indicate that foreign shareholders were interpreted by 
the market as tending to contribute to better 
governance by demanding greater transparency and 
that stock prices of firms with a high ratio of foreign 
shareholders increased more than firms with a low 
ratio of foreign shareholders. 
By contrast, the coefficients on Free are 
significantly negative for two regressions and 
insignificant for two regressions. This result weakly 
indicates that firms with higher free float ratios 
experienced more negative stock market reactions to 
the J-SOX-related news, perhaps because 
short-sighted investors did not seem to contribute to 
the preparation for the J-SOX compliance.  
We next discuss the size effect. The coefficients 
of Asset are significantly negative for all regressions. 
This result indicates that investors assumed that large 
firms had more complex operations and thus would 
suffer from larger auditing costs by the introduction of 
the J-SOX. Accordingly, stock prices of large firms 
experienced less positive market reactions than small 
firms. Our results are in contrast to previous studies 
that reported a negative relationship between stock 
returns and firm size, as the U.S. SOX imposed larger 
costs for small firms than for large firms 
(Chhaochharia and Gristein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007). 
However, the following news may support our results. 
For instance, the Nikkei newspaper reported on 
August 12, 2009 that audit fees paid by 297 major 
Japanese companies increased by 32% from the 
previous year in March 2009, while audit fees 
increased by 44.5% for SONY, 43.6% for Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial Group, 40.1% for Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, 36.2% for Mitsui and Co., and so on. 
Thus, the size effect of the SOX may depend on the 
country in question. 
We next discuss the effect of financial variables 
and beta. The effects of Salesgrowth and ROA are 
minimal, with insignificant coefficients for all 
regressions. With regard to the effect of Leverage, 
three regressions (Events G2 to G4) provide 
significantly positive coefficients, while one 
regression (Event G1) gives insignificant coefficient. 
This result indicates that investors regarded firms with 
a high leverage ratio as better prepared for the 
introduction of the J-SOX, perhaps because of the 
monitoring of the main banks. The effect of Beta is 
minimal, as the coefficient on Beta is significantly 
negative for Event G1 but insignificant for Events G2 
to G4. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In the present study, we investigated stock market 
reactions to news related to the introduction of the 
Japanese version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2006, 
using event study methodology. We found that the 
announcements that would have been interpreted as 
increasing the likelihood of the introduction of the 
J-SOX increased stock prices of firms listed on the 
First Section of the TSE. Another finding is that firms 
with a high ratio of foreign shareholders or leverage 
experienced more positive stock price reactions, 
perhaps because these firms were more prepared for 
J-SOX compliance, with a better governance structure. 
By contrast, whether the firm was audited by Big 4 
audit firms did not seem to matter to investors. In 
addition, large firms tended to have more negative 
stock price reactions than small firms, perhaps due to 
the high costs of J-SOX compliance. 
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Appendices  
Table 1. Events 
 
Event Date News Announced 
G1 26/12/05
 
Subcommittee of Financial System Council of the Financial Service Agency (FSA) 
released a report titled ―Legislation for ‗the Investment Services Law (provisional 
title)‘‖ on Dec. 22, 2005. 
G2 24/01/06 The FSA announced the inclusion of new restrictions on limited partners for 
investment into the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL). 
G3 10/03/06 The FIEL was approved by the Cabinet Office. 
G4 17/05/06 The FIEL was approved by the House of Representatives. 
G5 07/06/06 The FIEL was passed by the House of Councillors and enacted. 
A1 24/08/06 The U.S. SEC announced its intention to offer further relief from Section 404 
compliance for smaller public companies and many foreign private issuers to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
A2 14/12/06 The U.S. SEC voted to propose interpretive guidance for management to improve 
Sarbanes-Oxley 404 implementation on Dec. 13, 2006. 
A3 20/12/06 The U.S. SEC published a final rule titled ―Management's Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports.‖ 
I1 07/11/06 The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council of the FSA 
discussed a draft of the internal control rule on Nov. 6, 2006.  
I2 21/11/06 The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council released an 
exposure draft on the implementation standards of the FIEL on Nov. 20, 2006. 
I3 01/02/07 The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council approved 
of the guidelines on the implementation standards of the FIEL on Jan. 31, 2007. 
I4 16/02/07 The Business Accounting Council published a recommendation titled ''On the 
Setting of the Standards and Practice Standards for Management Assessment and 
Audit concerning Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (Council Opinions)‖ 
on Feb. 15, 2007. 
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G1 G2 G3 G4 Big4 GAAP IFRS Foreign Free Asset Salesgrowth ROA Leverage Beta
G1 1.000
G2 0.129 1.000
G3 0.110 0.110 1.000
G4 0.041 0.109 0.015 1.000
Big4 0.023 -0.028 0.019 -0.027 1.000
GAAP -0.020 -0.075 -0.014 -0.033 0.045 1.000
IFRS -0.010 -0.126 -0.051 -0.023 0.068 0.431 1.000
Foreign -0.020 -0.064 -0.019 -0.025 0.087 0.232 0.177 1.000
Free -0.060 0.094 -0.047 0.065 -0.129 -0.087 -0.039 -0.492 1.000
Asset -0.081 -0.203 -0.103 -0.075 0.125 0.294 0.282 0.513 -0.309 1.000
Salesgrowth -0.000 0.049 0.043 0.022 0.057 -0.006 -0.010 0.119 -0.113 0.058 1.000
ROA 0.010 -0.026 -0.038 -0.041 0.089 0.069 0.000 0.255 -0.285 0.053 0.199 1.000
Leverage -0.083 0.037 0.023 0.039 0.021 -0.004 0.004 -0.195 0.247 0.271 -0.002 -0.282 1.000
Beta -0.122 -0.011 -0.037 0.026 0.003 0.023 -0.008 0.099 0.039 0.214 0.109 0.138 0.328 1.000
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
G1 G2 G3 G4 Big4 GAAP IFRS Foreign Free Asset Salesgrowth ROA Leverage Beta
 Mean 0.37 1.14 0.78 0.71 0.85 0.02 0.02 14.50 18.87 11.73 7.35 2.96 52.67 0.86
 Median -0.13 0.64 0.51 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.00 11.70 16.80 11.50 5.03 2.82 54.05 0.83
 Maximum 27.56 27.53 16.73 13.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 73.60 63.30 17.17 205.28 55.78 98.78 5.81
 Minimum -12.61 -26.52 -12.16 -18.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 7.07 -65.38 -45.54 6.38 -0.06
 Std. Dev. 3.45 3.74 2.76 3.41 0.36 0.14 0.16 11.76 11.14 1.40 15.18 5.06 19.74 0.33
 Skewness 1.72 0.94 0.73 0.32 -1.93 6.97 6.13 1.22 0.70 0.73 3.92 -0.26 -0.12 2.81
 Kurtosis 11.57 9.67 5.52 6.38 4.71 49.52 38.60 4.81 2.93 3.57 37.90 30.18 2.23 38.49
 Observations 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339 1,339  
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
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Table 4. Results from least squares regression with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & 
covariance on dummy variables for event dates leading to the implementation of the J-SOX 
Panel A: Results from least squares regression on dummy variables for each event date 
Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 0.093 (2.03) ** 0.086 (1.87) *
Event G1 : Dec. 26, 2005 0.235 (0.56) 0.342 (0.89)
Event G2 : Jan. 24, 2006 1.058 (3.26) *** 1.334 (4.81) ***
Event G3 : Mar. 10, 2006 1.324 (2.95) *** 1.554 (3.69) ***
Event G4 : May 17, 2006 -0.218 -(0.38) 0.034 (0.08)
Event G5 : Jun. 7, 2006 -2.504 -(6.22) *** -2.774 -(4.38) ***
Event A1 : Aug. 24, 2006 -0.912 -(3.46) *** -0.892 -(2.55) **
Event A2 : Dec. 14, 2006 0.436 (3.77) *** 0.091 (1.21)
Event A3 : Dec. 20, 2006 0.447 (1.37) 0.133 (0.33)
Event I1 : Nov. 7-9, 2006 -0.692 -(3.80) *** -0.972 -(4.12) ***
Event I2 : Nov. 21, 2006 0.000 (0.00) 0.204 (0.31)
Event I3 : Feb. 1, 2007 -0.198 -(0.33) -0.009 -(0.02)
Event I4 : Feb. 16, 2007 0.020 (0.18) 0.091 (0.57)
Observations 531 531
Adjusted R
2 4.02% 5.60%
S.E. of regression 0.995 0.999
DW stat 1.983 1.837
F-stat 2.849 *** 3.620 **:
Notes: 1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
          2. TOPIX is the market capitalization of all floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE.
          3. Market is the equally-weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on the First Section of the TSE.
(t-stat)
TOPIX Market
(t-stat)
 
 
Panel B: Results from least squares regression on dummy variables for aggregated event dates 
Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 0.093 (2.05) ** 0.086 (1.89) *
Event G (Events G1 to G4) 0.600 (2.07) ** 0.816 (3.06) ***
Event A (Events A1 to A3) -0.010 -(0.04) -0.223 -(0.92)
Event I (Events I1 to I4) -0.285 -(1.37) -0.286 -(1.18)
Event G5 -2.504 -(6.27) *** -2.774 -(4.41) ***
Observations 531 531
Adjusted R
2 3.70% 5.11%
S.E. of regression 0.997 1.001
DW stat 1.961 1.818
F-stat 6.092 *** 8.135 ***
Notes: 1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
          2. TOPIX is the market capitalization of all floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE.
          3. Market is the equally-weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on the First Section of the TSE.
(t-stat)(t-stat)
TOPIX Market
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Table 5. Cross-sectional analyses 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 3.976 (3.85) *** 7.627 (7.44) *** 4.865 (5.64) *** 2.889 (3.12) ***
Big4 0.219 (0.78) 0.003 (0.01) 0.183 (0.86) -0.128 -(0.50)
GAAP -0.087 -(0.12) 0.367 (0.61) 0.747 (1.75) * -0.282 -(0.53)
IFRS 0.260 (0.47) -1.842 -(3.46) *** -0.504 -(1.54) 0.113 (0.26)
Foreign -0.005 -(0.45) 0.041 (3.52) *** 0.012 (1.16) 0.021 (2.11) **
Free -0.025 -(2.19) ** 0.015 (1.31) -0.027 -(3.38) *** 0.013 (1.31)
Asset -0.194 -(2.11) ** -0.729 -(7.20) *** -0.379 -(4.63) *** -0.284 -(3.31) ***
Salesgrowth 0.001 (0.17) 0.014 (1.44) 0.009 (1.52) 0.007 (0.98)
ROA 0.001 (0.05) -0.004 -(0.09) -0.028 -(1.27) -0.022 -(0.77)
Leverage -0.002 -(0.34) 0.024 (4.13) *** 0.015 (3.26) *** 0.010 (1.69) *
Beta -0.995 -(3.65) *** -0.173 -(0.18) -0.256 -(0.61) 0.254 (0.45)
Observations 1,339 0.068 0.033 0.015
Adjusted R
2 1.76% 6.09% 2.57% 0.77%
S.E. of regression 3.416 3.623 2.724 3.400
DW stat 1.895 1.921 1.850 1.956
F-stat 3.391 *** 9.673 *** 4.531 *** 2.034 ***
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Event G1
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Event G3 Event G4Event G2
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HAS THE THREAT OF A TAKEOVER IMPROVED THE MANAGEMENT 
OF TARGET FIRMS? 
AN ANALYSIS OF FIRMS IN WHICH M&A CONSULTING, JAPAN’S 
FIRST HOSTILE BIDDER, ACQUIRED STAKES  
 
Timothy A. Kruse*, Kazunori Suzuki** 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the new development of hostile takeovers and shareholder activism in Japan.  
The hostile bidders claim that the threat of takeover which they pose on the management of a poorly 
managed company is not only to their benefit, but also to that of the target company in general, 
because the management will run the company better to maximize its value. Nearly a decade having 
passed since the first-ever hostile TOB attempt in Japan by M&A Consulting (MAC), an investment 
fund led by Mr. Yoshihiro Murakami in January 2000, we examine the stock price and operating 
performance of the companies whose shares were bought by the MAC. We find that the shareholders of 
the target companies indeed enjoyed large positive abnormal returns in the two years following the 
news. We report, however, that their operating performance declined over the four fiscal years 
following such news. There is little evidence so far that the threat of a hostile takeover improved the 
actual operating performance of the target firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In January 2000, the investment fund M&A 
Consulting (MAC hereafter) run by Mr. Yoshihiro 
Murakami, a former METI (Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry) bureaucrat, launched the first-ever 
hostile tender offer bid (TOB) in Japan for Shoei Inc. 
Although unsuccessful, the TOB attempt alerted 
Japanese managers of a new era of corporate 
governance. In particular, poor performance of a 
public company might result in the ousting of its 
incumbent management through a hostile takeover. 
The MAC-Shoei case was the first of many 
hostile TOB and shareholder activism events at listed 
companies. These events have sparked a heated 
argument regarding the virtue of the threat of hostile 
takeovers and shareholder activism. Some observers 
claim the threat of a hostile takeover is an important 
aspect of corporate governance. They believe that 
when the incumbent management of a listed company 
cannot manage the company well, potentially more 
adept new management will replace it through a 
hostile takeover. Also, the threat of a hostile takeover 
will exert pressure upon the existing management to 
perform better. For example, the increase in the payout 
to fend off potential bidders might also bring a 
positive effect on the management of the company, 
since a payout increase results in the reduction of 
agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986).  
Others believe the pressure from the threat of 
hostile takeovers might force the management to 
become short-sighted, sacrificing long-term growth to 
maximize the short-term performance.  Besides, once 
the battle over the corporate control has started, there 
is a concern that management may concentrate too 
much on defensive strategy and will not be able to 
make decisions on the day-to-day operations of the 
company.  Japanese managers are generally very 
skeptical about the effectiveness of a hostile takeover 
in Japan.
65
 
Naturally, hostile bidders have stressed the virtue 
                                                   
65  For example, refer to the discussion by the CEO of 
Canon Inc., Mr. Fujio Mitarai during the Nikkei Corporate 
Governance Symposium, which appears in July 22, 2005 
edition of Nikkei Newspaper. 
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of the threat of a hostile takeover, claiming that it is 
not only to the benefit of the bidder and other 
shareholders, but also to the target company in general 
because it will precipitate improvements in the overall 
management and governance of the target firm. Mr. 
Murakami of MAC was the first Japanese investor 
who repeatedly claimed such benefit.
66
 Currently, a 
similar battle is being waged regarding hedge fund 
activism in the United States. 
The effectiveness of the threat from an activist is 
particularly relevant in Japan as many companies 
identified as potential hostile targets hold a large 
amount of cash beyond their need for the future 
investment. In fact, HSBC Securities reports that as of 
2000, there were 21 companies whose market 
capitalization was less than the net cash on their 
balance sheets.
67
 Moreover, as of March 2004, more 
than 40% of Japan‘s 3000 listed companies had a 
market capitalization less than the book value of their 
equity.
68
 
Traditionally sheltered from the threat of a 
hostile bid through inter-corporate shareholdings, 
management of Japanese listed companies are 
generally unprepared about protecting its corporate 
control rights. As companies sell their 
cross-shareholdings, many are now vulnerable to other, 
more-active, shareholders who are taking their place 
(see Kuroki, 2003, for a description of the unwinding 
of the cross-shareholdings). As of March 2008, foreign 
investors owned about 25% of all Japanese shares, an 
increase from 9.8% of 10 years ago.
69
 The recent 
hostile attempts prompted management to implement 
defenses. With a support from the economic ministry 
(METI), the use of a poison pill has been legalized in 
Japan.
70
 
In addition to implementing legal defenses 
against potential hostile bids, some companies adopt 
corporate financial policy to deter hostile takeovers.  
The most common measure has been to increase the 
payout (either dividends or share repurchases) to 
existing shareholders hoping to raise share prices and 
discourage potential bidders.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine 
the consequences of the threat of a potential hostile 
takeover. We attempt answer the following questions. 
How active are funds such as MAC? Do shareholders 
respond positively to the announcement of a MAC 
purchase of an ownership position (indicating the 
                                                   
66  For example, refer to an article on January 25, 2000 
edition of Nikkei Newspaper. 
67 As reported in the Financial Times, January 24, 2000, 
page 27. 
68 Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004, page A1 using data 
from PacificData. 
69 As reported by the Stock Ownership Distribution Report 
by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
70 The Japanese Commercial Law has a principle that all 
shareholders must be treated equally.  Therefore, the issue 
of warrants or convertibles that exclude a hostile bidder 
(which is also a target‘s shareholder) was considered to go 
against the principle, if not illegal. 
market believes the acquisition will bring about 
performance improvements)? Do MAC targets exhibit 
improvements in either share price or operating 
performance? By answering these questions, we hope 
to investigate the relative strength of the acquirers‘ 
arguments. 
We examine a sample of firms which had public 
announcements of significant positions by MAC 
during 2000 to 2002. Although MAC launched only 
one hostile TOB, the companies whose shares were 
purchased by MAC after the failed TOB against Shoei 
regarded themselves as a potential target of a hostile 
TOB. Some of these companies increased payout to 
prevent a launch of a hostile takeover, others fought 
with the MAC over the management policy through a 
proxy contest. In any case, all companies felt the 
pressure from the shareholding of the MAC.  
Murakami was welcomed by Japanese investors as a 
corporate reformer providing discipline and changes 
to the management of companies with prolonged poor 
performance. At its peak in March 2006, MAC 
maintained more than 400 billion yen (4 billion US 
dollars) of assets under its management. 
We examine the abnormal equity returns earned 
by the target companies surrounding the appearance of 
MAC as a major shareholder. We also examine 
changes in operating performance following MAC‘s 
acquisition. A typical long-term study based on 
operating performance requires 4 to 5 years of 
accounting data after the event occurred. Since MAC 
sold its stakes by the end of 2006, it is reasonable to 
assume that its influence also disappeared by fiscal 
year 2007. Between the first wave of MAC‘s share 
purchases that occurred between 2000 and 2002, and 
its closure at the end of 2006, we can find the 4 year 
post-event window of accounting data availability.
71
 
We find that shares of companies whose shares 
had been purchased by the MAC performed 
significantly better than the market. We report, 
however, that the operating performance of the targets 
following the event is worse than that of their industry 
peers. Our results show that although the threat of a 
potential hostile takeover benefited the hostile bidder 
and the shareholders of the targets, we have no 
evidence of the improvement in operating 
performance of the target companies. Although we do 
not have sufficient sample size to claim our results are 
definitive, our research poses some skepticism over 
the benefit of the emergence of hostile bidders as 
―corporate reformers.‖ 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 
provides additional background on hostile takeovers 
and shareholder activism. In Section 3, we briefly 
describe the case of the first hostile TOB against Shoei 
Company in the year 2000 by MAC. In Section 4, we 
explain the objective of our research, sample firms, 
                                                   
71 The next wave of hostile TOBs and the emergence of 
activist funds occurred after 2003, so that we do not yet have 
sufficient sample size or data points to analyze the operating 
performance of targets of other activist funds than MAC. 
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and research methodology and describe our sample.  
In Section 5, we report the results of our event studies 
on abnormal share returns and abnormal operating 
performance. Section 6 summarizes our findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 
Hostile raiders, or activist funds, are ―vultures and 
hyenas‖ according to Masao Yamaguchi, the executive 
director of Teikoku Hormone Manufacturing 
Company.
72
 Mr. Yamaguchi made this comment after 
the Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund, a U.S. based 
investment partnership purchased a stake of just over 
5% in his company. Steel Partners had just made the 
news by launching a double hostile TOB against Sotoh 
Company and Yushiro Chemical Industries. Mr. 
Yamaguchi added ―When we operate the company, we 
are not only looking at stockholders, we look at 
employees and creditors and everybody.‖ 
Historically, these attitudes have ensured that 
hostile takeovers would rarely be attempted in Japan 
(see Kester, 1991 for example).  However, economic 
conditions in the 1990s and the ongoing deregulation 
of Japanese financial markets, particularly in the form 
of dismantling of inter-corporate shareholdings paved 
a way for a possible hostile takeover bid for publicly 
traded Japanese companies.   
Soon after the TOB for Shoei, there were three 
additional attempts of hostile TOBs targeting four 
public companies.
73
 While none were successful, the 
whole TOB process was dramatically portrayed in the 
media. For example, one Japanese news magazine ran 
the headline, ―U.S. Fund On Wild Rampage.‖
74
 In 
addition, the fight over control of Nippon 
Broadcasting Inc. between Fuji Television Network 
and Live Door Inc. may be classified as another 
hostile takeover attempt against a listed Japanese 
company. However, in this case Live Door used a 
regulatory loophole and avoided the TOB procedures. 
More recent examples abound between 2006 and 
2007. 
Many companies have taken steps to protect 
themselves from this new threat. First, with the 
blessing of METI, many firms have adopted poison 
pills. Also, firms are changing their financial policy to 
make themselves less attractive to would be raiders. In 
particular, they are using some of their cash reserves 
to increase payouts in the form of dividends and/or 
share repurchases. This strategy has the added benefit 
of potentially increasing share prices. 
In theory, raising the payout in itself does not 
                                                   
72 Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004, page A1. 
73  Early examples of hostile TOB‘s other than the one 
against Shoei are; (1) against Sotoh Company and Yushiro 
Chemical Industries by Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund 
in December 2003, and (2) against Japan Engineering 
Consultants by Yumeshin Holdings Co., Ltd. in July 2005.   
74 As reported by the Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004, 
page A1. 
necessarily increase shareholders‘ wealth. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect capital 
market, dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders 
because an increase in dividend will be met with an 
offsetting change (fall) of share prices. A share 
repurchase does not change the wealth of remaining 
shareholders as long as the repurchase is made at the 
ongoing market price. Obviously, the payout policy is 
not irrelevant because there is no ―perfect capital 
market‖ in a real world. The tax effect and the 
signaling effect under asymmetric information are 
examples of factors that ensure that payout policy is 
relevant to existing shareholders. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is an 
ongoing debate regarding the value of outsider 
pressure on companies in the form of hostile takeover 
attempts and shareholder activism. Proponents argue 
the pressure is forcing management to do a better job 
of managing their companies. Also, companies are 
returning more cash to their shareholders. However, 
others claim the raiders and activists have a short term 
focus and do not have the necessary experience to 
manage the target firms. In the end, they argue the 
targets are worse off. 
Recently, hedge funds have become very active 
in the United States. Studies of this activism find 
significant abnormal returns of roughly 5 to 11% in 
the period surrounding the 13D filings, indicating the 
acquisition of a 5% ownership stake. (see Brav, Jiang, 
Thomas, and Partnoy, 2008, Clifford, 2008, 
Greenwood and Schor, 2009, and Klein and Zur, 
2009). However, is less clear that the activism always 
enhances value. Specifically, the returns are greatest 
when the desired outcome is the sale of the target 
company and are not always significant given other 
activism goals. Greenwood and Schor (2009) focus on 
the impact of the sale of the target firms on 
performance. They report the abnormal returns in both 
the short and long terms are significant only if the 
target firm is put into play and ultimately acquired.  
A primary goal of our study is to investigate 
whether a active raider will be able to bring about 
performance improvements at Japanese targets. 
 
3. Information about MAC and Shoei 
Company 
 
On January 24, 2000, M&A Consulting, (MAC), a 
private investment fund led by a former MITI 
bureaucrat, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, launched the 
first-ever hostile tender offer bid (TOB) in Japan 
against Shoei Company, a firm then listed on the 
second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).  
Shoei was founded in 1931 as a silk manufacturer with 
the help of Yasuda Bank. Yasuda subsequently 
changed its name to Fuji Bank and then merged with 
other two major banks to create the Mizuho Financial 
Group. As Japan‘s economy grew, silk manufacturing 
became unprofitable and Shoei evolved into a real 
estate company.  Its primary source of revenue is real 
estate based rental income, which accounts for about 
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two-thirds of total revenue. Also, the company 
manufactures electronic and construction parts.   
Shoei belongs to the Fuyo Group, one of the six 
bank-centered keiretsu groups, and its CEO at the time 
was a former Fuji Bank employee, Mr. Tanehiko 
Kamiura. Its largest shareholders at the time of the 
TOB included member companies of Fuyo Group, 
namely Canon Inc. (with a 19.5% stake), Yasuda Fire 
& Marine Insurance (10%), Yasuda Life Insurance 
(6%), Fuji Bank (5%) and Yasuda Trust Bank (5%), 
which in total accounted for 45.5% of outstanding 
shares. Mr. Murakami apparently came to know Shoei 
through his contact with Canon, Shoei‘s largest 
shareholder. In 1999, Mr. Murakami unsuccessfully 
tried to buy Canon‘s Shoei position; after collecting 
about 2 percent of Shoei‘s shares, he reportedly had a 
meeting with a board member of Canon in November 
1999 suggesting a possible hostile TOB. 
Mr. Murakami‘s TOB was for one hundred 
percent of Shoei‘s shares at the price of ¥1,000.  The 
closing share price of Shoei on the previous trading 
day was ¥800, indicating an offered 25% premium.  
The deadline of the TOB was set to be February 14.  
On January 25, the day after TOB announcement, 
Shoei‘s board members issued a recommendation to 
the shareholders that they were against the bid, 
claiming that they would increase shareholders‘ value 
more than Mr. Murakami would. The TOB received 
huge media coverage in Japan, because it was the 
first-ever hostile bid in the sense that the board 
member of a target firm officially declared that they 
were against it. Major shareholders including Canon 
and other members of Fuyo Group quickly announced 
that they were reluctant to accept the deal because the 
bidding price was too low. In fact, because Shoei‘s 
large real estate holdings were valued far more than 
their book value, the company‘s liquidation value 
would have been at least ¥2,000 per share. 
Shoei‘s share price soared to ¥1,280 immediately 
after the announcement (see Exhibit 1) and the highest 
closing price during the offer period was ¥1,302 on 
January 27. The market had anticipated an increase of 
the bid price, which never materialized. The offer 
expired on February 14 and Mr. Murakami could buy 
only 6.52% of Shoei‘s total shares. After the failure of 
the hostile bid, Mr. Murakami continued to own the 
shares that he bought through the TOB and requested 
that the management of Shoei take measures to 
increase its value.  Shoei‘s share price stayed around 
¥1,000 throughout the remainder of 2000 (see Exhibit 
2). 
On February 22, 2001, Shoei announced that it 
would increase its dividend for the fiscal year ending 
December 2000 to ¥14 per share, an increase of ¥6 
over the previous year.  In March 2001, Mr. Kenji 
Watanabe, another former Fuji Bank employee, 
replaced Mr. Kamiura as a CEO. Unlike Mr. Kamiura, 
who was reluctant to talk with Mr. Murakami, Mr. 
Watanabe started to implement drastic changes that 
reflected his orientation toward shareholders. Mr. 
Watanabe quickly introduced an employee stock 
option program and appointed external board 
members. In July and August 2002, Shoei repurchased 
its shares in an effort to increase its payout to equity 
holders. Mr. Murakami sold his shares to Shoei in 
response to the repurchase offer. Shoei sold the shares 
they repurchased through a secondary equity offering 
in March 2003, which led to the increased number of 
shareholders and consequently paved the way for a 
listing on the first section of the TSE. 
As for Shoei‘s share price, it increased to around 
¥1,400 after Mr. Watanabe‘s succession in 2001. It 
further increased to about ¥1,600 following the 
announcement of the listing on the TSE first section in 
2003 (see Exhibit 2). In contrast to the rapid rise in 
share price, Shoei‘s operating performance improved 
rather slowly. Table 1 shows Shoei‘s sales, operating 
profit and operating profit margin (over sales) between 
1995 and 2006. Because it manufactures electronic 
parts, its sales were affected by the silicon cycle, but 
even on the operating profit margin basis, the real 
improvement in performance was not realized until 
2004, by which time MAC had already unwound its 
investment in Shoei. 
In the years after its Shoei acquisition, MAC 
acquired significant stakes in an additional 27 
companies, reaching the peak of its power in early 
2006. Then in 2006, MAC experienced a rather abrupt 
downturn and subsequent dissolution. In June 2006, 
Murakami was arrested, allegedly having been 
involved in insider trading of Nippon Broadcasting 
System, one of MAC‘s portfolio companies. While the 
case is still being fought in the higher court, MAC 
dissolved itself shortly after Murakami‘s arrest and has 
sold off all of its stakes by the end of 2006. 
 
4. Shareholder Gains and Operating 
Performance 
 
4.1. Research Objectives 
 
Following MACs failed hostile TOB for Shoei in early 
2000, many Japanese managers became concerned 
about the potential threat of a hostile takeover.  In 
fact, MAC invested in many listed companies other 
than Shoei following the failed TOB attempt.  
Japan‘s Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) stipulates 
that if a person or a firm owns more than 5 percent of 
the outstanding shares of a listed company for the first 
time, he (or it) must report a change in his ownership 
to the Ministry of Finance and the stock exchange 
within 5 calendar days, or at the end of every quarter 
in the case of a financial company or an investment 
fund. Subsequently, increases by more than or equal to 
1 percent of the company's outstanding stocks, must 
be reported as well (Article 27-25 of the Securities and 
Exchange Law).  These reports are called ―A Report 
of Large Shareholdings,‖ or Kabushiki Tairyo Hoyuu 
Hokokusho. Upon submission of a Report, it 
immediately becomes available to the public on the 
Internet through the TD (Timely Disclosure) Net 
system run by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Thanks to 
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the TD Net, the name of companies whose shares are 
owned by the hostile bidder became public knowledge 
to the market. We also search the database to identify 
the date that such report of shareholdings about a 
certain firm was submitted. 
We are interested in how the threat of a hostile 
takeover affects share prices and operating 
performance of the potential targets. We hypothesize 
the share prices of the target firms will increase at the 
disclosure of the shareholding information of the 
hostile bidders. It is well documented in the U.S. that 
the share price of a target of a takeover goes up by 
more than 40 percent on average (see Bruner, 2002, 
for a survey of the takeover literature). Although MAC 
has not launched any TOBs since its first attempt 
against Shoei, the mere threat raised by their 
acquisition of a stake might be sufficient to provide 
abnormal returns to potential targets.  Furthermore, 
the target management sometimes increased the 
payout to shareholders, either by increases in dividend 
and/or share repurchases, which may be met with the 
positive share price reaction. We conduct a simple 
event study to examine the abnormal returns to the 
targets‘ shares generated by the announcement of a 
stock acquired by MAC. 
The second subject of interest, which, we believe, 
is more important, is whether the potential threat of a 
hostile takeover of these companies resulted in an 
improvement of their operating performance.  If the 
market is efficient, a rise in share price should be 
followed by the actual performance improvements by 
the targets.  If this is indeed the case, it will support 
the hostile bidders‘ argument that the threat of a 
hostile takeover serves as a governance mechanism 
prompting the target companies to be operated more 
efficiently.  Otherwise, we can infer that the threat 
benefits the targets‘ shareholders in the short run, but 
does not necessarily lead to the increase in the 
companies‘ operating cash flow in the long run, and 
that the market was too optimistic about the future 
operating performance improvement of target 
companies. This outcome is consistent with the 
common argument that shareholder activists are not 
always experts at managing their target firms. 
 
4.2. Data and Methodology 
 
We collect data on the MAC‘s targets from TD Net 
Database, the Nikkei Telecom Database and the 
Nikkei NEEDS Database to examine abnormal returns 
from the potential target companies. As we explained 
before, we searched TD Net to identify the name of 
the companies whose shares were purchased by MAC, 
and the date on which Report of Major Shareholdings 
was submitted to the stock exchange by MAC.  In 
some cases, newspaper articles report lists of 
companies purchased by the MAC prior to the 
submission of Report.  We collect such articles from 
Nikkei Telecom Database, which permits searches of 
articles appearing in four newspapers published by 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 
Our event date is the earliest of the following 
three dates; (1) the date on which a Report of Large 
Shareholdings was submitted, (2) the date on which an 
article appeared in one of the Nikkei newspapers, or 
(3) the annual yuuka-shoken hokokusho was submitted 
to the relevant stock exchange. The above search 
identified 27 companies, including Shoei, whose 
shares were purchased by the MAC between 2000 and 
2004. Since we analyze the long-term operating 
performance of target companies, we have limited our 
sample to non-financial firms and the events to those 
occurred between 2000 and 2002 to make four-year 
post-event accounting data available before the 
dissolution of MAC in late 2006. Our final sample 
consists of 21 observations. 
We calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
around the event date (e.g., the report submission date).  
Our benchmarks are the TOPIX Index, a value 
weighted index of all stocks listed on the First Section 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and returns on a control 
firm that we identify below.  We subtract the return 
on the TOPIX Index and the control firm from our 
sample‘s buy-and-hold returns. Since the TOPIX 
Index does not take dividends into account, we report 
abnormal returns calculated excluding dividends. We 
note this will bias away from finding abnormal returns 
as many of the sample firms increased their payouts 
following MACs acquisition of shares. 
We have assigned a control firm (benchmark) to 
assess the relative operating performance of our 
sample firms. Following by Barber and Lyon (1996), 
control firms operate in the same industry as that of 
our sample firms and exhibit similar operating 
performance (return on asset) in the pre-event year 
(year −1).  We use ROA (operating profit over the 
book value of the total asset) as our performance 
measure. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
We describe the characteristics of our sample in this 
subsection.  Table 2 presents the summary of our 
sample firms. The 21 firms have an average market 
capitalization of 31,505 million yen (the median is 
21,696 million yen), which is a little larger than the 
average market capitalization of the Second Section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. MAC held an average 
stake of 5.86% of the sample firms. The average cash 
holding balance relative to the book-value of total 
assets in the year before the event was 15.1 percent, 
but varied from a minimum of 2.2 percent to a 
maximum of 89.1 percent. The average of the same 
ratio of cash holding balance for all firms on the First 
Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is about 13 
percent in the Year 2000. 
Table 3 shows the composition of the sample by 
industry. Trading, service, and engineering companies 
together account for more than half of our sample. 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009 
 
 
142 
 
 
5. Results of Event Studies 
 
5.1. Share Price Performance 
 
Table 4 reports the announcement effects of MAC‘s 
purchase of shares in terms of the buy-and-old 
abnormal returns (BHAR) over those of the TOPIX 
Index and of a control firm. 
Our results show that the average abnormal 
returns around the announcement date (days 0 to +2) 
is positive but not statistically significant. The 
long-term BHAR against TOPIX is significantly 
positive before the event (days −120 to −1), 
suggesting some run-up before the event.  Because a 
looser disclosure rule is imposed on an investment 
fund like MAC to submit Report of Large 
Shareholdings only on quarterly basis, and because 
some of the event dates arise from the appearance of 
an article in the newspaper or when an annual 10K 
report was submitted, the market might have already 
known about the purchase of the MAC by the event 
date. The significant positive pre-event returns might 
well indicate the leak of information. 
In terms of the post-event BHARs, we find that 
the target firms of the MAC significantly 
out-performed TOPIX Index over one year (~+250 
days) and two years (~+500 days) after the news of 
the purchase by 15 to 20 percent. However the 
BHARs are not significant in any of the periods when 
we use a control firm as the benchmark.  The latter 
results may be because of the spillover effect from the 
information that MAC targeted our sample firms.  
Our control firms share the industry and the 
characteristics of our sample firms, so they could have 
been regarded as a potential target for the future 
hostile activity, resulting in their share prices to be bid 
up in line with those of our sample firms. Admitting 
the weak robustness of our results as above, we report 
that MAC generally earned higher returns than the 
market in general. 
 
5.2. Operating Performance 
 
We show the operating ROA of our sample firms in 
Table 5. Panel A reports both the average adjusted and 
control firm adjusted ROA across all sample firms 
around our event year. Note that in year –1, the control 
firm adjusted returns are closest to zero due to our 
method of choosing control firms. 
The unadjusted and control firm adjusted returns 
declined during the 10 years around the event.  The 
unadjusted ROAs barely change in the years following 
the event, while the control firm adjusted ROAs are 
significantly negative in years +2 to +4, suggesting 
that ROAs of control firms have improved after the 
event. 
Panel B examines the changes of ROA of each 
sample between Year –5 and +4 and Year –3 and +3.  
The decline of both adjusted and unadjusted ROA is 
significantly negative cross-sectionally between Year 
–5 and Year +4. Overall our results suggest that MAC 
was unable to bring about improvements in operating 
performance at its target firms. If anything, 
performance deteriorated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We examine the share price and operating 
performance of companies whose shares were 
purchased by MAC following MACs hostile TOB of 
Shoei in January 2000. We find that the shares of our 
sample firms show significant abnormal returns over 
two years after the purchase became publicly known.  
On the other hand, we have shown that the raw ROA 
and control firm adjusted ROA declined following the 
MAC‘s purchase. The average control firm adjusted 
ROA becomes significantly negative after 2 years and 
on following the event. 
Our sample size is limited, but at least we have 
shown that the first hostile TOB attempt followed by 
the threat of hostility by the first-ever activist fund in 
Japan has resulted in decent investment returns for the 
fund, but not in the improvement of the target‘s 
operating performance. Managers of the target 
companies frequently complain that outside activists 
do not have the necessary expertise to understand the 
business of the target. Moreover, many managers will 
see the effort as a threat to their jobs or autonomy. As 
a result, it is likely that the target management will 
resist making the changes proposed by the activists at 
all costs, devoting his time to defending his position 
rather than to managing his company‘s operations.  
Anecdotal evidence supporting this claim is 
provided by the case ofTokyo Style Co., one of our 
sample firms. Tokyo Style‘s management fought back 
most fiercely against Murakami involving several 
lawsuits.  The adjusted and the unadjusted ROA of the 
company at year +4 are −5.7 percent and 0.8 percent, 
respectively, which are below the mean and the median 
of our sample.  More recent attempts by other activist 
funds in Japan, such as Steel Partners Japan Strategic 
Fund (SPJSF) that adopted similar activist strategies as 
MAC since 2003, will provide an opportunity to 
examine the robustness of our results within a few 
years.  In the meantime, our preliminary investigation 
of other activist funds implies that a similar result may 
emerge. 
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Exhibit 1. Shoei‘s Share Price around the Hostile TOB 
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Exhibit 2. Shoei‘s Share Price over Longer Period 
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Table 1. Sales, Operating Profit, and Operating Profit Margin of Shoei 
Sales and operating profit are reported in millions of yen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Sample Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sample by Industry 
 
Industries
Textile 2
Pharmaceuticals 1
Non-Iron Material 2
Transportation Machinery 1
Other Manufacturing 1
Engineering 4
Trading (Wholesale) 5
Retailing 1
Service 4
TOTAL 21  
 
Table 4. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Stock Returns (Excluding Dividends) 
 
The table reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the TOPIX Index over the pre-and post-event 
period. ―*‖ and ―**‖ denote the significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Days (Event 
Date=0) 
Raw BH Return 
Adjusted BH Return 
Against TOPIX Against Control Firm 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
-120～-1 7.38% 10.13% 18.80% ** 24.53% ** -10.38% 17.98% 
0～+2 3.76% -0.30% 4.09% -0.12% 3.98% 0.00% 
0～+60 1.04% 0.00% 3.33% -2.19% -1.94% -8.44% 
0～+120 -3.07% -2.46% 5.69% 0.82% -4.44% -5.70% 
0～+250 -3.47% -1.73% 14.40% ** 15.85% * 0.96% 11.16% 
0～+500 10.09% 9.83% 24.14% ** 15.89% * -16.89% -4.45% 
-120～+500 15.82% 10.79% * 41.55% ** 33.47% ** -23.65% 10.64% 
 
FY SALES OP. PROFIT
OP. PROF.
/SALES
1995/12 10,104 1,046 10.4%
1996/12 8,072 671 8.3%
1997/12 8,812 850 9.6%
1998/12 7,280 1,029 14.1%
1999/12 5,880 801 13.6%
2000/12 7,475 953 12.7%
2001/12 4,908 585 11.9%
2002/12 7,702 820 10.6%
2003/12 8,100 898 11.1%
2004/12 9,101 2,014 22.1%
2005/12 13,707 2,813 20.5%
2006/12 16,904 6,044 35.8%
Event Year
# of
Firms
Avg. Mkt Cap.
(in Million Yen)
Avg. % of Hldg.
by MAC
Avg. % of Cash
to Total Assets
2000 5 17,213 6.44% 4.73%
2001 15 37,693 5.94% 17.76%
2002 1 10,150 1.73% 27.57%
TOTAL 21 31,505 5.86% 15.12%
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Table 5. Absolute and Relative Operating Performance of Sample Firms 
 
Median pre- and post-merger unadjusted and control firm adjusted operating returns for 21 firms.  ROAs are the 
operating profit divided by the book value of assets for the previous year.  Control firm is chosen to be the one in 
the same industry as that of the sample firm, and must be the closest in ROA in the year –1. ―*‖ indicates 
significance at the 5 percent significance level.
 
 
 Sample firms Control firm adjusted 
 mean median mean median 
Panel A – ROA for year relative to event: 
 –5 6.25% 3.49% 2.21% -0.37% 
 –4 6.15 3.15 1.65 -0.17 
 –3 4.43 2.94 0.42 0.46 
 –2 1.84 2.64
 
-0.53 0.27 
 –1 1.15 2.14 -0.17 -0.01 
 0 1.32 1.31 -1.35 -0.76 
 +1 2.34 1.45 -1.15 -0.22 
 +2 1.79 1.79 -2.55* -1.99* 
 +3 2.30 1.57 -2.48* -1.31* 
 +4 1.98 1.82 -4.03* -1.45* 
 
Panel B – Change in ROA between: 
 -5 to +4 -4.27* -2.67* -6.36* -3.19* 
 -3 to +3 -1.21 -0.70 -2.77 -2.16 
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1. Introduction 
 
Company law in the European Union is rapidly 
changing. Recent years have seen company law 
reform in large Member States such as the United 
Kingdom,
75
 Germany
76
 and France.
77
 In the Nordic 
region, the Companies Acts of Finland
78
 and 
Sweden
79
 were extensively reformed in 2006 and now 
it is the turn of Denmark. This paper will present the 
background to the proposed reform of Danish 
company law and provide an overview. 
 
2. Background to the reform 
 
The present Danish legislation on limited liability 
companies is contained in two separate acts, one on 
                                                   
75 For an insider‘s view of the 2006 reform, see P. Bovey, A 
Damn Close Run Thing – The Companies Act 2006 
(Legislative Comment), Stat. L. R. 2008, 29(1), 11 – 25. 
76 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur 
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen;the law entered into force on 
1 November 2008. See M. Beurskens & U. Noack, The 
Reform of German Private Limited Company: Is the GmbH 
Ready for the 21st Century?, 9 German Law J. No 9, Special 
Edition (available on-line on www.germanlawjournal.com). 
77 Loi de modernisation de l’economie; the law entered into 
force on 6 August 2008. For a comment on the reform in 
German, see C. Klein, Frankreichs kleine und mittlere 
Unternehmen sollen gestärkt werden, RIW 11/2008 770 - 
773. 
78 Act (624/2006) on companies; the law entered into force 
on 1 September 2006. 
79 Act (2005:551) on companies; the law entered into force 
on 1 January 2006. For an insider‘s view, see R. Skog, The 
New Swedish Companies Act, Die Aktiengesellschaft 7/2006 
238 - 242. 
public limited companies (aktieselskab, A/S) and one 
on private limited companies (anpartsselskab, ApS). 
The distinction was introduced into Danish law in 
connection with the accession to the then European 
Economic Community in 1973. Until then, Danish 
company law only had one form of limited liability 
company, the A/S. Denmark introduced the ApS to 
emulate the distinction found in German law between 
the public company (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) and the 
private company (Gesellschaft mit Beschränkter 
Haftung, GmbH), each regulated by a separate act. 
This distinction was deemed necessary as the 2
nd
 
Company Law Directive on capital
80
 that reflects the 
German doctrine on the protection of capital in a 
limited company to protect its creditors (kapitalschutz) 
applies only to public limited companies.  
The A/S Act of 1973 has been amended several 
times, the last major reform being Act No 1060/1992. 
In 1996, the ApS Act, which also dated from 1973, 
was reduced considerable in an attempt to avoid 
unnecessary legislation. However, following the 1996 
reform the users of the ApS Act had to look to the A/S 
Act for guidance in the absence of specific provisions 
in the ApS Act, and although some of the more 
important parts have since been reintroduced into the 
                                                   
80 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 
1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection 
of the interests of members and others, are required by 
Member States of companies within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of 
the formation of public limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent. Later amended by 
Directive 92/101/EEC and, more substantially, by Directive 
2006/68/EC. 
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ApS Act, it is still insufficient on its own. 
In October 2006, the Minister of Economic and 
Business Affairs appointed a committee to advice on 
the modernisation of Danish company law. The 
mandate of the committee was to provide a flexible 
legislation allowing for new technology and to avoid 
over-implementation of EU law unless it was 
considered necessary for the protection of important 
vested interests. The Committee was quite large, 
consisting of 27 members including representatives of 
all major interests in Danish business life and the 
relevant public authorities. Its secretariat was vested 
with the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency 
that is the principal public authority in respect of 
company law. Although the Committee also comprised 
three university professors it was not intended to be 
engaged in an academic enterprise exploring various 
possibilities within company law but to produce a 
draft bill that would likely pass the legislative 
procedure. The Committee fulfilled these expectations 
and published a 1270 pages long Green Paper in 
November 2008 including a draft bill with 
comments.
81
 After a brief public hearing, a proper bill 
was put before Parliament in March 2009,
 82
 where it 
had its first hearing out of three on April 14 and is 
expected to be passed within the end of the current 
session in June. 
This lack of a greater academic discourse and the 
speed by which it was presented to Parliament has 
been the subject of some criticism especially among 
company law scholars excluded from the process. It is 
true that more academic scrutiny may have enhanced 
the product. On the other hand it is noteworthy that the 
Committee availed itself of the extensive literature 
from the other recent European reforms and as such 
was in no need of inspiration and the considerable 
width of the represented interests ensured that the 
necessary political compromises that inevitably trump 
academic propositions were reached during the 
Committee‘s tenure enabling a result that perhaps is 
more viable than a drawn out procedure would have 
produced. 
 
3. The overall structure of the Act 
 
The bill before Parliament closely resembles the draft 
presented by the Committee and as such reference is 
made both in commentary part of the bill itself and in 
this paper to the comments made by the Committee in 
its Green Paper to the various provisions. 
The experience of the 1996 reform of the ApS 
Act had convinced the Committee that it was 
necessary either to expand that Act considerably, to 
avoid the need for references to the A/S Act, or to 
combine the two acts.
83
 Since a combined act for both 
public and private limited liability companies is 
                                                   
81  Cf. Green Paper (Betænkning) No. 1498/2008 on 
Modernising Company Law. 
82 Bill No. L 170 (Parliamentary session 2008/09). 
83 The 1996 reform is discussed in paragraph 2 above. 
well-known in several Member States, e.g. the United 
Kingdom and in the Nordic region, Finland and 
Sweden, and taking into consideration that the 
difference between public and private limited 
companies is diminishing,
84
 the new act will cover 
both company forms. In this way certain provisions 
that would only be binding on public companies will 
either be a default solution for private companies, 
allowing the shareholders to decide otherwise, or an 
inspiration for them to follow the same procedure as a 
public company would be obliged to do. In this way, 
guidance is offered for private companies without 
compromising their greater freedom to choose 
differently. 
 
4. Corporate governance 
 
To a considerable degree the Nordic countries share a 
common understanding of company law, notably in 
respect of corporate governance.
85
 All five Nordic 
countries, comprising the three EU Member States of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and the EEA Member 
States of Iceland and Norway, still share the same 
corporate governance model known as the dual 
executive system originally introduced into Danish 
law in 1930. 
 This could be viewed as a hybrid between the 
one-tier system known in the United Kingdom  with 
its board of directors and the two-tier system known in 
Germany with its distinction between a supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) and a management board 
(Vorstand). In the Nordic system the general meeting 
of shareholders appoints a board of directors 
(bestyrelse), which hires a board of managers 
(direktion).
86
  Collectively, these two executive 
organs are referred to as the management and share 
responsibility for their governance of the company. 
This may appear to be a two-tier system, but it is more 
closely related to the one-tier system. First of all, the 
board of directors is the superior executive organ and 
although it is also vested with the obligation of 
supervising the board of managers, it is itself engaged 
in management in a way that is irreconcilable with the 
role of a German supervisory board and more 
resembles the distribution of responsibilities between 
executive directors and outside directors in the English 
one-tier system. Second and equally like the English 
system, it allows for double mandates, i.e. a person 
can serve as a director and as a manager at the same 
                                                   
84 The distinction between public and private companies is 
inapt as a public company does not have to be public, have 
more shareholders, or in any other way be larger than a 
private company. A more relevant distinction seems to be 
between a publicly traded company, i.e. listed companies, 
and other limited companies. 
85 See in general J. Lau Hansen, Nordic Company Law, 
DJØF Publishing (Copenhagen, 2003), Chapter III. 
86 One small difference is that in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden the board of managers usually comprises only the 
CEO, whereas in Denmark and Iceland it is a collective 
organ that can comprise more than one manager. 
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time comparable to the English notion of an executive 
director. Third, the system is strictly hierarchical with 
the shareholders in general meeting as the supreme 
decision makers and is as such more vested with the 
shareholder value approach than the stakeholder 
approach normally associated with the two-tier system. 
In fact, due to the widespread occurrence of dominant 
shareholdings even in publicly traded companies, the 
hierarchical nature of the Nordic system is more 
pronounced than in most other shareholder value 
jurisdictions, e.g. the UK and the US, which tend to be 
more a managerial controlled system than a 
shareholder controlled system. 
As the international debate has so far proven 
unable to point to one system as being superior to the 
others, the Committee concluded that it was better to 
offer a freedom of choice to the shareholders of each 
company between the one-tier and the two-tier model 
as a supplement to the existing Nordic version of the 
one-tier model, which would leave the ultimate choice 
of governance model to the shareholders. Although the 
new act will offer a choice between one-tier and 
two-tier models, both models are curtailed by certain 
requirements mandated by law to provide good 
corporate governance. A manager may simultaneously 
serve as a director, but the majority of the board of 
directors may not consist of managers, nor can a 
manager chair the board of directors.
87
 Thus, the 
powerful position of an American CEO chairing the 
board of directors or a French PDG is not available. 
Section 111 of the new act offers a choice 
between the one-tier model and the two-tier model. 
The two-tier system is a novelty in Danish company 
law and consists of a supervisory board appointed by 
the shareholders in general meeting and a management 
board hired by the supervisory board. A manager 
cannot be member of the supervisory board but has the 
right to participate in its meetings unless the 
supervisory board decides otherwise ad hoc.
88
 The 
management board is the only executive organ and the 
supervisory board lacks executive powers. 
Whereas the two-tier system closely resembles 
its German origin, it becomes clear upon closer 
inspection that the one-tier model is divided into three 
different versions, which are already part of existing 
Danish company law but have been spelled out more 
clearly in Section 111:  
(i) A solitary board of managers, however, this is 
only available for private companies.
89
 
                                                   
87  National corporate governance codes applying the 
comply-or-explain principle may further strengthen this 
division between directors and managers. The Danish code 
recommends that managers do not serve as directors in 
publicly traded companies. However, even if the CEO is not 
a director, he or she may attend the meetings of the Board of 
Directors unless the Board decides otherwise ad hoc.  
88  This is to overcome the problem of communication 
between management and supervisors that appears to inflict 
the German system. 
89 The new Finnish Companies Act of 2006 (footnote 4 
above) provides this choice for public limited companies as 
(ii) A board of directors and a board of managers, 
where all the managers are hired among the 
directors. This resembles the one-tier system 
known in English law. Although technically it 
does comprise two independent boards with 
different powers and corresponding obligations 
the dual capacity of the directors cum managers 
veils the distinction. 
(iii) A board of directors and a board of managers, 
where some or all of the managers are hired 
from outside the board of directors. This is the 
present Nordic model and is expected to 
continue as the preferred model of choice. 
To emphasise the position of the shareholders as 
the supreme decision-makers, at least the majority of 
the board of directors or the supervisory board must be 
appointed by the general meeting and may be 
dismissed by it at will.
90
 Besides reducing the 
incentive for Danish nationals to avail themselves of 
the freedom to choose another company law regime 
than Danish law when forming a limited company 
afforded by the case law of the EC Court of Justice, 
the freedom to choose between different corporate 
governance systems is believed to offer an incentive 
for foreign companies to establish a subsidiary in 
Denmark as they will be able to chose a corporate 
governance model familiar to them. 
To strengthen this incentive and to induce more 
foreign direct investment by individual investors as 
well as active participation in the management of 
Danish companies, the company will be able to decide 
in its Articles of Association that the company 
language shall be English or Scandinavian, in which 
case all members of the board including employee 
representatives would be obliged to speak the 
preferred language.
91
 Even without an express 
provision in the Articles, the company can submit 
public documents, e.g. its annual accounts, to the 
Danish Commerce and Companies Agency in English 
or Scandinavian, thus avoiding the expense of 
translation. Any language can be used at the general 
meeting of shareholders as long as simultaneous 
translation into Danish is provided, and if a simple 
majority of shareholders so decide, the meeting can be 
held in English or Scandinavian without translation. 
As Danish company law has made on-line 
participation by shareholders in the general meeting 
legal since 2003, this possibility of conducting the 
                                                                             
well. 
90  Employees may have a right to appoint directors, 
however such directors must form a minority of no more 
than 1/3 of the board. On co-determination, see paragraph 5 
below. Although rare in practice, the Articles of Association 
may provide for the right of others, e.g. the original founder 
of the company, to appoint directors. Nonetheless, the 
majority of directors must be appointed by the shareholders 
in a general meeting which will appoint the whole board if 
nobody else has a right to appoint. 
91 The three Scandinavian languages of Danish, Norwegian 
and Swedish are closely related but different. A speaker may 
decide which Scandinavian language to speak. 
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general meeting in English and relying on documents 
and accounts in English would benefit foreign 
investors that could actively participate via electronic 
means without being physically present. 
 
5. Co-determination 
 
As the law stands, if a Danish company has employed 
on average 35 or more persons within the last three 
years, the employees or their unions may call for a 
referendum of the employees as to whether they 
should elect representatives to sit on the board of 
directors. If a majority is in favour, the employees 
have a right to appoint at least two directors to the 
board of directors or a higher number equal to half of 
the rest of the board, i.e. one third of the total number 
of directors. Employee representatives on the board 
will thus always constitute a minority. A director 
appointed by the employees is on par with all other 
directors on the board in respect of rights, obligations 
and payment, and an employee director may be 
disqualified ad hoc, as in the case of any other director, 
if that director has a substantial conflict of interest 
with regard to a particular matter so that the matter 
must be decided in his absence. 
This system, which is viewed as favourable by 
both employer and labour organisations, is continued. 
However, some procedural requirements will be 
relaxed in the new act, making it easier to decide on 
employee representation and if the employees cannot 
provide the number of candidates to fill the seats 
available to them, they may settle for a lower number. 
The present system only applies to employees in 
Denmark, but under the new act the general meeting 
of shareholders may decide to expand the system to 
cover all its employees globally. If the company has 
employees in Denmark, however, they are entitled to 
at least one seat, and two seats if they form more than 
10 per cent of the work force. 
 
6. Minority protection 
 
Danish company law already provides considerable 
protection of minority shareholders and this regime is 
continued in the new act. Each shareholder has a right 
to suggest issues for the agenda of the general meeting, 
may participate in the general meeting personally or 
by an attorney, may vote by proxy, may speak at the 
general meeting and put questions to the management 
in respect of any item on the agenda or in the annual 
accounts. Shareholders holding more than 5 per cent 
of the capital may call for an extraordinary general 
meeting to be convened.
92
 Shareholders holding more 
than 10 per cent may require the appointment of an 
additional auditor by the Commerce and Companies 
Agency, and shareholders may by simple majority 
decide an examination of the company‘s accounts, and 
if the request is supported by shareholders holding 
                                                   
92 The present threshold is 10 per cent. A company‘s own 
shares are not counted when calculating these figures. 
more than 25 per cent an examination may be ordered 
by the courts. Specific provisions, known as general 
clauses because in essence they codify broad 
principles, prohibit the majority of a general meeting 
from making decisions that may unjustly benefit 
certain shareholders or others to the detriment of the 
company or other shareholders, and equally they 
prohibit directors and managers from a similar abuse 
of their powers. 
 
7. Capital 
 
It is apparent from its Green Paper, that the Committee 
was in favour of affording wide discretion on the 
company and its shareholders qua investors in 
deciding how to organise the capital structure of the 
company unless the protection of creditors warrants 
otherwise. This, the Committee believed, was 
supported by experience and also in line with the 
development in other Member States and visible in the 
relaxation of the 2
nd
 Company Law Directive by the 
reform in 2006.
93
 Consequently, the Committee‘s 
proposal provided a very flexible regulation of capital. 
However, due to criticism in the media which argued 
that it would be irresponsible to abandon the stricter 
regime of the existing legislation, the bill presented 
before Parliament was less liberal in a few areas. 
The present legal minimum of DKK 500,000 
(EUR 67,120) for public companies in share capital 
will be maintained, although it is considerably above 
the EUR 25,000 required by the 2
nd
 Company Law. 
The bill would reduce the legal minimum for a private 
company from DKK 125,000 (EUR 16,780) to DKK 
50,000 (EUR 6,712).
94
 Upon subscription, the 
shareholders must pay in at least DKK 50,000 but 
only 25 per cent of any additional capital.
95
 
Outstanding capital can be called in with 2 – 4 weeks 
notice from the management and shareholders who 
fail to pay loose their voting rights on all shares in the 
company including fully paid in shares. A shareholder 
may at any time volunteer to pay in the outstanding 
amount and may opt to do so in case of a transfer of 
shares as the obligation to pay rest on both the seller 
and any prospective buyers of the shares. 
The requirement for a minimum share capital in 
private companies and a minimum ratio of paid in 
capital are the two only major areas where the bill 
departs from the draft proposed by the Committee. 
The Committee had suggested that the legal minimum 
for a private company should be abandoned and that 
the minimum ratio of paid in capital should set in only 
                                                   
93 See footnote 6 above. 
94  The requirement for a legal minimum share capital 
follows from Article 6 of the 2nd Company Law Directive, 
but only applies to public limited companies. However, 
Danish law has applied a similar requirement to private 
companies. 
95  This requirement follows from Article 9 of the 2nd 
Company Law Directive. Again, it only applies to public 
companies, but would in the new act apply to private 
companies as well. 
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above the minimum threshold applicable to public 
companies of DKK 500,000, which would effectively 
have made it possible for a private company to have a 
guaranteed capital if it was kept below DKK 500,000. 
The reasoning was that the minimum share capital was 
so small that it was of no use as a protection of the 
creditors while proving an obstacle to new small 
entrepreneurs trying to set up a company. Furthermore, 
the Committee found it sufficient that both directors 
and managers are personally liable for maintaining at 
all times a sufficient level of capital for the company 
to meet its obligations and pointed to the similar trend 
in Germany and France and the new proposal for a 
European Private Limited Company.
96
 However, this 
point was seized upon by the media which found it to 
be too risky in light of the present economic crisis. 
That a relaxation of an unnecessary capital 
requirement may actually help business in times of 
crisis as was the reasoning behind the German and 
French reforms was mostly ignored. By reducing the 
minimum share capital the bill has minimised the 
nuisance for small entrepreneurs. However, at the first 
hearing before Parliament, a majority appeared to be 
against lowering the minimum share capital for private 
companies and favoured maintaining it at DKK 
125,000. It is yet uncertain whether the bill will be 
amended in this respect. If it is, it will greatly enhance 
the attractiveness of foreign private companies with no 
or less onerous requirements for share capital that the 
Committee tried to counter. The new act would 
introduces non-par value (npv) shares, which are 
already known in Finland and Sweden, as a 
supplement to traditional shares with a nominal value 
and a company may choose freely between the two 
forms of shares. In respect of voting rights attached to 
shares and other arrangements pertaining to control of 
the company, the Committee took note of the ISS 
report of 2007 which was unable to conclude that 
control-enhancing mechanisms would reduce the 
profitability of a company.
97
 In the absence of clear 
empirical evidence that certain control arrangements 
may damage a company, the Committee decided to 
leave this for the existing and future shareholders to 
decide freely. The present restriction on voting 
differentiation, that differences in voting rights of 
shares representing the same capital may not exceed 1 
– 10, will be abolished in the new act, leaving it to the 
company and the investors to decide. 
As the law stands today private companies may 
issue voteless shares, which was possible also in 
public companies until the A/S-act of 1973. However, 
in the new act both public and private companies may 
issue such shares and there is no requirement that they 
should yield a minimum dividend or otherwise enjoy a 
                                                   
96 See the Commission‘s Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on the Statute of a European Private company, COM(2008) 
396. 
97  ISS, Sherman & Sterling, ECGI, Report on the 
Proportionality Principle in the European Union, 18 May 
2007. 
preferential standing as the discount expected at 
subscription and in later transactions compared to 
similar shares with voting rights is considered amble 
protection of the shareholders who prefer to acquire 
these shares. 
 
8. Protection of capital 
 
In the opinion of the Committee, the most important 
safeguard for the creditors of a limited liability 
company is the obligation of the directors and 
managers to ensure that the company is adequately 
funded at all times and the personal liability which 
that obligation entails on each member of the 
management. Consequently, the Committee proposed 
to introduce into Danish law some of the relaxations 
of the formal requirements for the protection of capital 
that have been allowed at EU level by the reform of 
the 2
nd
 Company Law Directive in 2006.
98
 
According to the new act, public and private 
companies will be allowed to acquire their own shares 
and the present 10 per cent threshold is abandoned. 
The most important safeguard is the requirement that 
only free reserves may be used to acquire the shares. 
Since these reserves may be paid out by the company 
as dividends, it is obvious that creditors are not put at 
any additional risk by abandoning the 10 per cent 
threshold. By the same reasoning, the provision of 
financial assistance for the acquisition of shares in the 
company, which is presently absolutely prohibited, 
will be allowed but only by payment from the free 
reserves available for dividends. As additional 
safeguards, a decision to provide assistance must be 
put before the general meeting of shareholders, the 
management must explain why the decision is deemed 
to be in the interest of the company and the company‘s 
shares must be acquired at market price. In the first 
hearing before Parliament, a majority also favoured 
that a declaration should be issued by the company‘s 
auditor. In the Committee, a minority presenting 
auditors had made such a suggestion, but a sizeable 
majority had declined, fearing that it would entail 
further costs to the company and in stead making it 
optional for the company. After the publication of the 
Green Paper, the auditors lobbied considerably for this 
proposition in the media, apparently with success. 
In Danish law, the ban on providing financial 
assistance is accompanied by a ban on lending to 
shareholders. In contrast to the ban on financial 
assistance, the ban on lending has no basis in the 2
nd
 
Company Law Directive and was introduced into 
Danish law as a response to earlier cases of abuse. 
Similar prohibitions are found in the laws of other 
Nordic countries, but the ban in Danish law is the 
most wide-ranging of these. Inspired by the reform of 
the ban on financial assistance, the new act will permit 
lending to shareholders under conditions similar to 
those for offering financial assistance and with the 
further requirement that the financial status of the 
                                                   
98 See footnote 6 above. 
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shareholder should be assessed. Again, a majority in 
Parliament may be in favour of mandating a 
declaration issued by the auditor of the company. 
 
9. Publicity 
 
The new act will introduce a public register of 
shareholders with holdings above 5 per cent to be 
maintained by the Danish Companies and Commerce 
Agency and accessible on-line at all hours without 
charge. For publicly traded companies disclosure of 
major shareholdings is mandated by EU law,
99
 but 
publication will apply to all companies, including 
private companies, as it will be helpful for society in 
general to know of major shareholdings even in small 
and non-public companies, and it may also benefit 
public prosecutors when investigating economic 
crimes, e.g. money laundering.  
 
10. Transfer of seat 
 
Cross-border mergers and divisions are already 
provided for in Danish law, but the new act will 
further make it possible for a company to move its 
registered seat in or out of Denmark, if that is 
acceptable to the other Member State affected by the 
move.
100
 The registered seat of a company provides 
its link to the Member State and thereby determines 
the applicable company law.
101
 A company moving its 
registered seat out of Denmark will cease to be 
Danish.
102
 Conversely, a company moving its 
registered seat into Denmark will become a Danish 
public company (A/S) or private company (ApS) and 
may have to increase its share capital and otherwise 
conform to Danish company law. The move itself will 
not affect the company and it will remain the same 
legal person after the move as before. Certain 
safeguards are provided for to secure employee 
                                                   
99 On the obligation to disclose major holdings in publicly 
traded companies, see Article 9 of Directive 2004/109/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending 
Directive 2001/34/EC. 
100  On cross-border mergers, see the judgment of 13 
December 2005 by the EC Court of Justice in Case C-411/03, 
SEVIC Systems, [2005] ECR I-10805. 
101 Cf. Judgement of 28 January 1986 by the EC Court of 
Justice in Case 270/83, Commission v France, [1986] ECR 
273 at Para. 18. 
102 It should be noted that Denmark does not apply the 
Sitztheorie previously applied in German law prior to the 
judgement of 5 November 2002 by the EC Court of Justice 
in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] ECR I-9919, and 
as such a company may freely move its administrative seat 
or main business out of Denmark without loosing its Danish 
nationality. However, the registered seat may not be moved, 
which was upheld by the EC Court of Justice in its 
judgement of 16 December 2008 in Case C-210/06, 
Cartesio. 
representation and minority shareholders that have 
opposed the transfer may call for their shares to be 
redeemed, which are provisions already known from 
the regulation of cross-border mergers and divisions. 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
The Committee‘s proposal for a new companies act 
was an attempt to introduce a whole new legislation, 
completely rearranging the existing legislation, 
combining two different acts into one, abolishing well 
known caveats once thought necessary and 
introducing a flexibility viewed by some as daring. 
The purpose was to provide a companies act that 
would bring Danish law at least on par with the best of 
other Member States in the European Union. 
Although the new act envisaged by the bill now 
before Parliament may appear unfamiliar when 
compared to the existing legislation, it may be argued 
that it is more a collection of what has already been 
done in Denmark or elsewhere. Indeed, if the new act 
is passed as is expected, not a single Danish company 
will have to change its statutes as the bulk of changes 
consist of options not presently available. It may even 
be argued that it does not provide true innovation as it 
might have done had it been submitted to a more 
prolonged and academic procedure with open hearings 
and public debates in lieu of the horse-trading done by 
the Committee‘s members. That, however, may turn 
out to be its major strength. By accepting almost all of 
Committee‘s proposals in its bill, the Government 
appears to have judged it has sufficient backing 
among the leading actors of the Danish business 
environment that formed the Committee to make it a 
viable reform. The anxiety displayed by the legislators 
at the first hearing of the bill in Parliament may result 
in an abandonment of the proposed relaxation of the 
capital requirements applicable to private companies. 
If that happens, the new act will probably fail to 
prevent the increased use of foreign private companies 
with more lenient capital requirements that the 
Committee sought to achieve. Despite this failure, 
which appears to be more a failure of nerve than a 
long term policy choice, the new act will provide a 
flexibility that brings it on line with the most modern 
companies acts in most other respects. 
Since nothing human is ever perfect, and since 
the upheaval of reform is in itself a major obstacle to 
success, perhaps this carefully negotiated reform will 
succeed in providing a companies act at the forefront 
of company law in the European Union as envisioned. 
New amendments will probably be necessary within a 
few years, e.g. in respect of the minimum share capital 
requirement for private companies or in respect of 
new financial instruments that have survived the 
present crisis and proved their value. The new act then 
will not be a monolith to be left untouched for 
generations to come, but a sound foundation for 
keeping up with the rest. 
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